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Abstract
This thesis is developed in the framework of the PhD school in complexity science at
the University of Urbino. As a consequence of the interdisciplinary nature of such PhD
program, the present work deals with different research areas: it includes economic
modeling and physical system control design through reinforcement learning techniques.
In the first Chapter a nonlinear discrete-time dynamic system proposed in economic
literature, as a market share attraction model, is studied. A rich scenario of local and
global bifurcations is obtained even with just two competing firms and the effects of
heterogeneities between them are investigated.
In the second Chapter the view point on economic modeling is enlarged to critically
discuss about assumptions of synchronization of economic agent allowing the description
in terms of a representative one stressing the role of heterogeneities even when these
are very small.
In the subsequent two Chapters the analysis of two evolutionary games in which
players in the population choose between two different strategies according to a profit-
driven evolutionary selection rule is carried out. The resulting discrete dynamical
systems, represented by two and three-dimensional nonlinear maps respectively, are
characterized by the presence of invariant manifolds on which the dynamics are governed
by the restrictions of evolution equations and represent synchronized populations of
players that adopt the same strategies.
Finally, in the last Chapter an adaptive nonlinear feedback controller is designed
based on reinforcement learning techniques, implemented through a neural network and
applied to a coupled two-pendulum system in order to improve stability and performance
of classical PID linear controller. This kind of approach improves performances in
particular when the available model of the real plant is wrong, a circumstance that
reduces benefits of optimal control design and provides superior limits for feedback
values avoiding problems of reliability of real feedback actuators.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is developed in the framework of the PhD school in complexity science at
the University of Urbino. As a consequence of the interdisciplinary nature of such
PhD program, the present work concerns different research areas: it includes economic
modeling and physical system control design. Further, this work is inspired by, and
based on, a quite large and interdisciplinary bibliography. Part of the work presented
here has been published on international journals and contributes to different stream
of literature.
1.1 Dynamic games: behavior and learning
In this section we illustrate some basic assumptions and methods of classical game
theory restricted to static games in strategic form and the role of rationality of the
individuals in taking most profitable decisions, playing the Nash equilibrium.
Classical game theory considers multiple decision makers, also known as players
or agents, that interact among each other through actions, or strategies, which they
choose to maximize (or increase) their utility (or payoff), according to a given ranking
of preferences, in their environment. In a static game, in particular, a single decision is
made by each player who has no knowledge about the decision made by the others
before making its own decision. The outcome of the game is then the set of strategies
that all players adopt simultaneously.
A game in strategic form has three elements: the set of players, i ∈ N := {1, 2, ...n},
the pure-strategy space Si for each player i and payoff functions ui that give players i’s
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui(σ) for each profile of strategies σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σn),
that is for each outcome of the game (for details on the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities see [78]). For the sake of completeness it can be noted that, in general, the
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strategy σi of player i is a mixed strategy, that is a weighted sum of pure strategies of
Si where weights are the probability (i.e. a lottery) associated to these pure strategies.
Here, however, we deal with the case in which players adopt only pure strategy, that
is σi ∈ Si, for i ∈ N . The interpretations of the solution concept of a game is
straightforward extended to mixed strategy profiles.
Each player’s objective is to maximize his own payoff function and tries to do
this from selecting his best response, that is the strategy that returns to him the
highest payoff given the strategy of others. A Nash equilibrium is, by definition, a
profile of strategies so that each player’s strategy is the best response to the other
players’ strategies. To express formally the previous statement let σ−i denote the
strategy profile for all players but i and (σ−i, σ′i) denote the strategy profile given
by (σ1, ..., σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, ..., σn). So the strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2, ..., σ∗n) is a Nash
equilibrium if, for every player, it results πi(σ∗) ⩾ πi(σ∗−i, σi). By this, it is meant
that, for player i, choosing σ∗i = (σ∗)i is at least as good as choosing any other strategy
σi given that the strategies of the others σ∗−i remain the same.
Classical game theory is a framework to model decisions where players are endowed
with sufficient information and rationality to make the best choice assuming the ability
of forecasting the behaviors of others. The solution concept of Nash equilibrium as the
outcome of a game can be (roughly) motivated by assuming that players are rational
and informed, meaning by this that they are endowed with sufficient computational
abilities and have perfect knowledge of the payoffs’ structures of all the players. By
this they are able to forecast the strategy of others and then to choose the strategy
that maximizes their own payoff. In other words, the players of classical game theory
are capable to compute their own best strategy solving an optimization problem
having correct expectations, namely rational expectations, on others’ strategies. In a
deterministic framework this leads to perfect foresight in the sense that they are able
to build the economic model and therefore they correctly anticipate the future states of
the economy. For a more exhaustive overview of game theory see e.g. [39], [15], [128]
or any other standard text of game theory.
Rational expectations seem to be too strong an assumption, a kind of limiting case
in which players are perfectly rational and informed, if compared with real economic
systems where agents have a limited ability to compute. Indeed the assumptions of
classical game theory allow the players to solve the game and play the Nash equilibrium
in a single decision. However, if the same assumptions are weakened, then the rational
process that leads each agent to forecast others’ strategy and to choose the better
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action is not efficient enough to compute the best response for all the players, and then
to play the Nash equilibrium, in a one shot game.
So economic models should take into account human limited ability to make
forecastings. This leads players to replace one shot optimal decision with repeated
myopic or adaptive decisions, that is to carry out a dynamic process that may or
may not converge to a Nash Equilibrium, provided it is an equilibrium point of the
dynamical system as well.
It is then introduced the weaker assumption of bounded rationality according to
which agents compute expected future variables of the economy by some behavioral
method: they could behave adaptively or adopting heuristics or learning by doing as
well as through trial and error explorations. Sometimes no one optimizes at all and
just follows rough rules of thumb. Deterministic repeated games usually take the form
of discrete time dynamical systems that read generically as:
σi,t+1 = Φi(σ(e)i,t+1,σt,σt−1, ..., t) (1.1a)
σ
(e)
i,t+1 = Ψi (σt,σt−1, ..., t) (1.1b)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and where t is a discrete temporal parameter. The equations
(1.1) account for the behavioral rules that real economic agents elaborate to make
forecastings and to update their own strategy. The equations of motion (1.1) are in
general nonlinear and, because of this, a single model of an economic scenario may be
characterized by very different scenarios highlighting different dynamic properties of the
system: depending on the local stability property of the fixed points, convergence may
occur as well as cyclic or chaotic dynamics may arise. To study the convergence towards
Nash equilibrium, the behavioral rule of the i-th agent described by the function Φi has
to be consistent with the underlying game. One can think of modeling the behaviors of
the players in order to make the Nash equilibrium of the real and unknown economic
model fixed points of dynamic equation (1.1a). When this occurs and assuming naïve
expectations, that is assuming that the equation (1.1b) reduces to σ(e)i,t+1 = σi,t, then
at the Nash equilibrium the players have correct expectations.1 This scenario is like
those presented in the following economic applications.
It can also be noted that when multiple Nash equilibriums are present the step
by step dynamic process may act as a selection device since their stability determine
1More generally this holds true for adaptive expectations of the form x(e)t+1 = x
(e)
t +α
(
xt − x(e)t
)
=
(1− α)x(e)t + αxt, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a speed of adjustment, that are commonly used in economic
modeling (see [52]). Naïve expectations are adaptive expectations in the case in which α = 1.
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which one prevails in the long run or with which probability each of them is reached.
In this context information about path dependence on historical accidents are obtained
from the study of basin of attractions. Indeed, in situations of multistability, the initial
conditions have a crucial importance. However, sometimes such repeated adaptive
processes never converge, and continue to move around an equilibrium point following
some periodic or chaotic time patterns. Or they may even irreversibly depart from it
and even diverge. In such cases some global analysis may be required to understand
the kind of time evolutions that characterize the long run behavior of the repeated
game.
It can be noted that very rarely the situations of the strategic interactions are
reproduced unchanged in the real-world. However one of the most important reason
that induces the study of repeated games is the spontaneous emergence of cooperation
in a non cooperative context (that is in the absence of institutions that guarantee the
compliance of agreements eventually signed by the parties). An example is provided
by cartels among economic agents in an oligopolistic market that emerge and persist
spontaneously. The emerging of collective and organized dynamics is related to the
remarkable result that regards whether a repeated boundedly rational (or trial-and-
error) decision leads to an adaptive (or myopic) process that converges, in the long
run, to the same ’optimal’ equilibrium chosen in one shot by rational and informed
players of classical theory with high computational abilities. In fact, such boundedly
rational players, whose behavior is much more similar to real imperfect people, play the
game repeatedly over time until they reach a situation where there is no further room
for improvement. Convergence emerges spontaneously as as a sort of some collective
coordination mechanism (i.e. the ”Adam Smith invisible hand“) that leads them to the
optimal outcome of the game. From this point of view, a fixed point argument provides
the evolutionary explanation of the asymptotic outcome of the Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, when a Nash equilibrium is an asymptotic outcome of some learning
process that takes place during the evolution of the economy, than its local stability can
be interpreted as the evolutive learning explanation of the perfect foresight solution2.
In other words agents are able to learn it endogenously and convergence of the learning
scheme to a perfect foresight solution reinforces it as interpretation of the real world.
Divergence means that the rational expectation solution is not really relevant because it
cannot be endogenously learned by boundedly rational agents according to the learning
2 Of course, also in this case, this requires that the Nash equilibrium must be an equilibrium for
the model with learning.
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rule adopted. Furthermore, when multiple Nash equilibriums are present, only the ones
which are stable under learning are important since they can be learned by the agents.
1.2 Some words about learning
What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing.
Aristotele, Nocomacheam Ethics, Book II.
It is widely acknowledged, from ancient times, that learning is the product of
experience (see [11]). Indeed an intelligent agent chooses the action to execute on the
environment in which he lives, or in which interacts strategically with others, in order to
change it and to receive some utility. This is possible if the agent owns some knowledge
about the environment which, moreover, can be acquired through the observation
of data concerning the environments’ evolution. Besides acquiring information, the
agent should be able to use it efficiently: “In the language of the learning theory, an
animal can gain selective advantage not from its performance on the training data but
only from its performance at generalization. Generalizing, and not “over-fitting” the
training data, is precisely the problem of isolating the features of the data that have
predictive value”. This sentence, taken from [127], highlights the importance of the
prediction phenomenon of generalization in learning. It is the skills, acquired through
learning, to generalize the knowledge gained from the observation of a finite number of
events or data to deal with new scenarios of which it hasn’t had any direct experience.
In the context of game theory, different learning methodologies can be designed to
model boundedly rational learners that interact in a strategic environment. Indeed, the
learning in games replies to the need of making the behavioral rules and the heuristics
of players consistent with the underlying game. More precisely, the inclusion of a
learning process explains the way in which the available information is used to play
in a non cooperative context and to forecast others’ strategies. Behavioral rules are
learned and built from experience during the play and not assigned a priori. In other
words the players acquire, through the learning process, the rationality needed to make
the best use of their experience.
The common knowledge argument of the classical game theory suggests that, to
compute the Nash equilibrium, an algorithm of a certain degree of computational
complexity has to be implemented by the rational and informed players. When players
are boundedly rational learners, a similar ability is demanded to them after a training
process and the result of the learning will depends on the informational complexity
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contained in the observed data, the cognitive abilities of the players and whether they
have experienced a suitable number training data.
Reinforcement learning methods are widely applied to economic modeling as well
as in control theory, machine learning and robotics, which are situations characterized
by a high level of complexity. However in the present thesis reinforcement learning
techniques are not used to endow players with learning skills to compete in games
through strategic interactions, but they are used to develop a nonlinear controller
which will be applied to regulate a physical plant.
From the paper [47] a sketch of description of reinforcement learning methods
can be found: “The theory of reinforcement learning provides a normative account,
deeply rooted in psychological and neuroscientific perspectives on animal behavior,
of how agents may optimize their control of an environment. To use reinforcement
learning successfully in situations approaching real-world complexity, however, agents
are confronted with a difficult task: they must derive efficient representations of the
environment from high-dimensional sensory inputs, and use these to generalize past
experience to new situations. Remarkably, humans and other animals seem to solve
this problem through a harmonious combination of temporal difference reinforcement
learning algorithm and hierarchical sensory processing systems [...].”
In its general outlines, reinforcement learning methodology consists in assigning a
value to the strategies on the basis of the expected effects they will produce. Such values
are adjusted adaptively as learning proceeds through trial and error actions. More
precisely, when the environment is unknown, the exploration activity prevails, random
actions are performed and their effects are observed. As the number of transitions
between successive states of the environment increases, the ability to forecast the future
effect of actions increases as well, and exploitation of the acquired knowledge will
prevail over the exploration of the environment. Furthermore, in order to model the
generalization capability of the intelligent agent, a parametrized function approximator
is used to represents the agent’s preferences on the possible states of the environment
and, because of its interpolating nature, it is capable of suggesting what actions to
take also in states of the environment that are not been previously experienced.
1.3 Thesis’ structure
The plan of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 we will consider a nonlinear
discrete-time dynamic model proposed by Farris et al. in the paper “When five is a
crowd in the market share attraction model: the dynamic stability of competition”,
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Journal of Research and Management (2005), [105], where a market share attraction
model with two firms that decide marketing efforts over time, according to best
reply strategies with naïve expectations, is presented. The model also considers an
adaptive adjustment towards best reply, a form of inertia or anchoring attitude, and
the effects of heterogeneities among firms are investigated. A rich scenario of local and
global bifurcations is obtained even with just two competing firms, and a comparison
is proposed with apparently similar duopoly models based on repeated best reply
dynamics with naïve expectations and adaptive adjustment. The contents of this
Chapter is an adaptation of the paper “A dynamic marketing model with best reply
and inertia” by Gian Italo Bischi and Lorenzo Cerboni Baiardi in the journal Chaos,
Solitons and Fractals, (2015), see [60].
In Chapter 3 the view point on economic modeling is enlarged to critically discuss
about assumptions of synchronization of economic agent allowing the description in
terms of a representative one stressing the role of heterogeneities even when these are
very small. In particular some nonlinear discrete-time dynamic model (proposed in
the literature to represent marketing competition are considered and used to critically
discuss the statement, often made in economic literature, that identical agents behave
identically and quasi-identical ones behave in a similar way. Through examples and
some general mathematical statements, it will be shown that the one-dimensional
model of a representative agent, whose dynamics summarize the common behavior
of identical interacting agents, may be misleading. In order to discuss these topics
some simple methods for the study of local stability and bifurcations are employed,
as well as numerical examples where some results taken from the literature on chaos
synchronization are applied to two-dimensional marketing models that exhibit riddling,
blowout and other global phenomena related to the existence of measure-theoretic
attractors. The contents of this Chapter is an adaptation of the paper “Fallacies of
composition in nonlinear marketing models” by Gian Italo Bischi and Lorenzo Cerboni
Baiardi in the journal Communication in nonlinear science and numerical simulation,
(2015), [61].
In particular Chapter 4 deals with a discrete time version of the model proposed
by Lamantia and Radi (2015) [89], to describe a fishery where a population regulated
by a logistic growth function is exploited by a pool of agents that can choose, at each
time period, between two different harvesting strategies according to a profit-driven
evolutionary selection rule. The resulting discrete dynamical system, represented by
a two-dimensional nonlinear map, is characterized by the presence of invariant lines
on which the dynamics are governed by one-dimensional restrictions that represent
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pure, i.e. adopted by all players, strategies. However, interesting dynamics related
to interior attractors, where players playing both strategies coexist, are evidenced by
analytical as well as numerical methods that reveal local and global bifurcations. The
contents of this Chapter is an adaptation of the paper “On a discrete-time model with
replicator dynamics in renewable resource exploitation” by Gian Italo Bischi, Lorenzo
Cerboni Baiardi and Davide Radi in Chaos, Solitons and fractals, (2015), see [59].
In Chapter 5 a 3-D evolutionary model of oligopoly competition in which economic
agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions,
is considered. We state the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games
and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic
Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global
dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the
system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted
(homomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong
attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be
in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity, where it is more profitable for the
agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state). The contents
of this Chapter is an adaptation of the paper “Evolutionary competition between
boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games” by Lorenzo Cerboni Baiardi,
Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi in Chaos, Solitons and fractals, (2015), see [87].
Finally, in Chapter 6 an adaptive nonlinear feedback controller is designed based
on reinforcement learning techniques implemented through a neural network applied
to a coupled two-pendulum system in order to improve stability and performance of
classical PID linear feedback. The reinforcement learning controller learns how to
act on the system being trained on estimations of dynamical states time series of the
physical system searching among feedback actions which maximize the expected future
discounted rewards. The training process leads the reinforcement learning controller to
build the state-action value function which approximates the solution of the optimality
Bellman equation of the system and which provides the actions’ selection mechanism in
order to drive the system towards its reference signal. This kind of controller improves
performances in particular when the available model of the real plant is wrong, a
circumstance that reduces benefits of optimal control design, and provides superior
limits for feedbacks when so are the actions.
Chapter 2
Case study: a dynamic marketing
model with best reply and inertia
2.1 Introduction
An important stream in the literature on dynamic models in marketing is based on
market share attraction models, where several firms selling the same good (or more
generally homogeneous goods) are competing in a market with a given sales potential,
and each firm has to decide its marketing effort in order to maximize (or at least
increase) its market share (see e.g. [40], [70], [91], [68], [105]). Here is considered
the discrete-time dynamic model proposed by Farris et al. [105] where, at each time
step t, in order to decide their marketing effort at time t + 1, the firms solve an
optimization problem to maximize their expected profits. However, their information
set is limited as they do not know the effort decisions of their competitors and their
are assumed to adopt naïve expectations about competitors’ choices, i.e. they guess
that marketing efforts will be the same as in the current period. The resulting model,
denoted as Best Response with naïve expectations, is well known in the literature since
the pioneering work of Cournot (1838) on mathematical modeling of oligopolies (see
[37] or any standard textbook on oligopoly modeling). As suggested in [105], as well as
by several other authors, see e.g. [107], [69], the awareness of the systematic error in
the assumption of naïve expectations, as well as the difficulties to change the marketing
policy, may induce the firms to adopt a compromise (a convex combination) between
the computed best response and the previously adopted efforts, a form of inertia or
anchoring attitude. This leads to the adaptive adjustment model considered in what
follows. The analysis of this model given in [105] is mainly focused on the case of n
homogeneous firms, i.e. characterized by identical parameters, in order to study the
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relation between market stability and the number of firms, by taking the number n
as a bifurcation parameter in a one-dimensional model that summarizes the common
behavior of the identical firms. Here a complementary approach is followed, in the
sense that just two firms competing in the same market are considered in order to
stress the effects of heterogeneities, i.e. how the differences between the parameters,
that characterize the dynamic behavior of the two firms, influence the equilibrium
points, their stability and bifurcations, as well as the global dynamic scenarios of the
model.
A rich spectrum of dynamic behaviors arising from the two-dimensional discrete-
time model exhibits under different parameters’ constellations is worth to be studied,
in particular in regions of parameters’ space where heterogeneity between the two firms
may play an important role. Analytical results can be easily proved for the model
obtained under assumptions of some (not all) identical parameters. Moreover, even if
numerical explorations are necessary in order to investigate the global properties of the
model with arbitrary parameters’ values, some general statements can still be given
and may stimulate further studies concerning both the economic and the mathematical
properties of the model.
The plan of the present Chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 the economic model
is described and it is written in the form of two-dimensional map with a simple
mathematical structure. In Section 2.3 existence and stability of equilibrium points is
proved for the case with identical efforts’ effectiveness and different inertia of firms, and
some numerical simulations are given to confirm and extend the analytical results. In
Section 2.4 a complete analytical study of the existence of equilibrium points is given
for arbitrary values of the parameters, and some numerical simulations are provided in
order to characterize the role of marketing efforts on the dynamic properties of the
model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
Let consider n firms that sell homogeneous goods in a market with sales potential B (in
terms of overall customers’ market expenditures, also denoted as market contribution
MC by some authors, see e.g. [105]), and let Ai(t), i = 1, ..., n, denote the attraction
of customers to firm i at time period t, where t ∈ N denotes an event-driven discrete
time variable. The key assumption in marketing literature is that the market share for
2.2 The model 11
firm i at time t is given by
si(t) =
Ai(t)∑n
j=1Aj(t)
(2.1)
If xi denotes marketing spending of firm i, following [91], see also [105], we assume
that attraction is given by
Ai = aixβii
where the positive constants ai denote the relative effectiveness of effort expended by
the firm i and the parameter βi denote the elasticity of the attraction of firm (or brand)
i with regard to the marketing effort, as dAi
dxi
xi
Ai
= βi. On the basis of these assumptions,
the one-period net profit of firm i is given by
Πi(t) = Bsi(t)− xi(t) = B aix
βi
i (t)
aix
βi
i (t) +
∑
j ̸=i ajx
βj
j (t)
− xi(t) (2.2)
In [105] the case of unit elasticities βi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, is considered and at each time t
agents are assumed to decide next period spending xi(t+1) by solving the optimization
problem
max
xi
Π(e)i (t+ 1) = maxxi
B aixi
aixi +
∑
j ̸=i ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
− xi

where Π(e)i (t + 1) is the expected profit at time t + 1 and x
(e)
j (t + 1) represent the
expectation of firm i about firm j spending at time t+1 on the basis of the information
set of firm i at time t. From the first order conditions ∂Πi(t+1)
∂xi
= 0, one gets
xi(t+ 1) =
√√√√
B
∑
j ̸=i ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
ai
−∑
j ̸=i
ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
Assuming naïve expectations
x
(e)
j (t+ 1) = xj(t)
the following dynamic model is obtained
xi(t+ 1) = Ri
∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t)
 =
√
B
∑
j ̸=i ajxj(t)
ai
−∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t) (2.3)
usually denoted as “Best Response” with naïve expectations. Notice that the parameter
B is just a scale parameter, that has no influence on the dynamic properties of the
model. So, without loss of generality we shall consider B = 1 in the following.
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In [105] also a different adjustment process is proposed, known as adaptive adjust-
ment towards best reply, see also [107], [85], [69], given by
xi(t+ 1) = (1− λi)xi(t) + λiRi
∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t)
 i = 1, ..., n (2.4)
where the constants λi ∈ [0, 1] represent the attitude of firm i to adopt the best reply,
whereas (1− λi) is the anchoring attitude to maintain the previous spending decision,
i.e. a measure of firms’ inertia to modify their marketing efforts. The model (2.4) is a
generalization of (2.3) because it reduces to it for λi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, whereas it tends
to complete inertia of firm i, i.e. xi(t+1) = xi(t), as λi → 0. It is straightforward to see
that for λi ≠ 0, i = 1, ...n, the model with inertia (2.4) has the same equilibrium points
as the model (2.3). These equilibrium points, being located at the intersections between
the two best response functions (2.3), are Nash equilibria. However the presence of
inertia influences their stability properties.
In the following is considered the case of two firms, n = 2, with the dynamic
variables rescaled as
x = a1a2x1 , y = a1a2x2 (2.5)
so that the dynamic model which will be study assumes the form of the map T :
(x, y)→ (x′, y′) with
T :
 x
′ = (1− λ1)x+ a2λ1
(√
y − y
)
y′ = (1− λ2)y + a1λ2 (√x− x)
(2.6)
where ′ denotes the unit-time advancement operator, that is, if the right-hand side
variables are productions of period t then the left-hand ones represent productions
of period (t+ 1). The same notation will be used in the rest of this thesis. The
map (2.6) is defined for nonnegative values of x and y. Starting from a given initial
condition (x0, y0) ∈ R2+ , where R2+ = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0} denotes the set
of nonnegative state variables, the iteration of (2.6) generates an infinite sequence of
states, or a trajectory {
(xt, yt) = T t(x0, y0), t = 1, 2, ...
}
(2.7)
provided that (x0, y0), as well as all its images T t(x0, y0) of any rank t, belong to R2+. If
ai ≤ 4, i = 1, 2, then the square S = [0, 1]× [0, 1] is a trapping region, i.e. trajectories
starting inside S remain in it for each t ≥ 0. However, feasible (i.e. non-interrupted)
trajectories can be even obtained for ai > 4 provided that λjai ≤ 4, i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2,
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j ̸= i, but this depends on the initial condition, i.e. in this case trajectories starting
inside S may be interrupted because of negative values of a dynamic variable. In the
following we shall denote unfeasible region the set of points that generate interrupted
trajectories and the considered initial conditions will be taken outside such region.
A similar dynamic model has been proposed as a Cournot duopoly model with
isoelastic demand and linear cost functions in [107] (see Appendix A for details where
is showed that the duopoly model reduces to the present model for a1a2 = 1), see
also [3] and [1] for a deeper local and global dynamic analysis of such duopoly model.
However, despite such apparently similar form of the maps, the dynamic properties of
the marketing model (2.6) reveal to be significantly different with respect to duopoly
Cournot model with inertia in [107] since it has only one nontrivial equilibrium point
that may lose stability via a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, whereas the former, as it will
be showed in the following, may have more than one equilibrium, and different kinds
of bifurcations can be observed, such as pitchfork, flip or saddle node bifurcations.
For λi ≠ 0 the fixed points of the map (2.6), obtained by imposing the conditions
x′ = x and y′ = y, are the real and non-negative solutions of the algebraic system x = a2
(√
y − y
)
y = a1 (
√
x− x) (2.8)
It is straightforward to see that E0 = (0, 0) is always a fixed point and a further real
positive solution of (2.8) always exists, say E1 = (x1, y1) with x1 ∈ (0, 1) and y1 ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, as is proved in the following, a couple of real positive solutions, say
E2 = (x2, y2) and E3 = (x3, y3) may exist according to the parameters’ values a1 and
a2.
It is noted that, from (2.2) with the new variables (2.5) and unit elasticities βi = 1,
the profits assume the form
Π1(x, y) =
a1x
a1x+ a2y
− x
a1a2
; Π2(x, y) =
a2y
a1x+ a2y
− y
a1a2
(2.9)
and after some trivial algebra the inequality Π1 > Π2 becomes
G(x, y) = a1x2 + (a2 − a1)xy − a2y2 − a21a2x+ a1a22y < 0 (2.10)
hence the isoprofit curve G(x, y) = 0 is an hyperbola with symmetry center
(xc, yc) =
(
a1a
2
2 (3a1 − a2)
(a1 + a2)2
,
a21a2 (3a2 − a1)
(a1 + a2)2
)
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and asymptotes of slopes a2 and −a1 respectively. As we shall see, the asymmetric
dynamics of the dynamical system (2.6) may converge to different attractors. According
to the region in which such attractors are included one or the other firm may gain
higher profits. When several different attractors coexist this crucially depends on
initial conditions, so a study of the global structure of the basins of attraction gives
information about the firm that prevail in the market, in the sense of gaining higher
profits.
Before starting to analyze the local and global dynamic properties of the map (2.6)
it is worth to notice that it is a noninvertible map, because if we compute (x, y) in terms
of a given (x′, y′) by solving the system (2.6) we can get up to four real solutions. i.e.
a point can have several rank-1 preimages. Geometrically, the action of a noninvertible
map can be expressed by saying that it “folds and pleats” the phase space, because
distinct points are mapped into the same point. This is equivalently stated by saying
that several inverses are defined that “unfold” the phase space. For a noninvertible
map, the phase space can be subdivided into regions Zk, k ≥ 0, whose points have k
distinct rank-1 preimages (see e.g. [33]). Generally, for a continuous map, as the point
x′ varies in R2, pairs of preimages appear or disappear as it crosses the boundaries
separating different regions. Such boundaries, denoted as LC (from the French “Ligne
Critique”) are defined as sets of points with two merging preimages, located on LC−1
(following the notations of [77], [33]). For a differentiable noninvertible map of the
plane, the set LC−1 is the set where the Jacobian determinant vanishes:
LC−1 =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2| detJ = 0
}
(2.11)
(see again [77], [33]) where, in our case,
J(x, y) =

1− λ1 λ1a2
(
1
2√y − 1
)
λ2a1
(
1
2
√
x
− 1
)
1− λ2
 (2.12)
So, we get the following equation for LC−1(
1
2
√
x
− 1
)(
1
2√y − 1
)
= (1− λ1) (1− λ2)
a1a2λ1λ2
(2.13)
formed by the union of two disjoint branches, say LC−1 = LC(a)−1 ∪ LC(b)−1. Also
LC = T (LC−1) is the union of two branches: LC(a) = T (LC(a)−1 ) and LC(b) = T (LC
(b)
−1).
The branch LC(a) separates the regions Z0, whose points have no preimages, from the
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region Z2, whose points have two distinct rank-1 preimages. The other branch, LC(b),
separates the region Z2 from Z4, whose points have four distinct preimages. For further
details on noninvertible maps and their anallysis with critic lines see Appendix B.
2.3 The case a1 = a2
In this section is considered the case of identical effort effectiveness
a1 = a2 = a (2.14)
so that the firms can only differ with respect to their inertia, expressed by the parameters
λ1 and λ2. Under this assumption the system (2.8) can be analytically solved, and
besides E0 the following fixed points are obtained
E1 =
(
a2
(1 + a)2 ,
a2
(1 + a)2
)
located on the diagonal ∆ = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x = y} and, for a ≥ 3, two further fixed
points in symmetric positions with respect to ∆ are given by
E2 =
a2
2 (a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
E3 =
a2
2 (a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
The local stability of the fixed points is described by the following statement.
Proposition 1. The fixed point E1 ∈ ∆ is locally asymptotically stable for a <
ap = 3. At a = ap a pitchfork bifurcation occurs at which the two fixed points E2 and
E3 are created and are stable nodes just after the bifurcation. The fixed point E1 ∈ ∆
also undergoes a flip bifurcation at a = af ≥ 3, being
af = 1 + 2
√
1 + 22− λ1 − λ2
λ1λ2
(2.15)
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at which a cycle of period 2 is created along ∆. For a > ah, with
ah = 1 +
3
√√√√2( 1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
+ 2
√( 1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)2
− 1627 +
+ 3
√√√√2( 1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
− 2
√( 1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)2
− 1627 (2.16)
the two fixed points E2 and E3 lose stability via a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix (2.12), with a1 = a2 = a, computed at the fixed point E1
becomes
J(E1) =
 1− λ1 λ1
1− a
2
λ2
1− a
2 1− λ2

From its characteristic equation
P (z) = z2 − trJ · z + detJ = 0
where trJ = 2− λ1 − λ2 and detJ = (1− λ1) (1− λ2)− λ1λ2 (1− a)2 /4 are the trace
and the determinant of J(E1) respectively, a sufficient condition for the stability is
expressed by the following system of inequalities (known as Schur or Jury’s conditions,
see e.g. [53], [45], [2])
P (1) = 1− trJ + detJ > 0 , P (−1) = 1 + trJ + detJ > 0 , 1− detJ > 0
(2.17)
which are equivalent to state that the two eigenvalues are located inside the unit circle
of the complex plane. In the present case
P (1) = λ1λ2
(
1− (1− a)
2
4
)
> 0 for a < 3
P (−1) > 0 for a < af
1− detJ = λ1 + λ2 − λ1λ2 + λ1λ2 (1− a)
2
4 > 0 ∀a, λi ∈ [0, 1]
where
af = 1 + 2
√
1 + 22− λ1 − λ2
λ1λ2
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For a > 3, the Jacobian matrix (2.12) computed at the two symmetric fixed points
E2 = (x2, y2) and E3 = (y2, x2) is the same, and has has complex conjugate eigenvalues
z1,2 =
1
2 (2− λ1 − λ2)±
√
(λ1 − λ2)2 + λ1λ2 (−a3 + 3a2 + a+ 1)
hence they are on the unit circle for a = ah at which det(J(E2)) = z1z2 = |z1|2 = 1,
and exit the unit circle, i.e. z1z2 = |z1|2 > 1, for a > ah. This completes the proof.
Notice that af = ap = 3 if and only if λ1 = λ2 = 1, i.e. the two firms exhibit
no inertia. In this case at a = 3 a degenerate bifurcation of codimension 2 occurs
at which the fixed point E1 ∈ ∆ is transformed from stable node into unstable node
and, simultaneously a pair of stable fixed points are created in symmetric positions
with respect to the diagonal ∆ and a stable cycle of period 2 is created along the
invariant diagonal ∆, as well. So, after this bifurcation, three coexisting attractors are
present, each with its own basin of attraction (see figure 2.1a, obtained with parameters
λ1 = λ2 = 1 and a = 3.03 > ap). The particular “rectangular shaped” structure of the
basins is a consequence of the fact that for λ1 = λ2 = 1 the map (2.6) assumes the
form (x′, y′) = T (x, y) = (f(y), g(x)), hence it maps horizontal lines into vertical lines
and vice-versa. The properties of attractors and basins of these maps, characterized by
the fact that T 2(x, y) = (f(g(x)), g(f(y))) is uncoupled, are studied in [65].
Instead, if λ1 = λ2 = λ < 1, i.e. the firms are homogeneous with the same degree
of inertia, the structure of attractors and basins is still symmetric with respect to the
invariant diagonal ∆, but with a more smooth shape. Moreover, from (2.15) it follows
that af > ap = 3: in this case as the parameter a crosses the bifurcation value ap, the
fixed point E1 is transformed from a stable node into a saddle point, with local stable set
along the invariant diagonal ∆, which becomes a boundary that separates the basin of
the two newly born stable nodes E2 and E3 (see the situation represented in figure 2.1b,
obtained with λ = 0.9 and a = 3.3, i.e. 3 = ap < a < af = 3.4). If the parameter a is
further increased across the bifurcation value af , at which the flip bifurcation occurs,
the saddle point E1 gives rise to a saddle cycle of period 2 with periodic points along ∆.
As a is further increased this saddle cycle gains transverse stability via a subcritical flip
bifurcation and this leads to the dynamic scenario represented in figure 2.1c, obtained
with λ = 0.9 and a = 3.7. So, at this stage there are again three coexisting attractors,
one along ∆ (a cycle of period 2) and two steady states in symmetric positions with
respect to ∆, each with its own basin of attraction, represented by different gray shades
in figure 2.1. Notice that the basins are non connected sets, a phenomenon that can
only be observed with noninvertible maps.
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With the same parameters λi, i = 1, 2, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs
at ah ≃ 3.71, according to (2.16) of Proposition 2.3, and the two fixed points E2
and E3 become unstable focuses, and they are surrounded by stable closed invariant
curves along which quasi-periodic motion occurs. This numerically proves that the
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is supercritical (see figure 2.1d).
It is worth to notice that, from (2.16), it results ah ≥ 3.645, as
(
1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
≥ 2 and
being ah increasing with
(
1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
.
Up to now we have only been concerned with the time evolution of marketing efforts
x1(t) and x2(t) of the two firms, related to the rescaled dynamic variables x(t) and
y(t) by (2.5). It is now important to consider the time evolution of profits as well. If
a1 = a2 = a then the condition (2.10), equivalent to Π1 > Π2, becomes
(x− y)
(
x+ y − a2
)
< 0, (2.19)
i.e. the hyperbola G(x, y) = 0 degenerates into the pair of orthogonal lines y = x
and y = −x+ a2, crossing at (xc, yc) =
(
a2
2 ,
a2
2
)
, that divide the phase space into four
sectors such that Π1 > Π2 in the two sectors above both lines and below both lines,
and Π1 < Π2 in the other two sectors. At the equilibrium E1, being x = y, the two
firms have the same profits, whereas for a > 3 at the two equilibrium points E2 and E3
the inequalities Π1 > Π2 and Π1 < Π2 hold respectively. In fact, at E2 and E3 we have
x+ y = a2
a2−1 < a
2, so it is easy to realize that at the equilibrium E2, characterized by
x > y (i.e. firm 1 spends more in marketing efforts) we have Π1 > Π2, i.e. firm 1 makes
more profits, and vice-versa in the equilibrium E3. Similar situations are obtained in
the case of more complex attractors, located around these equilibria when they are
unstable, in the sense that Π1 > Π2 when the dynamics occur along attractors located
in the region with x > y (i.e. below the diagonal ∆) and vice-versa for attractors in the
region x < y (above the diagonal ∆). In fact, for a > 3 the line x+ y = a2 is outside
the region where the asymptotic dynamics of the model take place, so that only the
first factor in (2.19) determines the difference between the two profits. Instead, in the
case of attractors that include both regions with x > y and x < y, time periods with
Π1 > Π2 alternate with time periods with Π1 < Π2.
This occurs, for example, in the case of homogeneous firms when the coexisting
chaotic attractors created around the unstable equilibrium points E2 and E3 merge and
form a unique large chaotic attractor, as shown in fig. 2. In the left panel (figure 2.2a)
when the asymptotic motion occurs along the attractor surrounding the equilibrium
E2 then firm 1 makes more profits, and vice-versa for the trajectories converging to
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2.1 Panel (a): λ1 = λ2 = 1 and a = 3.03 > ap, just after the codimension 2
bifurcation at which simultaneous flip and pitchfork bifurcations occur. Panel (b):
λ1 = λ2 = 0.9 and a = 3.3, just after the pitchfork bifurcation: 3 = ap < a < af = 3.4.
Panel (c): λ1 = λ2 = 0.9 and a = 3.7, just after the subcritcal flip bifurcation of the
cycle of period 2 along the diagonal. Panel (d): λ1 = λ2 = 0.9 and a = 3.72, just
after the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of equilibrium points E2, E3, being ah = 3.71.
The different gray shades represent basins of attraction, wherease the black region
represents the initial conditions that generate unfeasible trajectories, i.e. involving
negative values of the dynamic variables.
the upper attractor around E3. After the contact between the two attractors along
the diagonal ∆, occurring for increasing values of a, the motion along the unique large
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attractor is characterized by alternating time periods with higher profit for one firm or
the other one.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2.2 Panel (a): for λ1 = λ2 = 0.8 and a = 4.05 two chaotic attractors coexist each
with its own basin of attraction. Panel (b): for λ1 = λ2 = 0.8 and a = 4.0565 a unique
symmetric chaotic attractor exists.
However, as stated in the Introduction, in this Chapter we are mainly interested to
study the cases of heterogeneous firms. We start by discussing the effects of different
inertia, i.e. λ1 ̸= λ2. As stated at the beginning of this Chapter, the focus will now be
turn on the study of heterogeneous firms. Different inertia, i.e. λ1 ̸= λ2, as source of
heterogeneity is investigated first. In this case the diagonal is no longer invariant, i.e.
x = y in (2.6) does not imply x′ = y′. This has a remarkable effect on the shape of the
basins, as shown in figure 2.3a, obtained with λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.7 (i.e. firm 1 has
more inertia in revising efforts than firm 2) and a = 4, i.e. just after the Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation of E2 and E3. In this case the stable set of the saddle point E1, which
constitutes the boundary that separates the two basins of attraction, is folded so that
the basin of the attractor below the diagonal, where firm 1 makes more profits, is
smaller. Notice that firm 1 is the one with more inertia. In the situation shown in
figure 2.3b, obtained again for a = 4 but with λ1 = 0.7 and λ2 = 1 (firm 2 exhibit no
inertia, i.e. it moves directly to the computed best reply marketing effort) the two
attractors become chaotic, and the basin of attraction of the one surrounding E2
(characterized by higher profits of firm 1) shrinks further. As it can be seen in figure
2.3b, the chaotic attractor around E2 is quite close to the basin boundary. Indeed,
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if λ1 is slightly increased, then such a contact occurs, leading to the disappearance
of the chaotic attractor around E2, a global (or contact) bifurcation known as “final
bifurcation” (see [33]) or “boundary crisis” (see [32]). After this contact bifurcation the
generic trajectory goes to the chaotic attractor around E3 (see figure 2.3c, obtained with
λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 1 and a = 4). The former chaotic attractor around E2 is transformed
into a chaotic repellor, formed by the dense and unstable set of periodic points that
constituted the skeleton of the just disappeared attractor: such chaotic repellor is often
denoted as the “ghost” of the attractor, and its presence gives rise to long chaotic
transients along the former chaotic attractor before the generic trajectory reaches the
other attracting set (now globally attracting).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2.3 Panel (a): λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 0.7 and a = 4. Panel (b): λ1 = 0.7, λ2 = 1 and
a = 4. Panel (c): λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 1 and a = 4. The white and the light gray in
(a) and (b) represent the basins of the two coexisting attractors, whereas in (c) the
generic trajectory starting from an initial condition in the white region enters the
unique (chaotic) global attractor.
In the dynamic scenarios shown in figures 2.3a,b, as well as those in figure 2.1, the
feature of non connected basins of attraction is quite evident, a property specific to
noninvertible maps which is very important in applications, as it has a strong influence
on path dependence. This property is now well known, after the books [77] and [33],
as well as many papers and books dealing with applications, see e.g. [109], [68], [66],
where the transition between connected and non connected basins is explained in
terms of the unfolding action of critical curves. Here is given just a short qualitative
explanation, based on the fact that in the context of noninvertible maps it is useful
to define the immediate basin B0(A), of an attracting set A, as the widest connected
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component of the basin which contains A. Then the total basin can be expressed as
B (A) =
∞⋃
n=0
T−n(B0(A))
where T−n(x) represents the set of all the rank-n preimages of x, i.e. the set of points
which are mapped in x after n iterations of the map T . The backward iteration of a
noninvertible map repeatedly unfolds the phase space, and this implies that the basins
may be non-connected, i.e. formed by several disjoint portions. As recalled at the
end of Section 2.2, each branch of critical curve LC = T (LC−1) separates regions of
the phase plane characterized by different numbers of preimages. So, if a portion of
a basin, after a contact with a critical curve, enters the region Zk characterized by a
higher number of preimages, then the extra preimages created after the contact may
form a nonconnected portion of the basin.
On the basis of these arguments, in figure 2.4 is showed how the creation of a
nonconnected portion of a basin for the map (2.6) can be explained in terms of a
contact between the immediate basin and a branch of critical curve LC = T (LC−1),
where LC−1 is given by (2.13). In figure 2.4a, obtained for λ1 = 0.4 and λ2 = 0.6, with
a = 3.2, the two equilibria E2 and E3 are stable focuses, with the stable set of E1 that
separates the two basins, represented by light gray and white respectively. When λ1
is increased from 0.4 to 0.5 the boundary of the light gray basin of E2 has a contact
with LC and a portion of it enters the region Z4. This gives rise to the creation of a
new non connected portion of the same basin, formed by the union of the two further
preimages merging along LC−1, of the portion of the basin that entered the region Z4
after the contact.
To sum up, by tuning the different values of the inertia parameters λ1 and λ2, with
a fixed common value of marketing effectiveness a, both the kind of attractors and the
structure of the basins can be strongly influenced.
2.4 The general case
In this Section is considered the further source of heterogeneity results from relaxing
the assumption (2.14) of identical effort effectiveness, i.e. a1 ̸= a2, so that the two
firms can differ both for their effort effectiveness and for their inertia. Unfortunately
the simple analytical expression of the fixed points obtained in the previous section is
lost, however the following general result concerning their existence can be given.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2.4 Panel (a): λ1 = 0.4, λ2 = 0.6, a = 3.2. Panel (b): λ1 = 0.5 with the other
parameters at the same value as in (a).
Proposition 2. Besides E0 = (0, 0) a non vanishing fixed point always exists in
the region S = (0, 1)× (0, 1). If a1a2 ̸= 1 then two further distinct fixed points exist in
the region S if the following inequality holds
D(a1, a2) =
a21a
4
2
108 (1− a1a2)6
[
27 + a1a2 (4a1 + 4a2 − 18)− a21a22
]
< 0 (2.20)
and if D(a1, a2) = 0 these two further fixed points are merging, i.e. there are two real
coincident solutions of (2.8). In the particular case a1a2 = 1 the unique fixed point
E =
(
1
(a1+1)2
, 1(a2+1)2
)
is get.
Proof. The algebraic system (2.8), whose solutions are the fixed points of the map
(2.6), can be rewritten as

ζ − 1− a1a2
a2
η2 − a1η = 0
η
[
(1− a1a2)2
a1a2
η3 + 2 (1− a1a2) η2 + a2 (a1 + 1) η − a2
]
= 0
(2.21)
where η =
√
x and ζ = √y. The roots of the third degree polynomial inside square
brackets can be found by Cardano’s formula. In fact it can be written as
ξ3 + pξ + q = 0
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with ξ = η + 2a1a23 (1− a1a2) and coefficients
p = a1a22
3− a1
3 (1− a1a2)2
, q = a1a2
27 (1− a1a2)3
(
−27a2 + 9a1a22 − 2a21a22
)
and the condition for the existance of three real solutions is given by D = q2/4+p3/27 <
0 (see e.g. [115]), that is readily transformed in the form (2.20). In particular, if
a2 = 1/a1 then the system (2.21)
ζ − a1η = 0
η
a1
[(a1 + 1) η − 1] = 0
from which the unique non vanishing solution is η = (a1 + 1)−1, ζ = a1(a1 + 1)−1 =
(a2 + 1)−1, and, consequently, x = η2 = (a1 + 1)−2, y = ζ2 = (a2 + 1)−2.
Finally, the fact that the real solutions (x, y) of (2.8) are inside the region S follows
easily from direct inspection of (2.8). In fact, if y < 0 then from the second equation x
cannot assume a real value, and analogously if x < 0 then y cannot be real; if y > 1,
then from the first equation x < 0, which is a contradiction according to the argument
given above.
The graph of D(a1, a2) = 0 in the parameters’ plane (a1, a2), shown in figure 2.5, is
symmetric with respect to the diagonal a1 = a2 as D(a1, a2) = D(a2, a1), and is formed
by two smooth branches joining at the cusp point located in a1 = a2 = 3. If the two
parameters are below the line a1 + a2 = 6 then only one equilibrium can exist.
Notice that the particular case a1a2 = 1 corresponds to the duopoly model with
isoelastic demand proposed in [107] (see the Appendix A). This model is obtained
only in a subset of zero measure in the parameters’ plane (a1, a2), represented by the
dotted curve in figure 2.5, which is entirely included inside the region R1 where only
one equilibrium exists.
If the values of the parameters a1 and a2 are allowed to change in the portion of the
parameters’ plane with a1 + a2 > 6 a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when a smooth
branch of the curve D = 0 is crossed, i.e. two equilibrium points are created as the
branch is crossed towards the region R3 bounded by the two branches. Whenever the
parameters (a1, a2) are located along a branch of D = 0 two merging equilibria exist,
that split inside the region characterized by D(a1, a2) < 0 (denoted by R3 in figure
2.5) giving rise to a stable node and a saddle point, whose stable set represents the
boundary of the basin of the stable node. Instead, at the cusp point three merging
equilibria are obtained, and if the parameters (a1, a2) enter region R3 across the cusp
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Fig. 2.5 In the parameters’ plane (a1, a2) the region R1 (white), where one non
trivial equilibrium point exists, and the region R3 (light gray), where three non trivial
equilibrium points exist, are shown. R1 and R3 are bounded by the curve D(a2, a2) = 0.
The dotted line is the curve a2 = a−11 .
point (3, 3) then a pitchfork bifurcation occurs according to Proposition 1. Three
bifurcation diagrams are shown in figure 2.6, obtained when the parameters (a1, a2)
are varied along the paths shown in the small pictures reported inside. As it can be
seen in panels (a) and (b) the saddle-node bifurcations, at which pairs of equilibrium
points are created or destroyed, give rise to typical hysteresis effects. Instead, the
bifurcation path shown in panel (c), across the cusp point, gives rise to the typical
pitchfork bifurcation already discussed in the previous Section.
Fig. 2.6 Three bifurcation diagrams when the parameters (a1, a2) are varied along the
paths shown in the small pictures reported inside.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2.7 λ1 = λ2 = 0.8, a1 = 3.5. In panel (a) a2 = 3; in (b) a2 = 3.5, in (c) a2 = 4;
in (d) a2 = 4.1. The white region is the basins of the upper attractor, the light gray
region is the basin of the lower attractor, whereas the black region represents the set
of points that generate unfeasible trajectories (i.e. entering the negative orthants).
Some numerical explorations are performed in order to discuss the role of the
parameters a1 and a2 on the dynamic scenarios of the model. Let first consider a
sequence of numerical simulations obtained with identical inertia parameters λ1 =
λ2 = 0.8, starting from a simple dynamic situation, obtained for a1 = 3.5 and a2 = 3,
characterized by a unique globally stable equilibrium, denoted by E3 = (0.196, 0.864)
in figure 2.7a. As a2 is increased a couple of further equilibrium points, say E1 and
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E2, is created through a saddle-node bifurcation, the stable set of the saddle E1 being
the boundary that separates the basin of the two attracting equilibria E2 and E3.
The symmetric case with a1 = a2 = 3.5 is shown in figure 2.7b. As the parameter
a2 is further increased, the equilibrium point E2 loses its stability via a supercritical
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at which a stable closed invariant curve is created, which
is transformed into a chaotic attractor as a2 increases more and more, see figure 2.7c
obtained with a2 = 4. If a2 is further increased then the chaotic attractor enlarges until
it has a contact with the boundary that separates its basin with the set of unfeasible
trajectories, i.e. the set of points that generate trajectories involving negative values,
existing outside the phase space S = [0, 1]× [0, 1]. At this contact a final bifurcation
(or boundary crisis) occurs and, as already described in the previous Section, after this
contact the generic trajectory starting outside the basin of E3, is an interrupted path
leading to negative values (one firm stops marketing efforts, i.e. it exits the market) as
shown in figure 2.7d. To sum up, two contrasting effects are obtained by increasing the
effort effectiveness a2 of firm 2: it first leads to the creation of a second attractor and
then it leads to its destruction.
A similar effect is obtained when different levels of inertia are considered, like in
the sequence of numerical simulations shown in figure 2.8 obtained with λ1 = 0.9 and
λ2 = 0.7. In this case the initial dynamic scenario, obtained for a1 = 4 and a2 = 3,
is given by the presence of a unique equilibrium, say E3 = (0.12, 0.91), which is an
unstable focus surrounded by a stable periodic cycle of period 5 (five periodic points
located along an invariant closed curve) which is a global attractor, i.e. it attracts the
generic initial condition in the square S = [0, 1]× [0, 1]. As a2 increases, a saddle-node
bifurcation occurs at which the two equilibrium points E1 (saddle) and E2 (stable
node) are created, as shown in figure 2.8b obtained with a2 = 3.4. Just after the
saddle-node bifurcation the basin of E2 is very small, being it bounded, as usual, by
the stable set of E1. However this basin, or the basin of the attractor around the
originary fixed point, enlarges more and more when a2 is further increased, as shown
in figure 2.8c obtained for a2 = 3.8. This is a remarkable global phenomenon, that
cannot be revealed through a linear approximations around the attracting sets, and
can generally be detected by computer-aided analysis. Also in this case, like in the
sequence of numerical simulations analyzed in figure 2.7, as a2 is further increased the
attractor around the equilibrium E2 becomes chaotic, and its size increases until its
has a contact with the basin of unfeasible trajectories at which it disappears, i.e. it
is transformed into a chaotic repellor that influences the chaotic transient before the
trajectories are interrupted.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2.8 λ1 = 0.9, λ2 = 0.7, a1 = 4. In panel (a) a2 = 3; in (b) a2 = 3.4; in (c) a2 = 3.8;
in (d) a2 = 4.05. The white region is the basins of the upper attractor, the light gray
region is the basin of the lower attractor, whereas the black region represents the set
of points that generate unfeasible trajectories (i.e. entering the negative orthants
2.5 Conclusions
To conclude it can be stated that the role of heterogeneities on the existence, stability
and structure of the basins of attraction have been stressed through analytical results
and numerical analysis. An analytic study of the existence and stability properties
of equilibrium points has been given, showing how local and global bifurcations are
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influenced by differences in the parameters measuring inertia (or prudence) of firms,
as well as differences in the relative effectiveness of effort. In particular, it has been
shown that increasing inertia often leads, as expected, to more stability of the steady
states. However the basin of attraction of the attractor where the profit of the firm
with increasing inertia is higher shrinks, up to causing the disappearance of the
attractor through final bifurcations (or boundary crisis). Similar phenomena occurs
when the parameters that represent marketing efforts effectiveness are increased. These
parameters give rise to hysteresis phenomena due to the occurrence of saddle node
bifurcations at which couples of steady states are created or destroyed. Moreover, a
gradual increase of one of these effort efficiency parameters first cause the creation of a
coexisting attractors, and then its disappearance, when it becomes too large, due to a
contact bifurcation with the set of points that generate unfeasible trajectories.
The global bifurcations leading to the creation of non connected basins of attraction
are discussed, and their meaning in terms of strong path dependence is stressed.
The role of heterogeneities has been stressed both in stability properties and in the
structure of the basins, as well as the relations between symmetry properties and
bifurcation scenarios. A global study of the basins’ structure is crucial to forecast
which firm will prevale in the market in the sense of gaining higher profits. In fact,
the dynamic complexities shown in our analysis include coexistence of attractors of
different kinds (steady states, periodic cycles, quasi-periodic and chaotic motions)
on which firms have different profits in the long run, with topologically complicated
structures of the basins, due to noninvertibility of the discrete dynamical system. This
gave us the possibility to stress how the discrete dynamical system considered is quite
interesting even from the mathematical point of view. Moreover, the comparison with
the (apparently) very similar model proposed in [107] as a discrete-time model of a
duopoly game with isoelastic demand function, allowed us to stress that the latter is a
quite particular subclass of the marketing model considered here, and consequently
the dynamic scenarios analyzed in the marketing model are much richer than the ones
observed in the literature for that duopoly game.

Chapter 3
Critique study: fallacies of
composition in nonlinear marketing
models
3.1 Introduction
”The conventional assumption made in macroeconomic theory is that there are many
identical agents, whose behavior is summarized by that of the representative agent”.
This sentence, taken from [124], expresses a quite evident property provided that the
economic agents are truly identical, i.e. characterized by the same features and identical
starting conditions. Indeed, the concept of representative agent is widely used (even
abused) in economic modeling (see e.g. [49], [82], [124], [93]). Moreover, a stream of
literature exists where the common time evolution of n identical agents is reduced to a
one-dimensional dynamic model that summarizes the common aggregate behavior of
the n agents, and their numerosity n is taken as a bifurcation parameter, so that the
relation between stability and the number of agents is studied (see e.g. [119] and [69]
in oligopoly theory, [105] in marketing modeling). This is a classical issue in ecological
modeling as well, where the trade-off between the number of species and ecosystem
stability is often considered (see e.g. [97]). Analogously, in economics the relation
between market stability and the number of firms producing homogeneous goods is
often considered.
However, it’s quite evident that the assumption of agents with absolutely identical
features and identical starting conditions is not generic, one may say a zero probability
event, as in real systems one can at most say that agents are practically identical,
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or almost identical or quite similar and so on. Of course, economists are aware of
this difficulty, and in fact statements like the following are very common (we quote
again [124]) “although simple examples can be constructed wherein the preferences of
the aggregate might misrepresent those of diverse agents, it has not been established
that this is a significant problem in the analysis of macroeconomic shocks. (...) Unless
the agents have very different characteristics, it seems reasonable to expect that each
individual will respond to aggregate macroeconomic shocks hitting the general economy
in more or less the same qualitative way (though not necessarily identically), in which
case the aggregate should behave in a qualitative similar way as well”. In other words,
unless the agents have very different characteristics, it seems reasonable to expect
that each individual will behave in more or less the same qualitative way (though not
necessarily identically) so that the behavior of the aggregate system is still sufficiently
well summarized by the behavior of the representative agent. However, this point has
been recently criticized by some authors ([82], [117], [10], [58]).
A more formal statement of the problem is the following. If the time evolution of
an economic system with several interacting agents is represented by an n-dimensional
dynamical system, when the agents are identical, i.e. they are characterized by identical
parameters, then the dynamical system becomes symmetric in the sense that it remains
the same by interchanging the agents. This symmetry property implies that an invariant
one-dimensional subspace exists, corresponding to the obvious statement that identical
agents, starting from identical initial conditions, behave identically for each time, i.e. if
n identical agents start from identical initial conditions, say x1(0) = x2(0) = ... = xn(0),
then their dynamic behavior will be characterized by x1(t) = x2(t) = ... = xn(t) for
each t ≥ 0. Such synchronized dynamics are governed by a one-dimensional dynamical
system, given by the restriction of the n-dimensional system to the invariant subspace
on which the synchronized dynamics occur, which can be seen as the model of a
representative agent, whose dynamic behavior summarizes the common behavior of
the identical agents (see e.g. [58], [95]).
The main goal of the work presented in this Chapter is to show, through some
examples and some general mathematical statements, that the one-dimensional restric-
tion may be quite misleading. In order to support this claim two kinds of arguments
are used. First are showed some examples, taken from the literature, where, due to
algebraic simplifications or mathematical cancellations along the invariant submanifold,
the dynamic properties of the one-dimensional system may be completely different from
those of the complete model. In those cases it can happens that highly nonlinear models
with very complicated dynamic behaviors may dramatically collapse into a trivial linear
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dynamic model when identical agents are considered. Further, models based on similar
kinds of dynamic interactions, which exhibit similar dynamic behaviors, give rise to
quite different kinds of dynamic qualitative behaviors when the assumption of identical
agents is imposed and the corresponding restrictions are considered.
The second argument consists in investigating the question of the effects of small
heterogeneities, i.e. small deviations from the condition of identical agents, on the
basis of a stream of literature on symmetric dynamical systems (see [30] and references
therein). Indeed, even in the case of identical agents, if their time paths start from
slightly different initial conditions they may not synchronize in the long run, so that
their asymptotic behaviors become very different from the one expected according to
the model of representative agent. Moreover, a slight modification of the parameters
with respect to the symmetric situation, may lead to a qualitatively different dynamic
evolution (see e.g. [110], [12], [114], [132]). In other words, the destruction of the
invariant submanifold, on which synchronized dynamics takes place, implies that the
attractors that characterize the long-run behavior of the one-dimensional model of the
representative agent are substituted by new attractors that may be very different from
those existing when symmetry is present.
Even if the examples here considered are taken from the literature on dynamic
marketing models, the results obtained can be applied to a broad class of multi-agent
dynamic models in economics and social sciences with interacting agents, as well as
in ecological models of interacting species sharing the same (or similar) ecological
niche, or more generally in physical and engineering systems where identical or almost
identical coupled nonlinear oscillators are represented.
The plan of the present Chapter is as follows.
In Section 3.2 are considered three different kinds of adaptive adjustment models,
proposed in the literature to represent market share attraction of firms which compete
in the market and it is showed that even if the models with heterogeneous interacting
firms exhibit similar properties, in the symmetric case of identical firms starting from
identical initial conditions, whose dynamics are governed by the restrictions to invariant
subspace where synchronized dynamics occur, the dynamic properties are quite different
and in some cases even misleading.
In Section 3.3.2 we focus on two of the dynamic marketing models examined in
section 3.2, the one proposed in [105] and studied in Chapter 2 and one proposed in
[68] (see also [63], [95]) with two interacting firms, and is analyzed what happens in
the case of identical firms starting from slightly different initial conditions as well as in
the case of slight differences in one parameter.
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Section 3.4 concludes.
Some details on the study of local stability and bifurcations of the steady states
of models considered in the Chapter are given in the Appendix C, whereas in the
Appendix D a short overview of some recent results about chaos synchronization and
related phenomena is reported.
3.2 Some examples of representative firm dynam-
ics in marketing models
In this Section are considered three different n-dimensional dynamic marketing models
belonging to the class of market share attraction models. Let consider n firms that sell
homogeneous goods in a market with sales potential B, from the standard assumptions
in marketing modeling the one-period net profit of the i-th firm results to be given by
Πi(t) = Bsi(t)− xi(t) = B aix
βi
i (t)
aix
βi
i (t) +
∑
j ̸=i ajx
βj
j (t)
− xi(t) (3.1)
where i = 1, ..., n. Here is reminded that si is the market share for firm i, xi denotes the
marketing spending of firm i, the positive constants ai denote the relative effectiveness
of effort expended by the firm i and the parameters βi denote the elasticity of the
attraction of firm i with regard to its marketing effort. For further details see Section
2.2 of Chapter 2 and the cited bibliography.
The models considered in the following differ only in the adaptive methods used by
firms to decide next period efforts, being these methods based on the same profit function
(3.1). The models are then similar since derive from similar adaptive adjustment
processes and exhibit similar dynamic behaviors (at least in the two-dimensional case).
Despite these facts it is showed that they are characterized by completely different
behaviors when their one-dimensional restriction governing the synchronized dynamics
is considered.
3.2.1 The model with best reply
As it is pointed out in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, following Farris et al. [105], the
dynamics of n agents resulting by considering the case of unit elasticities βi = 1,
i = 1, ..., n and assuming that agents at each time t decide next period spending
xi(t + 1) by solving the optimization problem maxxi Πi(t + 1), where Πi is given by
(3.1), is get from the first order conditions ∂Πi(t + 1)/∂xi = 0 which leads to the
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following recurrence
xi(t+ 1) =
√√√√
B
∑
j ̸=i ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
ai
−∑
j ̸=i
ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
where is reminded that x(e)j (t + 1) represent the expectation of firm i about firm j
spending at time t+1 on the basis of the information set of firm i at time t. Assuming
naive expectations x(e)j (t+ 1) = xj(t) Farris et al. [105] get the “Best Reply with naive
expectations” dynamic model
xi(t+ 1) = Ri
∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t)
 =
√
B
∑
j ̸=i ajxj(t)
ai
−∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t) (3.2)
In particular they consider the symmetric case of identical players
ai = a and xi(0) = x(0) for each i (3.3)
which implies that xi(t) = x(t) for each t ≥ 0. In this case ∑j ̸=i ajxj(t) = (n− 1) ax(t)
and the common dynamic behavior of the identical firms is governed by the one-
dimensional difference equation
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t)) =
√
B(n− 1)x(t)− (n− 1)ax(t) . (3.4)
Farris et al. [105] numerically show that (3.4) exhibits a bifurcation from stable
equilibrium to stable periodic oscillations, and then chaotic dynamics, as the number
n of firms increases. Indeed, this statement can be analytically proved as follows. The
first order derivative
f
′(x) =
√
B(n− 1)
2
√
x
− (n− 1)a
computed at the unique positive equilibrium
x∗ = B(n− 1)
(1 + (n− 1)a)2 (3.5)
becomes f ′(x∗) = (1− (n− 1)a)/2, and from the stability condition −1 < f ′(x∗) < 1,
it results
(n− 1) a ≤ 3, i.e. n < 1 + 3
a
(3.6)
36 Critique study: fallacies of composition in nonlinear marketing models
In the case of unit efficiency a = 1, it follows that the marketing system loses stability
when the number of firms exceeds 4, expressed in [105] by the statement “5 is a crowd”,
in the sense that 5 firms imply instability.
Farris et al. [105] also propose a different adjustment, known as adaptive adjustment
towards best reply, see also [107], [85], [69]
xi(t+ 1) = (1− λi)xi(t) + λiRi
∑
j ̸=i
ajxj(t)
 (3.7)
where i = 1, ..., n and the constants λi ∈ [0, 1] represent the attitude of firm i to adopt
the best reply, whereas (1− λi) is the anchoring attitude to maintain the previous
spending decision, i.e. a measure of inertia. The model (3.7) is a generalization of (3.2)
because it reduces to it for λi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, whereas it tends to absolute inertia
of firm i, i.e. xi(t + 1) = xi(t), as λi → 0. Moreover, the model (3.7) has the same
equilibria as the best reply model (3.2), and under the assumption
ai = a, λi = λ and xi(0) = x(0) for each i (3.8)
the one-dimensional model of the representative agent
x(t+ 1) = (1− λ)x(t) + λ
(√
B(n− 1)x(t)− (n− 1)ax(t)
)
ensures asymptotic stability of the positive equilibrium (3.5) provided that
(n− 1) a < 4− λ
λ
, i.e. n < 1 + 4− λ
λa
hence the stability condition holds for an arbitrarily large number of firms provided
that λ is sufficiently small, i.e. under the assumption of inertia or “prudent behavior”
of the identical firms. Of course, the dynamic behavior of the complete n-dimensional
marketing model, with heterogeneous firms due to differences in some parameters
and/or in the initial conditions, is more rich. As an example is showed a numerical
snapshots of dynamic scenarios of the model (3.7) with n = 2 in figure 3.1 (see also
dynamic scenario presented in Chapter 2). A comprehensive analytical and numerical
study on existence and local stability of the equilibrium points of (3.7) with n = 2 is
given in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter 2, whereas, for the sake of completeness, a
short analytical one is reported in the Appendix C.
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Fig. 3.1 Two dynamic scenarios for the model (3.2) with n = 2 identical firms starting
with different initial conditions. Left: a1 = a2 = 3.79, λ1 = λ2 = 1. Right: a1 = 3.85,
a2 = 4, λ1 = λ2 = 0.8. The different grey shades represent the basins of attraction of
the coexisting attractors, represented by black dots.
3.2.2 A different kind of adjustment
Following [68] and several other authors, see e.g. [40], [70], [36], is now considered
the assumption that the two competitors change their marketing efforts adaptively in
response to the profits achieved in the previous period. In particular, the marketing
efforts in period t+ 1 are determined by
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + λixi(t)Πi(t) = xi(t) + λixi(t)
B aixβii (t)∑n
j=i ajx
βj
j (t)
− xi(t)
 (3.9)
where (3.1) has been used. In this model the decision of the firms is driven by profits
obtained in the previous period with a type of anchoring and adjustment heuristic
widely used in decision theory (see e.g. [116], [14]). The parameters λi > 0 measure
the speed of adjustment. Also in this case a wide spectrum of rich dynamic scenarios is
obtained, see [68] for an extensive study of the case with n = 2. Two exemplary cases
are shown in figure 3.2 (see Appendix C for a brief analytical study of equilibrium
stability).
It can be said that the global dynamic properties of this model are similar to the
ones observed in the profit optimization model of the previous subsection. However,
under the assumption of identical firms starting from identical initial conditions the
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Fig. 3.2 Two dynamic scenarios for the model (3.9) with n = 2 identical firms with
different initial conditions. The parameter values are B = 10, λ1 = λ2 = 0.514961,
a1 = a2 = 1. Left: β1 = β2 = 0.05, a two-cyclic chaotic attractor coexists with a stable
cycle of period 2. Right: β1 = β2 = 1.136 two chaotic attractors coexist in symmetric
positions. The different grey shades represent the basins of attraction of the coexisting
attractors, represented by black dots, and the dark grey region represents the set of
initial conditions that generate diverging trajectories.
one-dimensional restriction of (3.9) to the invariant diagonal is
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
(
1 + λB
n
− λx(t)
)
(3.10)
a quadratic map conjugate to the logistic map z(t + 1) = µz(t) (1− z(t)) with z =
nλ/(n + λB) and parameter µ = 1 + λB/n. Hence in this case the unique positive
equilibrium x∗ = B/n is stable for
1 + λB
n
≤ 3, i.e. n ≥ λB2 (3.11)
a result completely different from the one obtained by Farris et al. [105] and recalled
above, being in this case the system stable for a sufficiently large number of firms.
3.2.3 Gradient dynamics
Let now consider here a dynamic adjustment based on profit gradient (or marginal
profits) a decision rule often proposed in the economic literature on boundedly rational
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agents (see e.g. [83], [130], [125], [51], [27], [48], [113], [57], [67])
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + λixi(t)
∂Πi(t)
∂xi
= xi(t) + λi
Bβiaixβii (t)∑j ̸=i ajxβjj (t)(∑n
j=i ajx
βj
j (t)
)2 − xi(t)

(3.12)
where λi > 0, i = 1, ...n, is the speed of adjustment which measures how strongly
agent i reacts to signals of increasing or decreasing profits by increasing or decreasing
marketing efforts respectively. The model (3.12) with n = 2 has been studied in [67],
where it is shown that a unique positive equilibrium exists that loses stability giving
rise to oscillatory behaviors, see e.g. figure 3.3 (and the corresponding analytic study
of local stability in the Appendix C).
Fig. 3.3 A dynamic scenario for the model (3.12) with n = 2 and parameters B = 20,
a1 = 1, a2 = 1.572 β1 = 0.7, β2 = 0.72, λ1 = 2.25, λ2 = 1.824. E∗ is the unique Nash
equilibrium, unstable for this set of parameters, surrounded by an annular attractor
whose basin is represented by the white region, whereas the grey region represents the
set of initial conditions that generate diverging trajectories.
Consider again the case of n identical players
λi = λ, ai = a, βi = β and xi(0) = x(0) , i = 1, ..., n
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and compute the one-dimensional restriction that governs the corresponding dynamics
of the representative agent
x(t+ 1) = (1− λ)x(t) + B(n− 1)
n2ax1−β
(3.13)
Notice that in the case of unit elasticity β = 1 (as assumed in [105]) it becomes a
linear contractive one-dimensional map, hence always globally asymptotically stable
(independently of the number of firms n).
3.3 The problem of synchronization in the case of
two firms
In this Section are studied two of the dynamic marketing models presented in the
previous section with n = 2, and the two firms are assumed to be identical, i.e.
characterized by the same parameters and starting from the same initial conditions,
or quasi-identical, i.e. with a slight difference between the parameters and/or their
initial conditions. A recent stream in the literature on applied mathematics shows that
the symmetric models which derive from the assumption of identical coupled units
(agents, oscillators etc.) exhibit, in many situations, non-generic dynamical behaviors.
First is considered the case of two identical firms that start from different initial effort
allocations, with the related question if the trajectories synchronize over time, i.e.,
if ∥x1(t)− x2(t)∥ → 0 as t → +∞. In this case, the initial difference between the
marketing efforts of the two firms, ∥x1(0)− x2(0)∥ > 0, would cancel out within a
reasonably short time span, so it can be safely ignored the transient dynamics of the
two-dimensional system, and consider the one-dimensional model of the representative
firm instead. If synchronization takes very long or does not occur at all, then the
concept of the representative firm becomes meaningless. This leads to the following
question: under which conditions do the trajectories of identical competitors which
start from different initial effort choices synchronize, and how does this depend on the
initial conditions themselves, that is on the difference of the initial efforts?
The second topic considered concerns the question if small heterogeneities between
the two firms - a small mismatch of some of the parameters - matter for synchronization
or not. Answering these questions is not easy, since new dynamic phenomena may
appear, especially in the presence of chaotic behavior. In this case chaotic synchroniza-
tion may occur, a phenomenon that has been extensively studied in the recent physical
and mathematical literature. In the Appendix D is given a short overview of some
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notions and results that can be found in this stream of literature, and the reader is
referred to [80], [104], [30], [114], [64], [63] and references therein for a deeper insight.
3.3.1 Synchronization and synchronization failure in two mar-
keting models
Let now first consider model (3.9) with n = 2 competitors.
T k :

x′1 = x1 + λ1x1
(
B
a1x
β1
1
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x1
)
x′2 = x2 + λ2x2
(
B
a2x
β2
2
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x2
) (3.14)
A general study of this map is given in [68], and its features in the symmetric case, i.e.
identical competitors for which
λ1 = λ2 := λ; β1 = β2 := β; a1 = a2
are considered in [63], where it is argued that the parameter β measures the degree of
competition between the firms. This example is now used to show the effects of small
heterogeneities in the initial condition by using the methods described in the previous
subsection. The restriction of the resulting symmetric map to the invariant diagonal ∆
(see (D.2) in Appendix D) is given by
T k∆(x) =
(
1 + λB2
)
x− λx2. (3.15)
which can be rewritten as a standard logistic map z′ = µz(1 − z) throw the linear
transformation x = z
λ
(
1 + λB2
)
, where
µ = 1 + 12λB (3.16)
For the symmetric map, the Jacobian matrix, computed at a point of the diagonal ∆
results
J =
 1− 2λx+
λB(β + 2)
4 −
λBβ
4
−λBβ4 1− 2λx+
λB(β + 2)
4
 (3.17)
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hence the eigenvalues are given by
ν∥ = 1− 2λx+
λB
2 , ν⊥ = 1− 2λx+
λB
2 (1 + β)
It is important to note that the parameter β only appears in the transverse eigenvalue
ν⊥, so it is a normal parameter, i.e. it has no influence on the dynamics along the
invariant submanifold ∆, and only influences the transverse stability: the associated
transverse Lyapunov exponent becomes (see the Appendix D)
Λ⊥ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
ln
∣∣∣∣∣1− 2λxn + λB2 (1 + β)
∣∣∣∣∣
This allows to consider fixed values of the parameters λ and B, such that a chaotic
attractor As ⊂ ∆ of the map (3.15) exists, with an absolutely continuous invariant
measure on it. So, it can be studied the transverse stability of As as the degree of
competition, measured by the parameter β, varies. Suitable values of the aggregate
parameter λB, at which chaotic intervals for the restriction (3.15) exist, are obtained
from the well known properties of the logistic map (see e.g. [6], [134]). For example,
at the parameter value µ1 = 3.5925721841... the period-2 cycle of the logistic map
undergoes the homoclinic bifurcation, at which two cyclic chaotic intervals are obtained
by the merging of four cyclic chaotic intervals. By using λB = 2(µ1 − 1) we get a
two-band chaotic set As along the diagonal ∆, and the transverse Lyapunov exponent
is shown in Figure 4 as a function of β.
The plot in figure (3.4) shows the comparison between Λnat⊥ , the natural transverse
Lyapunov exponent, and Λ(2)⊥ , the transverse Lyapunov exponent associated to the
period-2 cycle in∆. For the values of β for which Λnat⊥ < 0 and Λ
(2)
⊥ > 0 it can be asserted
that the set As is certainly a non topological Milnor attractor, since ΛMax⊥ ≥ Λ(2)⊥ > 0
(see again the Appendix D). This is the situation shown in figure 3.5, obtained for
β = 0.83, at which Λnat⊥ ≃ −0.11 and Λ(2)⊥ > 0. The generic trajectory starting from
initial conditions taken in the white region of figure 3.5 leads to synchronization,
whereas the points of the gray region generate interrupted trajectories, involving
negative values of the state variables.
The Milnor attractor As is included inside a minimal invariant absorbing area
whose boundary can be easily obtained by arcs of critical curves as explained in [62]
(see also Appendix B). This absorbing area, represented in the left panel of figure 3.6,
constitutes a trapping region inside which the asynchronous dynamics observed during
the transient are contained. Indeed, along the transient, the time evolution of the
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Fig. 3.4 The comparison between the natural transverse Lyapunov exponents Λnat⊥ and
the transverse Lyapunov exponent Λ(2)⊥ associated to the lower cycle of period two
included in As which gives a lower approximation of the maximum Lyapunov exponent
Λnat⊥ .
system is characterized by several bursts away from ∆ before synchronization occurs.
This characteristic dynamical pattern, named on-off intermittency, is highlighted in the
right panel of figure 6 where the difference ∥x1(t)− x2(t)∥ is represented versus time.
If the value of β is decreased Λnat⊥ goes positive and As becomes a chaotic saddle i.e.
a blowout bifurcation occurs. In the present case the so called blowout bifurcation is
preceded by the contact between critical lines and the basin of negative numbers: the
basin of ∆ becomes riddled and, after a transient which can also be very long, almost all
trajectories goes towards negative values. For further details about blowout bifurcation
and riddled basins see Appendix D. In the left panel of figure 3.7, obtained for β = 0.8,
at which Λnat⊥ > 0 the transient is represented. On the right panel of the same figure 3.7
bursts which characterize the transient are represented as ∥x1(t)− x2(t)∥ and exhibit
the same time patterns of on-off intermittency.
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Fig. 3.5 Synchronous dynamic of the system (3.9) for n = 2 in the long run. The
attractor As is included in the minimal absorbing area. The parameter set is: β = 0.83,
B = 10 and µ = µ¯1; if follows that the transversal Lyapunov exponent value is
Λnat⊥ ≃ −0.11. We notice that Λnat⊥ > 0 so As is a non topological Milnor attractor.
To sum up, when Λnat⊥ > 0 a small heterogeneity in the initial efforts of identical
firms imply that the trajectory obtained never synchronizes, so that the one-dimensional
dynamics of the representative agent cannot be used to represent the dynamic evolution
of the marketing system.
Another dynamic situation is shown in figure 3.8, obtained with parameters β = 0.84,
B = 10 and λ such that µ = µ¯1, where it can be observed the presence of a new
attractor C4 far from the diagonal ∆. The presence of this attractor, whose basin
reaches the invariant diagonal ∆ where chaotic dynamics occur, gives rise to the
dynamic scenario of global riddling.
In fact C4 can be reached by a trajectory that starting from an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of the transversely unstable 2-cycle embedded in As, namely along a
small tongue of the basin of C4 located around the transverse unstable manifold issuing
from the two periodic points. As in As there is pure chaos, the preimages of the points
of the 2-cycle are densely distributed along As, and the same occurs for the tongues of
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Fig. 3.6 Left: critical lines that bounds the minimal absorbing area which contains
the trajectories after synchronization are represented. Right: transient part of the
trajectory for which, before synchronization, the phenomenon of on-off intermittency
is observed. The parameters are µ = µ¯1, β = 0.83.
Fig. 3.7 Plot of the transient of a trajectory with Λnat⊥ > 0. In the first part of the
trajectory on-off intermittency occurs but in the long run the dynamics goes to infinity.
In this case we have a contact between critical lines and the basin of infinity before
blowout bifurcation, so the basin of As becomes riddled and only a set of zero Lebesgue
measure leads to synchronization. The parameter set is: β1 = β2 = 0.8 for which
Λnat⊥ = 7× 10−3.
the basin of the attractor C4 located far from ∆. This implies that many trajectories
that are locally repelled away from ∆ reach C4, whose basin is consequently densely
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Fig. 3.8 For the parameter set β = 0.84, B = 10 and µ = µ¯1 we observe the comparison
of a new attractor C4 outside ∆ coexisting with the non topological Milnor attractor
As.
distributed inside the realm of attraction of As, thus giving the typical structure of
a riddled basin (see [80]). The two basins of As ⊂ ∆ and C4 are shown in the figure
3.8, however the graphical resolution does not give sufficiently clear idea of such a
complexity.
In figure 3.9 two trajectories starting from initial conditions very close each other
taken in a neighborhood of a periodic point of the transversely unstable 2-cycle
embedded into As, i.e.
xc1 = xc2 =
µ+ 1±√µ2 − 2µ− 3.
2λ
are represented, one folded back towards the diagonal ∆ and the other one reaching
the attractor C4 outside it.
So, even in this case, two almost identical initial efforts of identical firms give rise to
very different long run evolutions, one synchronizing in the long run and the other one
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Fig. 3.9 Different trajectories for almost identical initial conditions taken close to
unstable two-cycle along the direction of the unstable manifold (left) and along a slightly
different direction (right). Left: x1(0) = xc,11 + 10−3 × cos(3π/4), x2(0) = xc,11 + 10−3 ×
sin(3π/4). Right: x1(0) = xc,11 +10−3×cos(3π/4+ϵ), x2(0) = xc,11 +10−3×sin(3π/4+ϵ)
where ϵ = 2.7× 10−4. The parameter set is: β = 0.85, B = 10 and µ = µ¯1.
converging to a cyclic attractor far from the submanifold where synchronized dynamics
occur.
Let now consider the model with best reply and inertia (3.7) with 2 firms and
B = 1:
T f =

x′1 = (1− λ1)x1 + λ1
(√
a2x2
a1
− a2x2
)
x′2 = (1− λ2)x2 + λ2
(√
a1x1
a2
− a1x1
) (3.18)
The symmetric counterpart of recurrence (3.18) is provided by the conditions on
coefficients λi = λ and ai = a, i, j = 1, 2, and the restriction of the resulting symmetric
map to the invariant diagonal ∆ is given by
T f∆ = (1− λ)x+ λ(
√
x− ax) (3.19)
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From the Jacobian matrix relative to the symmetric case, see (C.2) in Appendix B, the
normal and transversal Lyapunov exponent are obtained and are respectively given by
Λ∥ = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=0
ln
∣∣∣∣∣1− λ+ λ
(
1
2
√
1
xk
− a
)∣∣∣∣∣ (3.20a)
Λ⊥ = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=0
ln
∣∣∣∣∣1− λ− λ
(
1
2
√
1
xk
− a
)∣∣∣∣∣ (3.20b)
Both Λ∥ and Λ⊥ depend on a and λ, so there are no normal parameters. It is noted
that for λ = 1 (no inertia) it results Λ⊥ = Λ∥ and they are showed in figure 3.10 as the
parameter a varies.
Fig. 3.10 Plot of Λ∥ = Λ⊥ versus a in the case λ = 1.
In this case every stable cycle of period n, Cn, is a topological attractor characterized
both by negative Lyapunov exponents. Pure chaos exists in a set of positive Lebesgue
measure in the parameter space (see [79], or [Thunberg] for a survey) and, since
Λnat⊥ > 0, subsets Aks ∈ ∆ in which chaotic dynamics occur are chaotic saddles. As
stressed in [105], synchronization can occur for certain parameters’ constellations giving
negative values of Λnat⊥ (and for certain initial conditions) as showed in figure 3.11.
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However, in the same figure 3.11 is observed the existence of other attractors in the
two-dimensional phase space out of ∆ coexisting with the stable cycles on the diagonal.
In other words, even if stable cycles may exist embedded into the diagonal ∆, their
basins may be quite intermingled with the basins of other stable cycles located outside
∆.
Fig. 3.11 Two different scenarios resulting from the model (3.18) in which a stable
periodic cycle with Λ⊥ < 0 is embedded into ∆. Synchronization occurs for initial
conditions in the white basin, while other different initial conditions lead the trajectories
towards other attractors out of the synchronization manifold ∆. The parameter values
are: a = 3.79, λ = 0.99 (left) and a = 3.84818, λ = 1 (right).
When no stable cycles exist along ∆, than trajectories never synchronize, except
the non generic case of identical firms that start with identical initial conditions, i.e.
only for a set of initial conditions belonging to ∆ which has zero Lebesgue measure
in R2. It is plain that in this case the one-dimensional synchronized dynamics of the
representative agent has no economic meaning. In figure 3.12 an example of a typical
dynamic scenario of the model (3.18) with Λnat⊥ > 0 is shown.
3.3.2 Quasi-homogeneous firms and symmetry loss
The very restrictive assumption that the firms’ structural parameters are the same and
the difference between the competitors lies only in their initial effort allocations are
now relaxed. Although synchronization does not necessarily occur for all initial effort
allocations, it could be determined for which parameters’ constellations and initial
conditions the two-dimensional model may be substituted by the one-dimensional
model of a representative agent as far as long run dynamics is concerned.
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Fig. 3.12 Two different scenarios resulting from the market model (3.18) for different
initial conditions. The system is characterized by λ = 1, a = 3.878 for which Λnat⊥ ≃
0.27 > 0. Left: a non generic trajectory obtained with initial conditions on ∆. Right:
a chaotic trajectories with initial conditions out of ∆.
For practical purposes, it can now be checked, by using the marketing model (3.9)
as a paradigmatic example, what happens as a consequence of small heterogeneities
due to small parameters’ mismatches. It is noted first that a parameters’ mismatch
causes the destruction of the invariance of ∆, due to the fact that the map is no longer
symmetric. This may lead to quite different dynamics since, after the parameters’
mismatch, synchronization along ∆ can no longer occur and the generic trajectory fills
up the minimal absorbing area around the former invariant set As (see e.g. [63], [62]).
However, if the attractor As existing along ∆ before the parameters’ mismatch is a
topological attractor, that is ΛMax⊥ < 0, then the introduction of small heterogeneities
does not have such a disruptive effect, and the symmetric model still serves as a good
approximation of the behavior of the two firms. Such a situation is shown in the
figure 3.13 where identical firms are characterized by a set of parameters such that
the one-dimensional chaotic attractor embedded into the diagonal is an asymptotic
attractor, i.e. ΛMax⊥ < 0. It has to be stressed that this is not easy to be proved in
general, since the cycles included in a chaotic attractor are infinitely many. However it
is claimed that the natural transverse Lyapunov exponent has a strong negative value,
as shown in figure 3.4, and the periodic cycles of lower period are transversely stable.
This last point constitutes a well known conjecture, based on the fact that if Λnat⊥ < 0
and ΛMax⊥ > 0, then some low period cycles should be transversely unstable, because if
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a cycle of high period is transversely unstable, i.e. its transverse Lyapunov exponent is
positive, also Λnat⊥ should be positive, see e.g. [133].
Fig. 3.13 Quasi-synchronization due to a mismach of parameters: a1 = 1, a2 = 1.01.
The attractor As is, with gratest probablity, a topological one, argued by the fact that,
for β = 0.97 and in the symmetric case, we have Λnat⊥ ≃ −0.35 and Λnat⊥ > Λ(2)⊥ .
So, the fact that the chaotic set on which synchronized dynamics occur is an
asymptotic attractor for the two-dimensional map implies two things: first, the syn-
chronization of trajectories starting out of it, and in its basin, is very fast; second, if is
introduced a small parameter mismatch, the resulting trajectories are “almost synchro-
nized” (see figure 3.13). Instead, if the introduction of a parameters’ mismatch occurs
starting from a symmetric situation where the chaotic one-dimensional invariant set
As ⊂ ∆ is an attractor only in Milnor sense (i.e. not asymptotic) then a quite different
effect generally occurs, because after the symmetry breaking endless intermittency
filling up the minimal absorbing area around As is observed. This is illustrated in figure
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3.14, obtained starting from the situation already discussed in the previous subsection
and illustrated in figure 3.6 after the introduction of a very small difference between the
response parameters of the firms, namely a1 = a2 and β1 = 0.83 while β2 = β1 − 10−5.
Such a small perturbation leads to quite different dynamics, since synchronization no
longer occurs, and the bursts never stop. The generic trajectory fills up the absorbing
area, which now appears to be a two-dimensional chaotic area, as shown in figure 3.14.
In the left panel is showed the evolution of the system starting from the initial effort
allocation (x1(0), x2(0)) = (3.5, 3.5) ∈ ∆, i.e., from homogeneous initial choices, is
represented in the phase space (x1, x2), whereas in the right panel of the same figure
3.14 the difference of the marketing efforts over time, (x1(t)− x2(t)), is represented
over 5000 periods. It is evident that long time intervals exist in which the two firms
show quasi-synchronized behavior, but in-between such intervals asynchronous behavior
emerges with an apparently random pattern.
Fig. 3.14 Left: an example of a trajectories which fills up the whole minimal absorbing
area due to a mismatch of parameters. Right: the corresponding never ending on-off
intermittency. The parameter values are: β1 = 0.83, β2 = β1 − 10−5, µ = µ¯1.
Of course, the study of the effects of small parameters’ mismatches may be important
in economic dynamic modeling, as stressed in [58] and [95].
3.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter we have critically considered a common practice, in economic literature,
that consists in the reduction of a model describing n identical agents to a one-
dimensional dynamical system that governs the asymptotic dynamics of a representative
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agent that summarizes the common behavior of the n identical firms. Often the same
equation is assumed to represent the dynamics of the system even in the presence of
“sufficiently small” heterogeneities, and is often used to study the trade-off between
stability of the overall system and the number n of firms, that can be seen as a
bifurcation parameter of the one-dimensional restriction. This approach can be found
in several books and papers, see e.g. [124], [119], [105], [69].
In particular, starting from some market share attraction models commonly used
in the literature to describe marketing dynamics with adaptive firms, we have shown
how dangerous (sometimes even misleading) this approach may be. First of all,
we have shown that similar nonlinear models based on adaptive profit increasing
mechanism, that exhibit similar and quite rich dynamic behaviors, may collapse into
qualitatively different one-dimensional models (and sometimes even leading to opposite
stability statements) when identical agents are considered. Moreover, by using some
advanced tools from the recent literature on symmetric dynamic models, we have shown
under which conditions the one-dimensional restriction is robust with respect to the
introduction of small asymmetries in the initial conditions and/or in the parameters of
the model. The theoretical as well as the numerical results suggest that the study of the
transverse Lyapunov exponents gives important suggestions about both questions. In
fact, negative values of the transverse Lyapunov exponent guarantees synchronization
in the long run (sometimes after a long transient characterized by on-off intermittency)
so that the one-dimensional reduction of the system remains meaningful even if the
identical firms start from (slightly) different initial conditions. However the question of
coexistence of attracting sets, with the related phenomenon of riddled basins, should
be carefully considered as well. Analogously, when small parameters’ mismatches are
introduced, if all the transverse Lyapunov exponents are negative then only small
changes in the shape of the attractor are observed, so that the long run dynamics
of quasi-identical agents are still well approximated by the one-dimensional model.
Instead, in the presence of some positive transverse Lyapunov exponents (even if
the natural transverse Lyapunov exponent is negative, so that the one-dimensional
invariant set along the diagonal is an attractor only in Milnor sense) a quite different
asymptotic dynamics may arise, along an attractor whose shape and extension depend
on the global properties of the dynamical system.
These results suggest that even if the restriction of the complete dynamical system
to the diagonal (where synchronized dynamics occur) may be meaningful in some cases,
in general this is not the case (see also [95] on this point).
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In order to address this general idea in the simplest case, the given examples and
numerical simulations are referred to marketing models with just two firms, represented
by two-dimensional dynamical systems. Similar arguments may be applied to higher
dimensional models, that represent systems with more than two firms, where conditions
for complete synchronization (i.e. all firms synchronize) or partial synchronization (i.e.
only a subset of firms synchronize) may be given. This will be a natural continuation
of the research stream whose early modest steps are moved by this work.
From an economic point of view, the obtained results make us aware how an
assumptions made in (or almost throughout) the economic literature should be critically
considered. In fact, if the assumption of aggregate dynamics where all identical agents
are summarized by the behavior of a representative agent is made for analytical
tractability, we should be aware that such aggregation represents a very special case.
The reason is that for dynamic models the symmetric case is often non-generic.
Chapter 4
Case study: on a discrete-time
model with replicator dynamics in
renewable resource exploitation
4.1 Introduction
In this Chapter is presented a discrete time version of the model proposed in [89]
to describe a fishery where two different harvesting strategies can be employed, one
denoted as standard and the other one more ecological (less intensive, hence more
environmentally friendly). At any time period, the fish population is assumed to
reproduce according to a discrete-time logistic growth function (see e.g. [28], second
Chapter, and [55]), and the agents that exploit the fishery are assumed to update
their harvesting strategy according to a profit-driven adaptive mechanism based on
the evolutionary selection rule known as replicator dynamics (see e.g. [118] and [73]).
For what concerns this Chapter it is now pointed out that, even if dynamic
models in ecology have been traditionally formulated in continuous time, discrete-time
population models have received a great amount of attention not only for the complex
and intriguing dynamics that they can produce even in the simplest systems, but
also because biological motivations have been proposed to explain their usefulness in
ecologic modeling. In fact, several authors stress that discrete-time population models
should be used whenever reproduction happens at given breeding seasons, as several
animal species successfully mate only during certain times of the year, thus giving
non-overlapping generations (see e.g. [54] and [98]). So, more and more discrete-time
population models have been proposed in the literature (see e.g. [55], [23] and [38]).
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Moreover, as already stressed in [89], in the model here considered decisions about
the kind of harvesting strategy to be adopted typically occur in discrete time, as such
decisions imply the adoption of different fishing technologies, and/or different numbers
of workers with different kinds of equipment, hence they cannot be revised at any time.
Sometimes the possibility of switching from a harvesting strategy to another one is
allowed only at given time periods by laws that regulate harvesting activities (see [21],
[20] and [24]).
On the basis of these motivations, a discrete-time model, represented by a two-
dimensional nonlinear map, is studied by using analytical, geometric and numerical
methods. The structure of the map is quite interesting from the point of view of
its mathematical properties, and is typical (hence representative) for a large class
of repeated evolutionary games where a population of n players can choose, at any
time, between two strategies. In fact, one dynamic variable, denoted as r(t) ∈ [0, 1],
represents the fraction of players adopting a given strategy at time period t ∈ N (of
course the complementary fraction 1− r(t) adopts the other strategy at the same time
period). As typically occurs in these kind of evolutionary games, the two lines r = 0 and
r = 1, where all players adopt the same strategy, are invariant lines, along which the
dynamics characterized by unique kind of players (pure strategy case) are governed by a
one-dimensional restriction of the map. In our case, the dynamics along such invariant
boundary lines are given by the iteration of a quadratic map, topologically conjugate
to the standard logistic map. However, interior attractors, where players carrying
out both strategies coexist, can be obtained, and some bifurcations involving interior
and boundary invariant sets can be studied. Indeed, very rich dynamic scenarios can
be highlighted, both analytically and numerically, and regions of the phase space of
the model can be detected in which quasi-periodic motions prevail (i.e. where the
linear approximation of the map has complex eigenvalues) and other regions where
real eigenvalues give rise to monotonic motions or improper oscillations. In both cases,
however, transitions to chaotic behaviors can be observed. Moreover, the existence
of non topological Milnor attractors embedded in the invariant lines is proved and
numerically shown.
The plan of the present Chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 the discrete-time
model is introduced and the dynamics along the invariant lines where one-dimensional
dynamics occurs when all agents adopt the same strategy is discussed. Section 4.3
contains analytical results on the existence of equilibrium points and their local
stability properties as well as local bifurcations. In Section 4.4 some statements on
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global behavior and some numerical simulations of the model and, also, some brief
final considerations are given.
4.2 The model
Following the general setup of the model proposed by [89], let x(t) denote the available
quantity at time t of a renewable resource and consider a population of n agents
that can exploit the resource by two different technologies: a standard (intensive) one
characterized by technology coefficient q1 > 0, and a more environmentally-friendly
(let’s say ecological) technology characterized by q0 ∈ (0, q1). Let r(t) ∈ [0, 1] be
the fraction of agents that adopt the standard technology during time period t and
consequently the complementary fraction of agents (1− r(t)) adopts the ecological
technology, so that r = 0 means that all the agents adopt the ecological technology q0,
and r = 1 means that all the agents adopt the standard technology q1. If hi denotes
the harvesting of resource by using technology i, i = 0, 1, following again [89] is here
assumed that the cost functions are given by
Ci(hi) = ci + γ
h2i
qix
; i = 0, 1 (4.1)
where ci ≤ 0 represents fixed costs and γ > 0 is a cost coefficient. Finally, denoting by
a0 > 0 the constant price at which consumers buy the resource harvested by ecological
technology and by a1 ∈ (0, a0) the price at which they buy the standard one, the
generic profits associated to the i-th behavioral rule reads as
πi(x) = aihi(x)− ci − γh
2
i (x)
qix
; i = 0, 1 (4.2)
As showed in [89], the optimal harvesting, computed as Nash equilibrium, of the
representative player that uses technology i is get from the first order condition
∂π/∂hi = 0 and is given by
hi(x) =
aiqi
2γ x; i = 0, 1 (4.3)
In the following a0 > a1 will be assumed, i.e. the loss in efficiency of the more ecological
harvesting strategy is counterbalanced by a higher price that consumers wish to pay
for the more environmentally-friendly product.
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As pointed out in the Introduction 4.1 a discrete-time model is considered here: the
resource is assumed to be obtained from a population with non-overlapping generations
growing according to the following discrete-time logistic equation
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + αx(t)
(
1− x(t)
k
)
−Nr(t)h1(t)−N(1− r(t))h0(t) (4.4)
where the parameter α > 0 is the natural growth rate of the resource, k > 0 represents
the carrying capacity, that is the equilibrium level of the resource in the absence of
harvesting. The fraction r(t) is assumed to evolve according to the discrete time
exponential replicator dynamics driven by the profits (see e.g. [35] and [73]) that is
according to the following discrete time recurrence
r(t+ 1) = r(t)e
βπ1(t)
r(t)eβπ1(t) + (1− r(t))eβπ0(t) =
r(t)
r(t) + (1− r(t))eβ(∆π(t)) (4.5)
where β ∈ [0,+∞) is the so called intensity of choice parameter and measures the
reactiveness of agents to adopt the more profitable strategy and ∆π(t) is the difference
between the two profits which, according to relations (4.3) and (4.2), results to be
given by
∆π(t) = π0(t)− π1(t) = a
2
0q0 − a21q1
4γ x(t)− ξ (4.6)
with ξ = c0 − c1. The parameter ξ ∈ R represents the difference between fixed costs
associated with the two technologies, and may be considered as a government parameter
as it includes taxes imposed in order to obtain the prevalence of one technology over the
other. In the following is considered the restriction ξ ≤ 0, coming from the consideration
that fixed costs for the more intensive harvesting method are higher, due to more
sophisticated technology and higher taxes, or equivalently to government subsidies for
agents adopting the more ecological fishing methods. The resulting dynamic model is
the two-dimensional iterated map T : (x, y)→ (x′, y′) explicitly given by
T :

x′ =
(
1 + α− Na0q02γ
)
x− α
k
x2 + N2γ (a0q0 − a1q1)xr
r′ = r
r + (1− r)eβ
(
a20q0−a
2
1q1
4γ x−ξ
)−1
(4.7)
The dynamic variable (x, r) represents a feasible state of the system if x ≥ 0 and
0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
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Let now consider the one-dimensional dynamics along the invariant lines. It is first
noted that the lines of pure strategies r = 0 and r = 1 where all agents adopt the
same harvesting rule, as well as the line of resource extinction x = 0, are invariant
sets. In particular the dynamics along the invariant line x = 0 is governed by the
one-dimensional restriction
x = 0: r′ = g(r) = r
r + (1− r) e−ξ (4.8)
which is a convex function in the interval r ∈ [0, 1] with fixed points in r = 0 (stable)
and r = 1 (unstable). The dynamics along the invariant line r = 0, where all the
agents adopt the ecological strategy, are governed by the one-dimensional restriction
r = 0: x′ = f0(x) =
(
1 + α− Na0q02γ
)
x− α
k
x2 (4.9)
topologically conjugate to the standard logistic map z′ = µz (1− z) by the transfor-
mation z = 2γα
k [2γ(1 + α)−Na0q0]x and parameter µ = 1 + α −
Na0q0
2γ . Its two fixed
points are given by x00 = 0 (extinction equilibrium) and
x∗0 =
k (2αγ −Na0q0)
2αγ (4.10)
that represents the viable equilibrium under ecological harvesting. Notice that x∗0 is
stable for the dynamics along the line r = 0 provided that
α− 2 < Na0q02γ < α (4.11)
where the condition Na0q0/(2γ) = α represents the transcritical bifurcation along the
line r = 0 at which the viable equilibrium x∗0 merges with the extinction equilibrium x00,
whereas the condition Na0q0/(2γ) = α− 2 represents a period doubling bifurcation, at
which a stable cycle becomes the unique attractor along the line r = 0. As it is well
known, this bifurcation opens the period-doubling cascade, leading to chaotic motion
along the line r = 0, as the aggregate parameter Na0q0/(2γ) is further decreased.
The dynamics along the invariant line r = 1, where all agents adopt the standard
(more intensive) fishing strategy, is governed by the map
r = 1: x′ = f1(x) =
(
1 + α− Na1q12γ
)
x− α
k
x2 (4.12)
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conjugate to the logistic map z′ = µz (1− z) by the transformation z = 2γα
k [2γ(1 + α)−Na1q1]x
and parameter µ = 1 + α− Na1q12γ . Here, the viable equilibrium is
x∗1 =
k (2αγ −Na1q1)
2αγ (4.13)
Notice x∗0 > x∗1 if a0q0 < a1q1, a parameters’ restriction assumed in the following in
order to characterize the technology q0 as more ecological. Calculus shows that the
stability of the equilibrium x∗1 along the line r = 1 is assured by the conditions
α− 2 < Na1q12γ < α (4.14)
Analogous statements about the transcritical and period doubling bifurcations already
made for x∗0, hold for x∗1.
The existence of these invariant lines that bound the two-dimensional phase space
of the dynamical system (4.7) is important in order to characterize its global dynamical
properties. Moreover, the knowledge of the kind of dynamic motion occurring along
the two lines where a single pure strategy exists, tells what will happen in the long run
when one of the two strategies becomes dominant in terms of profits so that it will
prevail due to evolutionary pressure. The latter problem may be equivalently stated
by asking when the one-dimensional attractors of the restrictions along the invariant
lines r = 0 and r = 1 given by (4.9) and (4.12) respectively, are also attractors of
the two-dimensional dynamical system. This depends on the transverse stability as
well as on the existence of attractors interior to the phase space, i.e. characterized by
r ∈ (0, 1). These are the questions examined, analytically and numerically, in the next
Sections. Here, for the sake of clarity, it is worth specifying that the j-cycle (j ≥ 1)
laying on an invariant line has one of its eigenvectors that is along the invariant line
itself, while the other eigenvector has generally another direction. This last eigenvector
is commonly named transverse eigenvector, which is tangent to the so-called transverse
invariant manifold.
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4.3 Existence and stability of equilibrium points
The equilibrium points of the model (4.7) are solutions of the system
x
[
α− Na0q02γ −
α
k
x+ N2γ (a0q0 − a1q1) r
]
= 0
r(1− r)
eβ
(
a20q0−a
2
1q1
4γ x−ξ
)
− 1
 = 0
(4.15)
The extinction fixed points E00 = (0, 0) and E01 = (0, 1) always exist. Moreover, if ξ = 0
then any point of the whole segment (0, r), with r ∈ [0, 1], is a fixed point. Other
boundary equilibrium points are E∗0 = (x∗0, 0) with x∗0 given by (4.10) and E∗1 = (x∗1, 1)
with x∗1 given by (4.13). Furthermore, an interior equilibrium may exist, characterized
by the co-existence of both harvesting strategies, given by E∗ = (x∗, r∗) with
x∗ = 4γξ
a20q0 − a21q1
; r∗ = 2αγ(k − x
∗)−Nka0q0
Nk (a1q1 − a0q0) (4.16)
provided that x∗ > 0 and r∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Let notice that if ξ < 0, i.e. c0 < c1 as argued above, then x∗ > 0 provided that
a20q0 < a
2
1q1, which is a more stringent condition than a0q0 < a1q1 being a0 > a1. It
will be assumed that this condition is satisfied in the following1. It is worth noticing
that the condition r∗ ∈ (0, 1) can be easily expressed in term of the carrying capacity
k, as r∗ = 0 for k = k0 with
k0 =
2αγx∗
2αγ −Na0q0 =
8αγ2ξ
(2αγ −Na0q0) (a20q0 − a21q1)
(4.17)
and r∗ = 1 for k = k1 with
k1 =
2αγx∗
2αγ −Na1q1 =
8αγ2ξ
(2αγ −Na1q1) (a20q0 − a21q1)
(4.18)
with k0 < k1 being a0q0 < a1q1, so that r∗ ∈ (0, 1) for k0 < k < k1.
These existence conditions are the same as the ones given in [89] for the model in
continuous time, whereas the stability conditions now are different. In order to study
1For sake of completeness, we stress that if ξ > 0, i.e. c0 > c1, then x∗ > 0 provided that
a20q0 > a
2
1q1, that together with the condition a0q0 < a1q1 implies
a21q1
a0
< a0q0 < a1q1, which is a
nonempty set being a0 > a1.
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Fig. 4.1 Fixed points E∗(k), E∗0(k) and E∗1(k) are shown as k ∈ [k0, k1]. The point E∗
merges with E∗0 in r = 0 for k = k0 and merges with E∗1 in r = 1 for k = k1. Other
fixed points do not depend on k.
the local stability of the equilibrium points we consider the Jacobian matrix
J(x, r) =

1 + α− Na02γ −
2α
k
x− N2γ (a1q1 − a0q0) r −
N (a1q1 − a0q0)x
2γ
βr(1− r) (a21q1 − a20q0) eβ∆π
4γ (r + (1− r)eβ∆π)2
eβ∆π
(r + (1− r)eβ∆π)2
 (4.19)
In E00 it results that
J(0, 0) =
 1 + α− Na0q02γ 0
0 eβξ
 (4.20)
so E00 is stable along the vertical direction (r direction) and stable along the horizontal
one (x direction) provided that Na0q0/(2γ)− 2 < α < Na0q0/(2γ). At E01 we have
J(0, 1) =
 1 + α− Na1q12γ 0
0 e−βξ
 (4.21)
so E01 is unstable along the vertical direction and stable along the horizontal one
provided that Na1q1/(2γ)− 2 < α < Na1q1/(2γ).
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In E∗0 it results
J(x∗0, 0) =

1− α + Na0q02γ −
N (a1q1 − a0q0) (2αγ −Na0q0)
2αγ2
0 e
β
(
k(a21q1−a20q0)(2αγ−Na0q0)
8αγ2 +ξ
)
 (4.22)
so E∗0 is stable along the eigendirection transverse to r = 0 if k < k0, with k0 given by
(4.17), and stable along the horizontal direction if Na0q0/(2γ) < α < Na0q0/(2γ) + 2.
In E∗1 it results
J(x∗1, 1) =

1− α + Na1q12γ −
N (a1q1 − a0q0) (2αγ −Na1q1)
2αγ2
0 e
−β
(
k(a21q1−a20q0)(2αγ−Na1q1)
8αγ2 +ξ
)
 (4.23)
so E∗1 is stable along the eigen-direction transverse to r = 1 if k > k1 with k1 given by
(4.18), and stable along the horizontal direction if Na1q1/(2γ) < α < Na1q1/(2γ) + 2.
Notice that all the stability conditions along the horizontal invariant lines r = 0
and r = 1, on which the boundary fixed points are located, correspond to those already
examined for the logistic restrictions (4.9) and (4.12).
Finally, in E∗ it results
J(x∗, r∗) =
 1− αx∗k −N(a1q1−a0q0)x∗2γ
β
4γ r
∗(1− r∗) (a21q1 − a20q0) 1
 (4.24)
Hence, given that trace and determinant of the matrix (4.24) are respectively
trJ = 2− αx
∗
k
= 2− 4αγξ
k (a20q0 − a21q1)
(4.25)
detJ = 1− αx
∗
k
+ Nβ8γ2 (a1q1 − a0q0)
(
a21q1 − a20q0
)
x∗r∗ (1− r∗) (4.26)
and, as stated in previous Chapters, a sufficient condition for the local asymptotic
stability of E∗ is that the eigenvalues of (4.24) are located inside the unit circle of the
complex plane. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is given by the system of
inequalities (the Schur or Jury’s conditions, see e.g. [46]) involving the characteristic
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polynomial of the Jacobian matrix J given in (2.17) of Chapter 2. In the present case
it results that P (1) = −4Nβξ8γ (a1q1 − a0q0) r∗ (1− r∗) > 0 which vanishes (and then
changes sign) when r∗ crosses the value r∗ = 0 from above and when r∗ crosses the
value r∗ = 1 from below. These two conditions correspond to transcritical bifurcations
when the interior equilibrium E∗ = (x∗, r∗) merges with the boundary points E∗0 and
E∗1 respectively. In fact, the condition r∗(x∗) = 0 implies x∗ = x∗0 and r∗(x∗) = 1
implies x∗ = x∗1. The two bifurcation conditions can easily be expressed in terms of
the carrying capacity k as k = k0 and k = k1 respectively, see also figure 4.1, where
the equilibrium points are represented for k in the range [k0, k1]. Notice that a change
of sign of P (1) also occurs when ξ changes from negative to positive, and this is a
transcritical bifurcation as well, but of codimension two as it occurs when the fixed
point E∗ crosses at ξ = 0 the segment of fixed points along the axis x = 0.
Before analyzing the other two stability conditions, consider the condition (trJ)2 −
4detJ > 0 which ensures that the eigenvalues are real. Calculus shows that the previous
inequality becomes
2α2γ2x∗ + 16kαγ2 > k2Nβ (a1q1 − a0q0)
(
a21q1 − a20q0
)
r∗ (1− r∗) (4.27)
from which it is evident that it is surely satisfied (hence eigenvalues are reals) when r∗
is very close to 0 or 1, whereas it is surely not satisfied (hence eigenvalues are complex
conjugate) for intermediate values of r∗ and sufficiently high values of the parameter β.
Notice also that both x∗ and r∗ do not depend on the parameter β.
Indeed, if the other parameters are fixed so that x∗ > 0 and r∗ has intermediate
values, i.e. it is not too close to the invariant lines of pure strategies, then a Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation occurs for increasing values of β. In fact, the third stability condition
1− detJ > 0, where a change of sign of the left hand side indicates the occurrence of a
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of E∗, becomes
Nβ (a1q1 − a0q0)
(
a21q1 − a20q0
)
r∗ (1− r∗) < 8αγ
2
k
(4.28)
This stability condition can be equivalently written as β < βNS, with
βNS =
8αγ2
Nk (a1q1 − a0q0) (a21q1 − a20q0) r∗ (1− r∗)
(4.29)
and r∗ given by (4.16), and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs when β increases
across βNS.
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Finally, the stability condition P (−1) > 0 becomes
32kγ2 +Nkβ (a1q1 − a0q0)
(
a21q1 − a20q0
)
x∗r∗ (1− r∗) > 16αγ2x∗ (4.30)
that can be equivalently written as β > βF with
βF = 2βNS − 8γ
Nξ (a0q0 − a1q1) r∗ (1− r∗) (4.31)
These results can be summarized by the following statement:
Proposition 1 The map (4.7), with ξ ∈ (−∞,+∞) and positive values of all other
parameters, always has the boundary fixed points E00 = (0, 0) and E01 = (0, 1), and if
ξ = 0 any point of the whole segment (0, r), with r ∈ [0, 1], is a fixed point. Moreover,
the following holds:
i.) If 2αγ > Naiqi, i = 0, 1, then two more boundary fixed points exist, namely
E∗0 = (x∗0, 0) with x∗0 given by (4.10) and E∗1 = (x∗1, 1) with x∗1 given by (4.13).
ii.) If ξ < 0, a20q0 < a21q1 and k0 < k < k1 where k0 and k1 are given by (4.17)
and (4.18) respectively, then an interior equilibrium E∗ = (x∗, r∗) exists with
components given by (4.16).
iii.) If E∗0 exists (i.e. 2αγ > Na0q0) then for ξ < 0 E00 is a saddle point with stable
set along the invariant line x = 0 and unstable set along the invariant line r = 0.
iv.) If E∗1 exists (i.e. 2αγ > Na1q1) then for ξ < 0 E01 is an unstable node.
v.) E∗0 is a stable node if k < k0 and Na0q02γ < α <
Na0q0
2γ +2. At k = k0 it undergoes a
transcritical bifurcation at which it merges with E∗, at α < Na0q02γ +2 it undergoes
a flip bifurcation along the invariant line r = 0.
vi.) E∗1 is a stable node if k > k1 and Na1q12γ < α <
Na1q1
2γ +2. At k = k1 it undergoes a
transcritical bifurcation at which it merges with E∗, at α < Na1q12γ +2 it undergoes
a flip bifurcation along the invariant line r = 1.
vii.) The interior fixed point E∗ is stable if k0 < k < k1 and βF < β < βNS, where βNS
and βF are given by (4.29) and (4.31) respectively, hence the range of stability is
nonempty provided that αγξ > −k (a21q1 − a20q0)
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It is worth highlighting that condition βF < βNS is equivalent to k < αx
∗
4 that,
being k > k0, is verified for 1 + α− Na0q02γ < 5, that is true when the restriction (4.9)
to r = 0 has bounded dynamics, i.e. when 1 + α− Na0q02γ ≤ 4. The stability range of
the interior equilibrium E∗, as the parameter β varies, is shown by the bifurcation
diagrams in Figure 4.2, where the supercritical flip and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations,
through which the equilibrium loses its stability for decreasing and increasing values of
β respectively, can be clearly seen.
Fig. 4.2 Left column: Bifurcation diagrams for β ∈ [0, 350] showing the asymptotic
dynamics of the two state variables x and r. Parameters: α = 2.7, γ = 1, N = 15,
a0 = 1.05487, a1 = 0.5, q0 = 0.01, q1 = 0.2, k = 6.7 and ξ = −0.056. Right column:
Attractors on the (x, r) phase space for different values of β. The other parameters are
as in the left column.
4.4 Global dynamics
Here are presented further analytical results and numerical explorations of some global
dynamic scenarios of the discrete dynamical system (4.7) under the constraints on the
parameters imposed by the economic and ecologic meaning of the model. The numerical
4.4 Global dynamics 67
simulations will confirm the analytical results on local stability and bifurcations given
in the Section 4.3 and some snapshots about global dynamic behaviors are given.
First consider the bifurcation diagrams in Figure 4.2. They show the long run
dynamics of the model varying the intensity of choice parameter β, that represents the
evolutionary propensity to switch to the more profitable technology. In evolutionary
models a common occurrence is that an increase of the value of β leads to instability
and complex dynamics, see e.g. [73]. However, this is not necessarily true in the
case of the evolutionary model studied herein. Indeed, starting from values of the
parameter β colse to zero, as it is increased, is observed a transition from oscillatory
dynamics (periodic or chaotic) towards non oscillatory dynamics through a cascade of
period-halving bifurcations leading to the stability of the fixed point E∗. Moreover,
there is a range of the values of β, namely β ∈ (βF , βNS) as stated in Proposition 1,
such that the fixed point E∗ is stable. Furthermore, for β > βNS, the equilibrium
point E∗ becomes unstable again through a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation,
at which a stable invariant closed curve is created around E∗ itself, whose amplitude
increases as β increases, see figure 4.2 right panel. So, this example underlines the
unusual result that low values of intensity of choice, as well as high values, lead to
instability of the fixed point E∗ with the creation of periodic or quasi-periodic or even
chaotic attractors, whereas intermediate levels of the intensity of choice are required
for the local asymptotic stability of E∗.
Other interesting results regard the evolutionary dominance of one of the two
harvesting strategies. On the basis of the analytical results of Section 4.3 is known that,
as long as E∗ exists, then the two fixed points E∗0 and E∗1 are transversally unstable.
At first sight, this may suggest that an evolutionary dominant strategy, that is an
attractor along the invariant lines r = 0 or r = 1, exits if and only if the interior fixed
point E∗ is unfeasible and at the same time an attractor with r ∈ (0, 1) exits if and
only if the interior fixed point E∗ is feasible. Instead, interior attractors (cyclic or
chaotic) may exist even for k > k1, i.e. after the transcritical bifurcation at which
the equilibrium E∗ merges with E∗1 and becomes unfeasible. Moreover, convergence
towards the invariant line r = 0 may occur even when the equilibrium E∗ is feasible,
i.e. k0 < k < k1. These two occurrences are summerized respectively by the following
two Propositions.
Proposition 2 Consider map (4.7). Let ξ < 0 and the other parameters are positive
and such that E∗1 exists and it is unstable along the manifold r = 1, and a period-2
cycle, say C21 = {(x∗11 , 1) , (x∗21 , 1)}, exists on the invariant set r = 1, as the result of
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the period-doubling bifurcation of E∗1 . If the following condition holds
ξ − k (a
2
0q0 − a21q1)
2αγ <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 (4.32)
then the fixed point E∗1 has stable transverse invariant manifold and period-2 cycle C21
is transversely unstable. The contrary cannot occur.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The Proposition 2 hints at an interesting dynamic scenarios, confirmed by the
numerical simulations shown in Figure 4.3. In this case, although there are no interior
fixed points and the border equilibrium E∗1 is transversely stable, the dynamics of
the model can still converge in the long run to a stable inner attractor, a stable
period-2 cycle C21 shown in Figure 4.3 (left panel). This evidence indicates that the
stability of the transverse invariant manifold of E∗1 does not imply the predominance
by evolutionary pressure of the standard (or intensive) technology.
The situation is different (and in some sense reverted) when we consider the invariant
line r = 0, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider map (4.7). Let ξ < 0 and the other parameters are positive
and such that E∗0 exists and it is unstable along the invariant manifold r = 0, and a
period-2 cycle, say C20 = {(x∗10 , 0) , (x∗20 , 0)}, exists on the invariant set r = 0, as the
result of the period-doubling bifurcation of E∗0 . If the following condition holds
ξ − k (a
2
0q0 − a21q1)
2αγ <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 (4.33)
then the fixed point E∗0 is transversely unstable and period-2 cycle C20 has a stable
transverse invariant manifold. The contrary cannot occur.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The Proposition 3 provides an interesting result highlighted by the numerical
simulations shown in figure 4.3 (right panel), where, although the border equilibrium
E∗0 is transversally unstable, the 2-cycle C20 is locally asymptotically stable and coexists
with the locally asymptotically stable interior fixed point E∗. Numerical investigations
suggest that this dynamic scenario occurs due to a specific sequence of bifurcations.
In particular, a 2-cycle in the region with negative r, let us name it C2, undergoes a
transcritical bifurcation, merging with the 2-cycle C20 originated by a period-doubling
bifurcation of the fixed point E∗0 , and becomes feasible. After the bifurcation C20
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becomes local asymptotically stable while C2 is a saddle 2-cycle and its one-dimensional
stable manifold marks the boundary separating the basins of attraction of E∗ and C20 .
Then, changing the values of the parameters in a suitable way, the 2-cycle C2 disappears
through a subcritical flip bifurcation at which E∗ looses stability and becomes a saddle
fixed point. These bifurcations occur before the merging of E∗ with E∗0 . These results
underlines that agents can select the environmentally-friendly technology even when E∗
is a feasible fixed point and E∗0 is transversely unstable and point out a quite peculiar
property of the considered evolutionary model. In fact, the instability of the inner
fixed point of the model may lead to an increase in the propensity of the agent to
adopt the environmentally-friendly technology. These scenarios do not occur on the
continuous (or hybrid) setting of the model analyzed in [89].
The basins of attraction in figure 4.3 reveals further interesting properties of the
dynamics of the model. In particular, from the right panel in figure 4.3, it is possible to
observe that the transverse unstable manifold of E∗0 belongs to the basin of attraction
of E∗, hence such a basin has a contact with the invariant line r = 0 at the point E∗0 .
This implies that all the preimages of E∗0 along the invariant line r = 0, computed
according to the restriction (4.9), represent tongues at which the basin of E∗ has a
contact with line r = 0. In the same figure only some of them are visible, but infinitely
many exist and accumulate near E00 . The fine structure of these tongues is quite
complicated and will be analyzed in future works.
It is worth observing that the mechanisms that lead to the evolutionary-dominant
environmentally-friendly technology when the fixed point E∗ is feasible, can be even
different from the described one and, as shown in the following, can be due to the
existence of non topological Milnor attractors on the invariant line r = 0. For example,
the bifurcation diagrams in Figure 4.4, obtained varying parameter a0 in the range
[0.5, 1.3], show another case such that an attracting invariant set As, laying on the
axis r = 0, exists even when the interior equilibrium point E∗ is feasible. The measure-
theoretic arguments about the transverse attractiveness of the invariant set As, already
mentioned in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and in Appendix D and here recalled, can be
used to provide an explanation of this dynamic phenomenon. In particular take into
account the transverse Lyapunov exponent (see e.g. [13], [31]) given by
Λ⊥ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
ln |ν⊥(xn)| (4.34)
where {xn = fn0 (x0), n ⩾ 0} is a trajectory embedded in As and ν⊥(xn) is the transverse
eigenvalue computed in xn. Precisely, when As is a k-cycle Ck0 , its transverse attrac-
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Fig. 4.3 Left panel: The gray region is the basin of attraction of the inner period-2
cycle C21 while the fixed point E∗1 is transversely attractive. The point E∗ is unfeasible,
i.e. it lies in the region r > 1. Parameters’ values: α = 3.1, k = 1, N = 8, q1 = 1,
q0 = 0.01, γ = 4, a0 = 1.1, a1 = 1, β = 10, ξ = −0.0415. Right panel: The gray region
is the basin of attraction of the transversely stable fixed point E∗ and the white region
is the basin of attraction of the period-2 cycle C20 . Parameters’ values: α = 2.6, k = 1,
N = 8, q1 = 1, q0 = 0.1, γ = 2, a0 = 1.1, a1 = 1, β = 80.615, ξ = −0.095.
tiveness is measured by the product of the transverse eigenvalues νk⊥ =
∏k
i=1 ν⊥(xi)
and, if Λ⊥(Ck) = k−1 ln |νk⊥| < 0, then As is a topological attractor. Whilst, when
the attractor As is chaotic and so includes infinitely many cycles densely distributed
within it, each one characterized by its own transversal Lyapunov exponent, transverse
attractiveness of As can be measured by the spectrum of the Lyapunov exponents.
This is defined, see e.g. [31], as
Λmin⊥ ⩽ · · · ⩽ Λnat⊥ ⩽ · · · ⩽ Λmax⊥ (4.35)
where Λmin⊥ and Λmax⊥ are the Lyapunov exponents of the most attractive and the
most repelling cycles in As respectively. Moreover the natural Lyapunov exponent Λnat⊥
is computed along a generic aperiodic trajectory embedded in As, and it measures
transversal attractiveness on average. In other words, Λnat⊥ carries contributions to
attractiveness from all the trajectories in As, giving the mean local behavior in its
neighborhood (see e.g. [103]). If As contains at least one transversely repelling cycle
with a dense set of preimages embedded in As, that is Λmax⊥ > 0, than there is no
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neighborhood of As containing only points whose ω-limit set belongs to As. According
to the theorem stated in [5] the latter inequality implies that the one-dimensional
invariant chaotic set cannot be a Lyapunov attractor in the two-dimensional space
because of the transversely unstable set of the period-2 cycle as well as its preimages.
If the inequality Λnat⊥ < 0 holds also, thus the set As attracts a positive measure set of
points which converges to it. It follows that this is an attractor in Milnor sense (see
[101]). A large number of results about global attractiveness of invariant manifold of
lower dimension than the total phase space can be found in the literature, see e.g. [5],
[13], [31].
Fig. 4.4 Bifurcation diagram of x vs a0 (left panel) and r vs a0 (center panel) varying
a0 ∈ (a1, a1
√
q1/q0). Dashed lines represent paths of both x∗ and r∗. It can be noted
that the asymptotic dynamics is enclosed along the invariant axis r = 0 even for
r∗(a0) > 0. This is due to the transverse attractiveness of some subsets of the invariant
axes r = 0 while both the fixed point E∗0 and the period-2 cycle C20 are transversally
repelling. For µ = 1 + α − Na0q0/2γ ≈ 3.5925721841 such that a0 = ac = 1.07428,
the attractor As of the logistic map on r = 0 is characterized by pure chaos. Since
Λnat⊥ (µ¯) ≈ −0.0034703 < 0 while Λ⊥(C20) > 0, it results that As is a non topological
Milnor attractor. Parameters’ values are as in figure 4.2 except N = 20 and β = 5.
In the right panel of figure 4.4, there are presented both the transverse Lyapunov
exponent characterizing transverse attractiveness of As and the transverse Lyapunov
exponent of to the period-2 cycle C20 . For suitable values of the aggregate parameter
µ = 1 + α− N2γ a0q0, at which the 2-cycle of the logistic map undergoes the homoclinic
bifurcation due to which 2-cyclic chaotic intervals are obtained by the merging of
4-cyclic chaotic intervals, pure chaos exists in As (see e.g [96]). For example, for
α = 2.7, N = 20, γ = 1, q0 = 0.01 and a0 = ac = 1.07428, we detect the presence
of a Milnor attractor when µ = µ¯ ≈ 3.5925721841, value at which Λnat⊥ (µ¯) < 0 while
Λmax⊥ ⩾ Λ⊥(C20) > 0. Note that the parameter β is a called normal parameter, that is it
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affects only the transverse stability of As and does not have influence on the dynamics
inside the invariant set As. Setting µ = 1 + α−Na0q0/(2γ) = µ¯ and varying β, the
spectrum of Lyapunov exponents varies, i.e. the topological property of the invariant
set As are changing turning to be a chaotic saddle, a non topological Milnor attractor
and a topological Lyapunov stable set. To sum up it can be stated that As can attract
a set of positive Lebesgue measures even when it contains repelling cycles together
with dense sets of their preimages.
In the last part of the Section, it is pointed out that numerical simulations of the
model show dynamic scenarios which are difficult to infer analytically. For example,
in figure 4.5 is observed a chaotic attractor in the region r ∈ (0, 1) where both
harvesting strategies coexist, although there is a prevalence of the environmentally-
friendly one. The time series r(t) shows an apparently stochastic behavior which
typically characterizes the evolutionary dynamics driven by a replicator equation.
Fig. 4.5 Upper panel: a trajectory in the phase space. Lower panel: a time series of
r(t). Parameters’ values are as in Figure 4.2 but N = 20 and β = 5.
To conclude, the entire class of evolutionary games that this model could represent
reveals some interesting and economically insightful dynamics that are not observable in
other and more simple evolutionary games, see e.g. [73]. In particular, Neimark-Sacker
bifurcations and cascade of period-doubling bifurcations can lead to quite complicated,
even chaotic, dynamics. Moreover, a deeper analytical and numerical analysis reveals
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the existence of Milnor attractors. For this reason the presence of the Milnor attractors
and the related study of riddled basins for this class of evolutionary games, represent
an interesting aspect that deserve further investigation.

Chapter 5
Case study: evolutionary
competition between boundedly
rational behavioral rules in
oligopoly games
5.1 Introduction
It is well known that the solution concept adopted in oligopoly theory is the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. In particular, the Cournot equilibrium, proposed by Cournot in
1838, is the first example of Nash equilibrium, which is a concept elaborated by Nash
in 1950 for general n-person games. When all agents are in such an equilibrium, no
unilateral deviation by a single agent is profitable and therefore no one has an incentive
to deviate from that state.
However, the possibility for the economic agents to reach the Nash equilibrium is
not an obvious achievement when the assumptions of perfect rationality and complete
information of the classical game theory are not assumed any more.
Indeed, in real-world situations firms are complex organizations that elaborate
particular “behavioral rules” to face the market competition in uncertainty conditions
and to make their decisions regarding quantities to produce, prices, R&D activities,
business strategies, advertisement, etc. If “better” rules are currently available, it
seems reasonable that the firm’s management would update the previous adopted rules
in order to improve the overall “performance” of the firm.
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In the economic literature, several studies have been proposed to fill the gap
between the theory of oligopoly and a more realistic description of competition. As
an example, in the paper “Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in
Cournot competition”, E. Droste et al. (see [43]) present an interesting example with
a Cournot duopoly where ex-ante identical firms can employ different behavioral rules
to set the quantities to produce. The economic structure of the underlying game is
particularly simple, with homogeneous goods, linear demand and quadratic production
costs. The fitness of each behavioral rule at each time period is assessed by considering
average payoffs obtained by pairs of firms that are randomly matched to play the game.
An evolutionary mechanism based on average profits regulates the distribution of the
various rules over time. Further, in the same paper ([43]), Droste et al. concentrate on
the comparison between a cheap “Best Reply” rule and a costly “Nash” rule and shows
that endogenous fluctuations and complicated dynamics may arise, mainly due to the
dominance of Best Reply behavior in a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium because
of information costs. Also, in the paper “On the stability of the Cournot equilibrium:
An evolutionary approach” by Hommes at al., see [76], is presented a similar setup
with linear demand and linear production costs but with random matching of n firms
at a time. On the basis of past performance, these firms decide to switch between
costly rational and cheap boundedly-rational expectation rules on aggregate output
of their rivals. In this framework, Hommes at al. finds that the classic Theocharis’
result [120] on the instability of the Nash equilibrium with more than three firms is
also confirmed qualitatively in an evolutionary setting.
A Cournot oligopoly game populated by firms that adopt rules based on limited
knowledge of the demand function is of interest from an economic prospective, as
demand function may often be difficult to be estimated, as pointed out in early
contributions on learning of the demand function, see, e.g. [81] and [29], as well
as in recent contributions, see, e.g., [26] and [123]. In particular, it can be cited
here the contribution from the paper “Learning cycles in Bertrand competition with
differentiated commodities and competing learning rules” by M. Anufriev at al. (see
[9]) where an oligopoly game with heuristics (analogous to the one here considered)
under Bertrand competition with nonlinear demand has been proposed. In that paper,
some firms use Least Square Learning, wrongly assuming that demand is linear and
does not depend on competitors’ prices (analogously to LMA firms), and other firms
use Gradient learning (in prices). Nevertheless, in both contributions the possibility
to converge to a stable equilibrium depends on the parameters configuration and the
presence of heterogeneous learning mechanisms may lead to non stationary dynamics.
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In the present Chapter is first presented a general framework for dealing with
evolutionary oligopoly models with different behavioral rules and show some general
properties of such setting whatever the switching mechanism among the rules is
designed.
Afterwards, it is examined a particular example with two specific behavioral
rules proposed in the oligopoly literature to model agents with boundedly rational
expectations in forecasting next-period outputs. One rule is the so-called Local
Monopolistic Approximation (LMA), which was first proposed in [26] to model a
dynamic oligopoly where demand is not known by firms but estimated at each time
period through market experiments, see also [123]. In particular, in [26] is showed that
the dynamics generated through LMA behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium also
in cases where the classic Best Reply dynamics fail to converge to it. The second rule
is the Gradient (G) dynamics, which was first proposed in [25], to model the behavior
of boundedly rational duopolists who decide their production in order to improve
their profits over time. In particular, in [25] is established under which conditions this
adjustment preserves the convergence to the Nash equilibrium of the game and the
possible asymptotic dynamics of the system.
In the evolutionary game here considered firms adopt less cognitively demanding
heuristics than in the most related contributions, such as [43], [76] and [22], where at
least one behavioral rule employs global knowledge of the demand function. Indeed
the specific behavioral rules here considered do not require “global” information about
the demand function, but only of “some” information on it is needed. Further, these
rules can not be ranked according to the amount of information required or to their
‘degree’ of rationality. Different rules are just different ways to decide production plans
over time. So, different information costs, which may be associated to each behavioral
rule (see e.g. [43] or [76]), could be interpreted as a bias for selecting one particular
strategy over the other.
In particular, a simple economic setup is assumed, with homogeneous goods and
linear production costs. The selling price is obtained through isoelastic demand, widely
used in these kinds of models. Moreover, the endogenous switching mechanism among
behavioral rules will be the replicator dynamics (see e.g. [118] and [73]), already
introduced in Chapter 4, that is a profit-driven adaptive mechanism based on the
evolutionary selection rule.
In the dynamic scenarios that arises from the settings depicted above, it results
that if the Nash equilibrium of the game is stable under any behavioral rule, then the
asymptotic behavior of the model is very simple since the cheapest behavioral rule
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will prevail and all agents will end up producing the Nash equilibrium quantity. In
this case, the standard results of oligopoly theory are retrieved by the evolutionary
model. However, intriguing questions from an economic as well as mathematical point
of view arise when the Nash equilibrium is unstable at least under one behavioral
rule. Then questions about the most likely short-run and asymptotic production of
the industry as well as about the long term distribution of behaviors when firms fail to
converge to the Nash equilibrium becomes relevant. Further, it will be important to
pay attention to what condition determines the spread through the whole population
of a mutation (that is when a behavioral rule adopted by an infinitesimal fraction of
agents will be adopted by a finite fraction of the whole population). Moreover, the
particular example of evolutionary selection of behavioral rules analyzed herein (G and
LMA rules) extends the stream of investigation started in [22] to the case of behavioral
rules for which there is no clear hierarchy between them in terms of degree of required
information.
Before addressing the complete evolutionary model cases in which fixed fractions of
agents employing the behavioral rules are considered. In particular two benchmark
cases are particularly important, that is the model with all LMA-players and with all
G-players. These system’ configurations are described by triangular maps, for which
there can be obtained analytically results on the global dynamics, such as measuring
the basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium. It can be anticipated that when all
firms adopt the LMA rule, the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable when the number of
firms is sufficiently high and a further stable attractor, other than the Nash equilibrium,
may exist. On the contrary, when all firms adopt the G rule the feasible oligopolies are
characterized by the stability of the Nash equilibrium.
The global analysis of the dynamics reveals that the main differences between [22]
and the work presented in this Chapter are due to the differences between the G rule
and the Best Reply rule. It will be confirmed that the Best Reply rule has stability
properties that are analogous to those of the LMA rule, i.e. instability of the Nash
equilibrium occurs if the number of firms is sufficiently high, and in particular is showed
that when the G rule is more expensive than the LMA rule, it is never evolutionary
dominant while [22] found that when the Best Reply rule is more expensive than the
LMA rule, then it can become evolutionary dominant. Moreover, even if it is the
cheapest rule, it dominates only when the Nash equilibrium is stable.
The analysis on invariant planes, where only one strategy is played by firms, is
particularly important for understanding the complete evolutionary model, since these
two planes are invariant for the model under replicator dynamics. Thus, an attractor
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on these planes could also be an attractor for the complete model with evolutionary
switching of rules. When this happens, the population is in a monomorphic state,
as all agents employ the same heuristic. Here it is meaningful to study whether this
indeed happens once evolutionary pressure is introduced. In fact, if in the population
only one behavioral rule is available, it is obvious that all agents must use that rule.
However, to to study whether the introduction of an alternative rule (a mutation)
spreads over the population or not will be focused under which conditions an attractor
on an invariant plane is also an attractor for the evolutionary model. This consists in
an analysis of the transverse stability of the attractors on invariant planes.
Further, attractors outside these invariant planes can exist and are generated
through particular codimension-two bifurcations. From an economic point of view the
existence of internal attractors, provides evidence that it might be profitable for agents
to behave differently than similarly. So behavioral heterogeneity endogenously arise
through competition and persists in the long-run evolution. This phenomenon will
be referred as evolutionary stable heterogeneity: evolutionary pressure selects the best
behaviors and it turns out that the presence of both behavioral rules may guarantee, in
the long run, an improvement of aggregate welfare to producers, measured by producer
surplus. In other words, in some cases it might be more profitable for the firms to
be heterogeneous, and employ different heuristics, than to be homogeneous. As a
consequence, polymorphisms in the population emerges in the adoption of behavioral
rules.
The plain of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 are provided some general
properties of the evolutionary oligopoly model. In Section 5.3 it is outlined the
competition between the Local Monopolistic Approximation rule and the Gradient
rule and are provided useful results on global dynamics through the study of the
non-evolutionary version of the model and the transverse stability of attractors located
on invariant planes. Finally, it is describe the emergence of inner attractors, where
agents’ behavioral heterogeneity arises endogenously through evolutionary pressure.
5.2 The general model
Consider an oligopoly market with n ex-ante identical firms that produce homogeneous
goods. It is assumed here that the set of strategies is a nonempty compact and convex
set of Rn and each firm’s profit is concave in its own strategy.1 These assumptions
1In particular, the case with isoelastic demand and linear costs, which is developed in the next
Section, satisfies these assumptions.
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guarantee that at least a Nash equilibrium exists, see [111]. The inverse demand
function, which specifies the selling price p(Q) as a function of produced quantities
Q, is unknown by the agents. For this reason, firms conceive different behavioral
rules for setting their next period productions. The present analysis is limited to the
case in which two different behavioral rules are available noting, however, that the
generalization to more different behavioral rules is straightforward.
Denoting by x(k)i the production at time t by the k-th firm adopting the i-th rule,
then its the next-period production x(k)i (t + 1) is given by the rule it has adopted,
which is a function of the expected next-period productions by other firms and of the
expected next-period distributions of each rule. For the sake of generality it is noted
that behavioral rules may also incorporate older information through a “memory” term
(see [22] for details). This last contribution is neglected in the present treatment. For
the sake of simplicity firms are assumed identical among them and to bear the same
production cost C employing the same technology. Because of agents are identical, is
assumed that the ones that adopt the same behavioral rule set the same quantities,
that is xki = xi, resulting that such agents are described in term of a representative
agent. Moreover, it is assumed that firms have naïve expectations on next-period
productions, that is these base their decisions believing the economic scenario will not
change in the future. The quantities dynamics are then given by the followings lows of
motion:
xi(t+ 1) = Hi (x1(t), x2(t), r(t)) ; i = 1, 2 (5.1)
where r(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the distribution frequency among the firms of one behavioral rule
at time t and, obviously, the complementary frequency 1− r(t) is the distribution of
the other rule at the same time.
The profit obtained by employing behavioral rule i, which entails the fixed “infor-
mation cost” Ki ≥ 0, results to be given by
πi = (p− C)xi −Ki; i = 1, 2 (5.2)
Firms can switch from period to period to the more profitable behavioral rule modifying
their the next-period distribution. The evolutionary mechanism here considered is the
exponential replicator model, which was firstly proposed by [35] (see also [73] and [74]
and [86] for an application in oligopoly theory), according to which the frequency r
evolve over time as
r′ = re
βπ1
reβπ1 + (1− r) eβπ2 =
r
r + (1− r) eβ(π2−π1) (5.3)
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where “”’ denotes the time advancement operator and the explicit dependence on time
are omitted for convenience. In recurrence (5.3) the parameter β ≥ 0 is the intensity
of choice, which measures how sensitive the players are at selecting profit-increasing
behavioral rules. The minimum value β = 0 corresponds to the case of stationary
distribution, being r(t + 1) = r = r. The other extreme case, β = ∞, corresponds
to a situation where all firms immediately switch to the behavioral rule showing a
(even negligible) better performance, i.e. r → 1 if π1 > π2 and r → 0 if π1 < π2. It
can be further noted that, because of the strictly monotone transformation πi → eπi ,
the exponential replicator guarantees that the fractions obtained through (5.3) are
always contained in the interval [0, 1] even when πi < 0. It is worth pointing out that
the adoption of replicator dynamics, in whatever form, implies a random matching,
see, e.g., [106]. Then, r must be interpreted as the probability to meet a G-player, or,
better, it is the probability that a firm adopt the G-rule. Because of the firms are
representative agents the probability r will indicates also the fraction of firms that are
G-players. In the following, the output at time t of a representative G and LMA-firm
are denoted, respectively, by x and y.
The dynamics of the quantities (5.1) together with the evolutionary dynamics
in (5.3) define a 3D map T in the phase space (x, y, r) ∈ A ⊆ R2+ × [0, 1], where
R+ = [0,+∞). Nevertheless, because of the presence of the exponential replicator,
the planes r = 0 and r = 1 where only one pure strategy is employed (H2 or H1
respectively) are invariant planes, that is if r = 0, 1 than at any subsequent time t′ > t
it is r(t′) = 0, 1 respectively. It means that absent behaviors remain absent and can not
rise up and spread in the population. Conversely, a mutation in agents’ behavior may
spread over the population or may be reabsorbed depending on the transverse stability
of attractors of the two-dimensional restrictions of T on invariant planes. In general,
an attractor on such a plane may be transversely stable, so that it attracts trajectories
starting outside the restriction, i.e. from r(0) ∈ (0, 1) being also an attractor of the
three-dimensional map T . ∗Otherwise, the attractor on the restriction is transversely
unstable, so that it might not be reached by trajectories coming from inside the phase
space.
By assumption, at least one Nash equilibrium of the game always exist and, since
agents are homogeneous, at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium must exists too, which
is then characterized by the same production by all agents, i.e. x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗.2 The
present analysis is now restricted to cases in which the behavioral rules are consistent
2This class of behavioral rules includes as a particular case the so called unbiased rules, see, e.g.,
[43], which are characterized by having the symmetric Nash equilibrium x∗ as their unique equilibrium
quantity.
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with the corresponding evolutionary game played by the agents in the hypothesis that
they know the real demand function. This means that behavioral rules are required
to be stationary at any symmetric Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. So, if
the industry is at a Nash equilibrium, each behavioral rule prescribes to stay at that
equilibrium regardless of the dynamics of r. This stationary property is expressed as
x∗ = Hi (x∗, x∗) ; i = 1, 2 (5.4)
From equation (5.4), together with the specific functional form of the switching
mechanism given by the exponential replicator (5.3), it follows that if productions are at
a symmetric Nash equilibrium level x∗ then the points E0 = (x∗, x∗, 0), E1 = (x∗, x∗, 1)
and E = (x∗, x∗, r∗), which is present if the condition π1 = π2 is satisfied for some r∗, are
equilibria of the 3D map T . Regardless of the specific behavioral rules considered, the
following stability properties characterize the asymptotic behavior of the evolutionary
map T in the hypothesis that the Nash equilibrium is stable for any fixed value of r.
It is here noted that, any employed heuristics used to forecast next-period variables,
does not affect the stability analysis of the Nash equilibrium since, in this case, firms
have correct expectations.
Proposition 4 Consider the dynamical system T defined by (5.1) and (5.3) with
β > 0 and where profit functions are given by (5.2). If the symmetric Nash equilibrium
(x∗, x∗) is a locally asymptotically stable fixed point of the two-dimensional map (5.1)
for any fixed value of the frequency r ∈ [0, 1] then the set S = {(x∗, x∗, r) | r ∈ [0, 1]}
is T -invariant, that is T (S) ⊆ S, and
• if K1 = K2, then each point E∗ ∈ S is a stable equilibrium.
• if K1 ̸= K2, the two extreme points of S are equilibria, namely E∗0 = (x∗, x∗, 0)
and E∗1 = (x∗, x∗, 1). If K1 < K2 [K1 > K2] the equilibrium E∗1 [E∗0 ] is locally
asymptotically stable, whereas E∗0 [E∗1 ] is unstable.
Proof. Assume that firms of either type produce the Nash equilibrium quantity x∗.
Then, for any r ∈ [0, 1], the difference in their profits is get from (5.2) and is given by
the information costs, π1 − π2 = K2 −K1. Therefore, if fixed information costs are
equal, i.e. K1 = K2, the replicator equation in (5.3) reduces to r(t + 1) = r so that
any point E ∈ S is a fixed point for map T . Instead, if K1 ̸= K2, then at any point
E ∈ S it results that π2 ≠ π1 and the stationary condition can be satisfied only at the
boundary points E∗0 = (x∗, x∗, 0), and E∗1 = (x∗, x∗, 1), where all agents employing the
same behavioral rule.
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Stability analysis of equilibria can be studied through the Jacobian matrix JT (E)|E∈S
of the map T computed along the invariant set S where fixed points are located. It
results from (5.4) that its entries J13 and J23 are equal to zero, and its characteristic
equation becomes
P (z) =
(
eβ(π1+π2)
((r − 1) eβπ2 − reβπ1)2 − z
)
P2 (z)
where P2 (z) is the characteristic equation of the two-dimensional model (5.1), whose
roots are in modulus less than one by the hypothesis of stability of the Nash equilibrium.
Thus in the case K1 = K2, for which it results π1 = π2 along S, the third eigenvalue of
JT (E)|E∈S is z3 = 1 and any point E ∈ S is a stable equilibrium.
If K1 < K2 at r = 0 and at r = 1 the eigenvalues related to the transversal direction
with respect to invariant planes, that is the direction identified by the vector (0, 0, 1),
are the entries J33 of the Jacobian matrix of the 3D map T which are respectively
given by
J33(r = 0) = eβ(K2−K1) ∈ (1,+∞) (5.5a)
J33(r = 1) = eβ(K1−K2) ∈ (0, 1) (5.5b)
Analogous calculations can be made in the case K2 < K1.
The conditions under which the symmetric Nash equilibrium is stable can be
violated and some attractors can be created through bifurcations, as stated in the
following corollary:
Corollary 5 Consider the dynamical system T defined by (5.1) and (5.3) with β > 0
and where profit functions are given by (5.2). When the conditions for local asymptotic
stability of the Nash equilibrium (x∗, x∗) are broken in (5.1) with r = r∗, the following
cases occur:
i) If K1 = K2, an attractor can appear in R+ ×R+ × [0, 1] (or in R+ ×R+ × (0, 1)
if r∗ ̸= 0, 1) through a bifurcation of codimension 1, 2 or 3.
ii) If K1 ̸= K2, r∗ = 1 and K1 < K2 [r∗ = 0 and K1 > K2], then equilibrium E1
[E0] undergoes a bifurcation and an attractor appears in the invariant subspace
r = 1 [r = 0], whereas E0 [E1] remains unstable.
Proof. The first part of the corollary follows observing that two of the roots of the
characteristic polynomial associated to the Jacobian matrix of dynamical system T
84
Case study: evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in
oligopoly games
(defined by (5.1) and (5.3) with β > 0) computed at the fixed point E = (x∗, x∗, r∗),
coincide with the two roots of the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix of
system (5.1) computed at the fixed point (x∗, x∗) with r = r∗.
The second part of the corollary follows by noting that the dynamics on the invariant
plane r = 1 (or r = 0) of the dynamical system T is equal to the one of system (5.1)
with r = 1 (or r = 0).
On the other hand, if the Nash equilibrium is unstable for the quantity adjustments
(5.1) and more complex attractors exist, then the asymptotic behavior of the model
becomes more complicated but also more interesting both from a mathematical as well
as economic point of view.
5.3 An example with specific behavioral rules
In this Section, we develop the model described above in its general form considering
as specific behavioral rules the Local Monopolistic Approximations (LMA) and the
Gradient dynamics (G), proposed, respectively, in [26] and [25].
Let us consider an oligopoly with n ≥ 2 firms that produce homogeneous goods
with linear cost given by
Ci = cqi +Ki (5.6)
where qi is the quantity produced by firm that adopt the i-th rule, i = 12, and c > 0
denotes the marginal cost, the same for all firms, and Ki ≥ 0 is the information cost
associated to the i-th behavioral rule. The true demand function, unknown by firms,
is a function of the overall quantity Q in the market and it is assumed to be isoelastic
with constant elasticity equal to one3:
p(Q) = f (Q) = 1
Q
(5.7)
The dynamics can take place only in the case of positive aggregate production, that is
if Q > 0, whereas the case Q = 0 is referred as the infeasibility of the oligopoly.4
3This particular demand function is widely employed in the literature, see, e.g., [108], [16], [122], [4],
[90] and [88]. In particular, isoelastic demand is obtained when a representative consumer maximizes
a log-linear (or Cobb-Douglas) utility function, see [90] for details.
4Note that, for Q = 0, the demand function is not defined and therefore the oligopoly is infeasible.
An alternative would be to impose that the demand function is equal to a finite amount for Q = 0.
In this case, Q = 0 represents a stable fixed point for the game and the set of trajectories that are
now infeasible would converge to such a fixed point. Nevertheless, the economic interpretation of the
results would not change as in either cases Q = 0 represents the infeasibility (or unprofitability) of
the oligopoly.
5.3 An example with specific behavioral rules 85
At a given time t, the fraction of players that adopt the Gradient behavioral rule,
let them be called G-players, is denoted by r ∈ [0, 1], and the complementary fraction
of players that adopt the Local Monopolistic Approximation rule, let them be called
LMA-players, is 1− r. From the interpretation of r as the probability that a firm adopt
the G-rule than r will indicates also the fraction of G-players. In the following, the
output at time t of a representative G and LMA-firm are denoted, respectively, by x
and y.
Now each representative agent split the total production Q in two contributions,
its own current production, x or y, and the current aggregate production Q−1 of the
rest of the industry, which is defined as
Q−1 = (N − 1) {rx+ (1− r)y} (5.8)
Q = x+Q−1 (5.9)
Q = y +Q−1 (5.10)
Q = N
N − 1Q−1 (5.11)
According to the setup here adopted, modeling both G and LMA heuristics requires to
know the realized level of production. Indeed, G-firms observe their profits, which are
here expressed as a function of the total level of production of the industry. At the
same time, LMA-firms observe the current price, which is again expressed as a function
of the realized level of production of the industry. However, this modeling setup does
not provide the exact level of production of the industry but only its expected value.
Thus, for modeling purposes we considered the last one as a proxy for the first one. See
also [43] and [22] for the same assumption. This modeling choice implies that G-firms
estimate the derivative of their own profits computed at the expected level of production
(instead of estimating the derivative of their own realized profits) and LMA-firms
approximate the inverse demand function in a neighborhood of the expected level of
production (instead of approximating the inverse demand function in a neighborhood
of the realized production). However, the expected level of production should be an
acceptable proxy for the realized one, at least for a sufficiently high number of players.
It is also worth pointing out that in the classical approach of decision theory (see [76]
for a similar setup) firms select the Best Reply dynamics maximizing expected profits
instead of profits of expected productions. That approach, however, would require to
assume (contrary to what we do here) that firms have global knowledge of the demand
function. See also [126] for a brief discussion about the issue of discreteness of the
space of firms in oligopoly models.
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At time t, the representative G-firm sets its next-period production in the direction
that maximizes its expected profits. In particular it is assumed to know the derivative
of its profit with respect to its own production at the present industry output level
and sets quantities in the direction (increment or reduction) such that its expected
profit increases avoiding solving an optimization problem. More precisely, from (5.2),
its current profits can be expressed as:
πG (x,Q−1) =
(
1
x+Q−1
− c
)
x−KG (5.12)
where KG ≥ 0 is the fixed ‘information’ cost associated to the G-rule and Q−1 is the
current production for the rest of the industry. Than the behavior adopted by a G-firm
consists on setting its next-period quantity in the follow way:
x′ = max
{
0, x+ λx∂πG
∂x
}
=
= max
{
0, x+ λx
(
Q−1
(x+Q−1)2
− c
)}
(5.13)
= max
{
0, x+ λx
(
(N − 1) (rx+ (1− r) y)
(x (Nr + 1− r) + y (N − 1) (1− r))2 − c
)}
where λ ≥ 0 is a speed of adjustment (see [16] for details) equal for all G-players and
the definition (5.8) is used in the latter equality.
Similarly, at time t, the representative LMA-firm sets its production in order to
maximize its expected profit, expressed in terms of expected price, being able to locally
estimate the partial derivative of (5.7) with respect to its own production at the present
industry output level and solving a quadratic optimization problem, which involves a
linear equation when costs are linear (as in the present case) or quadratic. From (5.2)
it results
y′ = argmax
yM≥0
{(p˜e − c) yM −KL} (5.14)
where KL ≥ 0 is a fixed information cost for LMA-players and p˜e is exactly the expected
next-period price. Further, LMA-firms assess the estimation of future price believing
it will varies only due to its own current production (see [26] for details):
p˜e(y′) = p+ dp
dy
(y′ − y)
= p− 1
Q2
(y′ − y) (5.15)
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Equation (5.15) assert that LMA-players adopt a linear estimation for future price,
where the slope of demand is correctly assessed and the increments in quantities disre-
gard the production by the other competitors (from which the name Local Monopolistic
Approximation). This is equivalent to say that an LMA-firm assumes that all other
firms will produce at time t + 1 the same quantity produced at time t (as assumed
in the well-known Best Reply adjustment, see [16]). Than the behavior adopted by a
LMA-firm consists on setting its next-period quantity in the follow way:
y′ = max
0, (1− α)y + α
y
2 +
c− p
2
(
dp
dy
)−1 (5.16)
= max
{
0, (1− α)y + α2
(
y + N
N − 1Q−1
(
1− c N
N − 1Q−1
))}
(5.17)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a speed of adjustment (see [16] for details) equal for all LMA-players.
Recurrence (5.16) is computed assuming naïve expectations on the future scenario
of the economy, that is Qe−1(t+ 1) = Q−1, LMA assuming naïve expectations on the
future scenario, while the letter equality (5.17) is obtained using the definition (5.8)
and the approximation Q = NQ−1/(N − 1).
By coupling the dynamics of quantities by G- and LMA-firms, respectively (5.13)
and (5.17), with an exponential replicator used as the evolutionary mechanism of
switching between the two behaviors, the following 3D map T is obtained:
T :

x(t+ 1) = max
{
0, x+ λx
(
Q−1
(x+Q−1)2
− c
)}
y(t+ 1) = max
{
0, (1− α)y + α2
(
y + N
N − 1Q−1
(
1− c N
N − 1Q−1
))}
r(t+ 1) = re
βπG
reβπG + (1− r) eβπLMA
(5.18)
where Q−1 is given in (5.8) and the profits are given by:
πG = px− (cx+KG) =
(
N − 1
NQ−1
− c
)
x−KG (5.19)
πLMA = py − (cy +KL) =
(
N − 1
NQ−1
− c
)
y −KL (5.20)
The max operator in (5.18) imposes non-negativity of productions whenever a
behavioral rule returns a negative quantity, so that the firm simply decides not to
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produce for the next time period. Differently, the region where map T is not defined
refers to cases of infeasibility of the oligopoly, which occurs, as previously recalled, if
the demand function (5.7) is not defined, that is for Q = 0. So the definition’s domain
of T , let it be designed by A such that T : A→ A, is excluded from including the axes
{(0, 0, r)}, for r ∈ [0, 1], {(0, y, 1)}, for y ⩾ 0, and {(x, 0, 0)}, for x ⩾ 0, in which it
results Q = 0 together with the set of their preimages (see [18] for details):
A =
(
R2+\
(
∪+∞n=0T−n (0, 0, r) ∪+∞n=0 T−n (0, y, 1) ∪+∞n=0 T n (x, 0, 0)
))
× [0, 1]
5.3.1 The benchmark case β = 0
The study of the model (5.18) in the case β = 0 is here provided. This is equivalent to
assume that the fraction of G-players (and consequently of LMA-players) is exogenously
fixed, i.e. r′ = r, since benchmark case provides interesting insights on the complete
model (5.18). With β = 0, (5.18) reduces to a two dimensional map T2 : A2 −→ A2
where A2 = R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (0, 0):5
T2 :

x(t+ 1) = max
{
0, x+ λx
(
Q−1
[x+Q−1]2
− c
)}
y(t+ 1) = max
{
0, (1− α) y + α2
(
y + N
N − 1Q−1
(
1− c N
N − 1Q−1
))}
(5.21)
where Q−1 is given in (5.8).
The unique and symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium E∗ = (x∗, x∗) is also a fixed
point of (5.21) and it is characterized by the same quantity for both kinds of agents:
x∗ = N − 1
cN2
(5.22)
The following proposition summarize the stability properties of (5.22).6
Proposition 6 Consider the dynamical system T2 in (5.21) and its non-trivial equi-
librium E∗ in (5.22). Then
1. if r = 0 (all LMA-players) the fixed point E∗ is a stable node provided that
2 ≤ N < 1 + 4/α and λ < N/c:
5It is worth noting that for the case r = 1 it is T2 : A2 −→ A2 where A2 = R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (0, y),
while for the case r = 0 it is T2 : A2 −→ A2 where A2 = R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (x, 0).
6The first numbered point of Proposition 8 has already been proved in [22].
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i) E∗ loses stability through a period doubling bifurcation at λ = N/c provided
that 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4/α. The 2-cycle that appears belongs to the subspace
y = y∗;
ii) E∗ loses stability through a period doubling bifurcation at N = max {2, 1 + 4/α}
provided that λ < N/c.
2. if r = 1 (all G-players), then E∗ is a stable node for all N ≥ 0 provided that
λ < 2/c; for λ > 2
c
the map is eventually defined only on E∗: any other initial
condition will lead the map to the focal point (0, 0);
3. if 0 < r < 1 (mixed population state) and
2 ≤ N < Nb = 5− 2r1− r (5.23)
then E∗ is a stable node provided that the following condition holds:
λ < λ∗ (α) = 2N (α (1− 2r −N (1− r)) + 4)
c (r (α + 4) (N − 2)− 2α (N − 1) + 8) (5.24)
4. if 0 < r < 1 (mixed population state) and N > Nb, then E∗ is a stable node
provided that condition (5.24) holds with the following additional condition:
α < α∗ = 4
N (1− r) + 2r − 1 (5.25)
5. For λ∗ (α) > 0 and α < α∗, E∗ loses stability at λ = λ∗ (α) through a period-
doubling bifurcation.
6. For r ̸= 1, the map T2 has the additional equilibrium Ex=0 =
(
0, N−1−Nr
cN2(1−r)2
)
. If
Ex=0 is asymptotically stable, then it must be that α < 4N(1−r)−1 .
Proof. Consider the Jacobian matrix of (5.21) computed at equilibrium (5.22), which
is given by
J (E∗) =
 N−cλ(2+(N−2)r)N − c(N−2)(1−r)λN
− (N−2)rα2 12 ((1−N (1− r)− 2r)α + 2)
 (5.26)
For r = 0 and r = 1, the result follows immediately because J (E∗) becomes a triangular
matrix. For the stability of the equilibrium E∗ when 0 < r < 1, it is required that the
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following system of inequalities (known as Schur or Jury’s conditions, see e.g. [52], [46],
[99]) are satisfied: 
1 + trJ (E∗) + det J (E∗) > 0
1− trJ (E∗) + det J (E∗) > 0
1− det J (E∗) > 0
(5.27)
where trJ (E∗) and det J (E∗) are, respectively, the trace and the determinant of
(5.26). By straightforward calculations, it is possible to verify the following statements.
Condition 1−det J (E∗) = 0 is never satisfied if the other conditions in (5.27) hold, thus
ruling out that E∗ can lose stability through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. If condition
(5.25) holds, then it is 1− trJ (E∗) + det J (E∗) > 0. Assuming condition (5.25) and
imposing 1 − det J (E∗) > 0, we can solve for 1 + trJ (E∗) + det J (E∗) = 0, thus
obtaining the bifurcation value λ = λ∗ (α) in (5.24). These conditions are necessary for
a flip bifurcation of the two-dimensional map (5.21) to occur. The sufficient conditions
can be verified by standard calculations.7 Moreover, it is worth noting that λ∗ (α∗) = 0,
and that λ∗ (α) > 0 for α < α∗ and λ∗ (α) < 0 for α > α∗, at least in a neighborhood
of α∗. This confirms that equilibrium E∗ loses stability only at λ = λ∗ (α). In fact,
condition (5.25) ensures that in (5.24) it is λ∗ (α) > 0. Observe that in (5.25) it is
α∗ > 0. When the number of players is such that 2 ≤ N < Nb = 5−2r1−r , then the
denominator in the right-hand side of (5.25) is smaller than 4, so that condition (5.25)
is always satisfied, being α ≤ 1. In other words, if the number of players is smaller
than Nb, then condition (5.24) alone guarantees that the Nash equilibrium E∗ is a
stable node, being λ∗ (α) > 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1].
With respect to equilibrium Ex=0, by employing the component x+λx
(
Q−1
[x+Q−1]2
− c
)
of the first equation in (5.21), the Jacobian matrix assumes the following triangular
form
J (Ex=0) =
 1 + c(N(r−2)+1)λ(N−1)(N(r−1)+1) 0
− (N(r−1)+2)rα2(r−1) 1 + 12 ((N (r − 1) + 1)α)
 (5.28)
whose eigenvalues are the entries along the diagonal. It is easy to show that it is
impossible for both eigenvalues to be inside the unitary circle. However, when the
constraint x = 0 is active because of the Max in (5.21), then the entry in the first row
and first column of J (Ex=0) becomes zero, because the map is constant. In this case, one
eigenvalue is always z1 = 0 and the other eigenvalue is z2 = 12 ((N (r − 1) + 1)α + 2).
Condition z2 ∈ (−1, 1) reduces to α < 4N(1−r)−1 , which is a necessary condition for the
stability of Ex=0. QED
7We provide evidence of the 2-cycle by numerical simulations showing its existence.
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The stability analysis of the two-dimensional model (5.21) underlines two important
differences of the behavioral rules: under the Gradient rule the convergence towards
the Nash equilibrium E∗ is always ensured by a sufficiently low speed of adjustment,
regardless of the number of firms n. On the contrary, the LMA rule guarantees
convergence to E∗ provided a sufficiently low speed of adjustment α given a certain
number n of players. Moreover, when LMA- and G-firms interact at a fixed proportion
(at a constant r), then the presence of a positive fraction of LMA-players destabilizes
the Nash equilibrium if, for given values of α and λ, the number of players is sufficiently
high.
Remark 7 Proposition 8 states that for r = 0 the Nash equilibrium E∗ is stable if
both the following conditions are satisfied: 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4/α and λ < N/c. However,
from an economic point of view, the first condition alone is sufficient to ensure that all
players select the Nash quantity y∗ = N − 1)/cN2. In fact, at λ = N/c equilibrium E∗
loses stability through a flip bifurcation so that an asymptotically stable 2-cycle appears.
However, as stated in Proposition 8, this 2-cycle belongs to the subspace y = y∗, i.e. it
is of the type {(x1, y∗) , (x2, y∗)}. Therefore, although the quantity produced by G-firms
changes over time, all players still produce y∗, since no G-firms are present, being
r = 0.
These analytical results unveil quite reach dynamic scenarios, which are further
investigated in the following by numerical analysis. In particular, it is provided a
detailed investigation of all the possible scenarios of the 2D model here considered,
with the aim to provide a better understanding of the 3D dynamical system.
Let it starts by taking the speed of adjustment α of LMA-players as a bifurcation
parameter. In particular, it is investigated how the long-run dynamics of the model
change as α varies in (0, 1] under two different dynamic scenarios. In the first one,
depicted in Figure 5.1, it is considered a situation such that for r = 1 (with G-firms
only) equilibrium E∗ is stable, so that in the long run the level of production converges
to the Nash equilibrium. According to Proposition 8, this occurs when λ < 2/c. In this
case, it is observed that as the fraction r of G-firms increases, the values of α at which
the Nash equilibrium E∗ loses stability increases as well. Moreover, it is observed that
for r = 0 the oligopoly becomes infeasible as α increases, see Figure 5.1(a). This is
due to the fact that the oligopoly competition leads firms to stop the production and
the demand function (5.7) is not defined when total production is zero. In the second
scenario, when λ > 2/c, whose simulations are not reported for the sake of brevity,
the equilibrium E∗ is unstable for r = 1 and, the oligopoly becomes infeasible as all
the firms eventually decide to stop their production. In addition, as α increases, the
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oligopoly becomes infeasible also in the case of a mixed population state, i.e. r ∈ (0, 1),
when λ > λ∗ (α).
Let it now performs a similar analysis as λ, the reactivity of G-firms, changes. In
Figure 5.2 the limit dynamics of x and y are depicted as λ varies; in these example,
the stability condition α < α∗ is ensured, i.e. the stability of the Nash equilibrium
E∗ depends only on λ∗, which in turns depends on r. It is worth noting that if the
game is played by LMA-firms only, i.e. r = 0, when λ > λ∗ the Nash equilibrium E∗
becomes unstable but the oligopoly remains feasible, see Figure 5.2(a). On the contrary,
if the game is played by G-firms only, i.e. r = 1, the condition λ < λ∗ determines
the feasibility of the oligopoly game itself, see Figure 5.2(c). Condition (5.24) for the
stability of the Nash equilibrium E∗ at r = 0.5 is depicted in Figure 5.2(b).
Fig. 5.1 Bifurcation diagrams of x (black) and y (red) for α varying in (0, 1]. Case
λ < 2
c
. Panel (a) r = 0. Panel (b) r = 0.01. Panel (c) r = 0.2. Panel (d) r = 0.5.
Panel (e) r = 1. Parameters values: λ = 0.8, N = 20, c = 0.1. Black dots in Panel (a)
refer to the production level of G-firms the frequency of which is equal to zero (r = 0),
it follows that such black dots are irrelevant for the description of the oligopoly.
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Fig. 5.2 Bifurcation diagrams of x (black) and y (red) for λ varying on (0, 1]. Panel
(a) r = 0. Panel (b) r = 0.5. Panel (c) r = 1. Parameters values: α = 0.2, N = 20,
c = 0.1.
Another aspect worth of investigation is the interaction between the two different
behavioral rules as parameter r ∈ [0, 1] is changed. To this aim, there are presented
several simulations in Figure 5.3. In Panel (a), the parameters values are such that the
equilibrium E∗ is stable both for r = 0 and for r = 1, i.e. 2 ≤ N < 1+ 4
α
and λ < 2
c
. We
observe that in this case the stability of the Nash equilibrium occurs also for r ∈ (0, 1).
In other words, when the Nash equilibrium is stable with either all LMA-firms or all
G-firms, then it is stable for any r ∈ (0, 1). In Panel (b), the parameters values are
such that the Nash equilibrium E∗ is unstable with all LMA-firms (i.e. r = 0) but it is
stable with all G-firms (r = 1). In other words, N > 1 + 4
α
and λ < 2
c
. In this case,
for small values of r a complex attractor exists, while as the fraction of G-firms in the
oligopoly increases, a cascade of halving bifurcations occurs and the Nash equilibrium
gains stability already for relatively low values of r. In Panel (c), the parameters values
are such that the Nash equilibrium E∗ is stable with all LMA-firms and unstable with
all G-firms. In particular, parameters are such that 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4
α
and N
c
> λ > 2
c
.
In this case, it is observed that the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable when
the fraction of the LMA-firms in the oligopoly is high (low r), while the oligopoly
becomes infeasible, i.e. firms stop production, as the fraction of G-firms increases.
In Panel (d), the parameters values are such that the Nash equilibrium is unstable
with all LMA-firms as well as with all G-firms. In particular, parameters are such
that N > 1 + 4
α
and N
c
> λ > 2
c
. In this case, complex dynamics for low fraction of
G-firms are observed while the oligopoly becomes infeasible as the fraction r of G-firms
increases. In Panel (e), we present the case 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4
α
and λ > N
c
. It means
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Fig. 5.3 Bifurcation diagrams of x (black) and of y (red) for r varying on [0, 1]. Panel
(a) α = 0.5, λ = 1. Panel (b) α = 0.3, λ = 1. Panel (c) α = 0.2, λ = 21. Panel (d)
α = 0.3, λ = 21. Panel (e) α = 0.2, λ = 201. Panel (f) α = 0.3, λ = 201. Other
parameters values: N = 20, c = 0.1.
that with all LMA-firms the Nash equilibrium is unstable, and the asymptotically
stable equilibrium is the equilibrium Ex=0 defined in Proposition 4. When the fraction
of G-firms is increased, this equilibrium loses stability and the oligopoly becomes
infeasible. With all G-firms the oligopoly results to be infeasible as well. In Panel (f),
it is depicted the case N > 1 + 4
α
and λ > N
c
, i.e. E∗ is unstable for both r = 1 and
r = 0. Paradoxically, in this case, the oligopoly game remains feasible for higher values
of r, although two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle, if compared to the case of
Panel (d), where equilibrium E∗ has only one eigenvalue outside the unit circle for
r = 0.
The investigation based on bifurcation diagrams reveals that if one starts from a
situation where only one of the two heuristics is employed, either G or LMA, and this
rule leads the oligopoly to converge to the Nash equilibrium E∗, then the presence of
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this ‘stable’ rule favors the convergence to the Nash equilibrium also when there is a
fraction of agents adopting the other available rule.
In addition, the numerical analysis reveals another important aspect of the model,
which is related to the lost of asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium. In particular,
if the oligopoly is populated by LMA-agents only, then the production dynamics are
governed by a nonlinear map, with a range of stability of the Nash equilibrium that is
lower than with all G-firms; however, when this equilibrium loses stability, the oligopoly
remains feasible although fluctuations of the level of production are observed. On the
contrary, if the oligopoly is populated by G-firms only, then the level of production
depends on a piecewise-linear map. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can be characterized
by more stability if one considers the size of its basin of attraction. However, when
the Nash equilibrium loses stability, then the only possibility is that of an ‘infeasible’
oligopoly, with all agents that stop to produce and exit the market.
Global Analysis
In this part, there are provided some considerations on the global dynamics of the map
T2, which are also useful for understanding the behavior of the evolutionary model
(5.18). In the following there are analyzed the structure of the basins of attraction of the
Nash equilibrium when only one behavioral rule is present, i.e. with r = 1 (all G-firms)
or r = 0 (all LMA-firms) and compare their measure in the two cases. In particular
the comparisons are performed when the Nash Equilibrium E∗ is asymptotically stable
in r = 0, that is if 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4
α
and λ < N
c
as stated in Proposition 4, in order to
do what? to underline the destabilizing effect of the presence of G-firms in the full
evolutionary model?
Proposition 8 Consider the dynamical system T2 in (5.21) and its non-trivial equi-
librium E∗ in (5.22). Denote by µ (V) the measure of a region V ⊆
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+
}
and
by B (V ) the basin of attraction of an attractor V of T2. Define the following sets:
B1 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|x ≥
λ
cλ− 1
N − 1
N2
}
,
B2 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|y ≥
2− α + αN
αcN2
}
, and
B3 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|x2 + (N − 1)2 y2 + (N − 1)xy −
λ (N − 1)
λc− 1 y ≤ 0
}
Assume that E∗ is asymptotically stable when r = 0. Then the following statements
hold:
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1. If 1− λc > 0, then µ (B (E∗)r=0) ≤ µ (B (E∗)r=1), where
B (E∗)r=1 := R2+, B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2) (5.29)
2. If 0 > 1− λc > −1, and
λ
cλ− 1
N − 1
N2
≥ 2− α + αN
αcN2
(5.30)
then µ (B (E∗)r=0) ≤ µ (B (E∗)r=1), where
B (E∗)r=1 := R2+\B1 and B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2 ∪ B3) (5.31)
3. If −1 > 1− λc, then µ (B (E∗)r=1) = 0 ≤ µ (B (E∗)r=0), where
B (E∗)r=1 = E∗ and B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2 ∪ B3) (5.32)
Proof. First of all, recall that, by Proposition 4, conditions 2 ≤ N < 1+ 4
α
and λ < N
c
guarantee that E∗ is asymptotically stable when r = 0. Indeed, if r = 1 (all G-agents),
the map (5.21) becomes
T2,r=1 :

x(t+ 1) = max
{
0, x+ λx
(
(N − 1)x
x2N2
− c
)}
= max {0, fx}
y(t+ 1) = max
{
0, (1− α) y + α2 [y +Nx (1− cNx)]
}
= max {0, fy}
(5.33)
where the first component is a master equation, i.e. a one-dimensional difference
equation uncoupled from the second one, whereas the second component is a slave
equation, because it depends also on the first variable8. The properties of the one-
dimensional map fx, which is a (piecewise-)linear map, strongly influence the dynamics
of the whole system. The Nash equilibrium E∗ =
(
N−1
cN2 ,
N−1
cN2
)
is a fixed point of (5.33)
and the asymptotic dynamics depend on the initial conditions of the system (5.33).
Specifically, let us consider the following subset of R2+, which represents the points of
8Map 5.33, as well as map 5.35 below, are two triangular maps. For more details on these maps
see e.g. [41], [42] and [84] .
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R2+ that are mapped by (5.33) into (0, y) in one iteration:
B1 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|x (1− λc) + λ(N−1)N2 ≤ 0
}
=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|x ≥ λcλ−1 N−1N2
} (5.34)
It is clear that any trajectory starting with initial condition (x, y) ∈ B1 does not converge
to E∗. Having assumed that E∗ is asymptotically stable and being the only attractor in
the invariant region R2+\∪+∞n=0T−n2 (B1), it follows that B (E∗)r=1 := R2+\∪+∞n=0T−n2 (B1).
With r = 0, (all LMA-agents), the map (5.21) becomes
T2,r=0 :

x(t+ 1) = max
{
0, x+ λx
(
(N−1)y
[x+(N−1)y]2 − c
)}
= max {0, fx}
y(t+ 1) = max
{
0, (1− α) y + α2 [y +Ny (1− cNy)]
}
= max {0, fy}
(5.35)
where the second component is the master equation (uncoupled from the first one),
while the first component depends also on the second variable (slave equation). The
properties of the one-dimensional map fy, which is a quadratic map conjugates to the
well known logistic map, strongly influence the dynamics of the system. The fixed
point of (5.35) is again the Nash equilibrium E∗ =
(
N−1
cN2 ,
N−1
cN2
)
, and the asymptotic
dynamics depends on the initial conditions. Specifically, let us consider the following
two subregions of R2+:
B2 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|fy ≤ 0
}
=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|y ≥ 2−α+αNαcN2
}
B3 :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|fx ≤ 0
}
=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+|x2 + (N − 1)2 y2 + (N − 1)xy − λ(N−1)λc−1 y ≤ 0
}
(5.36)
It is clear that any trajectory starting in (x, y) ∈ B2 ∪ B3 will never converge to
E∗, while, assuming E∗ asymptotically stable, its basin of attraction is given by
B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2 ∪ B3).
Considering r = 0, it is trivial to prove that the set B3 is empty for 1−λc > 0, while
any trajectory starting in B2 is lead in the subregion (axis) y = 0, where the dynamics
is undefined and so the oligopoly is infeasible. On the contrary, trajectories starting in
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R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2) converge either to E∗ (assuming E∗ asymptotically stable) or to
some attractor contained in the region. Moreover, considering r = 1, it is trivial to
prove that B1 is empty for 1− λc > 0. It follows that B (E∗)r=1 := R2+. Noting that
R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2) ⊆ B (E∗)r=1 := R2+, the first part of the proposition follows.
Considering r = 0, it is easy to see that for λc > 1 the set B1 is not empty and
preimages in R2+ of the x = 0 and y = 0 axis exist as sketched in Figure 5.4. It
follows that B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2 ∪ B3). Moreover, considering r = 1, if
0 > 1 − λc > −1 it is straightforward to prove that every trajectory starting in B1
converges to the x = 0 axis where the map is undefined as it is a set of focal points
whereas each trajectory starting in R2+\B1 converges to the asymptotically stable Nash
equilibrium E∗, which is also the unique attractor in the region. This can be proved
easily noting that the map fx is linear in R2+\B1, so it follows that B (E∗)r=1 := R2+\B1
and ∪+∞n=0T−n2 (B1) = B1. If condition (5.30) holds, it is easy to see that the area of B1
is smaller then the area of B2. Thus the second part of the proposition follows.
Considering r = 1, if 1− λc < −1, then the Nash equilibrium E∗ is unstable and
the first recurrence of T2,r=1, i.e. max {0, fx} in (5.33), is a linear function as long as
x (t) > 0. It follows that each trajectory of fx starting in R2+\E∗ diverges to −∞ and
so every trajectory of T2 starting in R2+\E∗ converges to the focal point (0, 0). The
third point of the proposition follows.
Proposition 8 provides important insights about the robustness of the asymptotic
stability of the Nash equilibrium, measured by the area of the basin of attraction of
the equilibrium itself, when all the firms involved in the oligopoly adopt the same
heuristic, i.e. either the G or the LMA rule. In particular, the three cases discussed
in Proposition 8 are depicted in Figure 5.4, while in Figure 5.5 regions B2 and B3 are
depicted for r = 0, together with the basin of attraction B (E∗)r=0. The picture shows
the presence of lobes, which are typical when there are focal points, as it is the point
(0, 0) for map T2, see e.g. [18], [19] and [17] for details.
The economic intuition behind the results of this analysis is synthesized in the
following remark.
Remark 9 Consider the dynamical system T2 in (5.21) and its non-trivial Nash
equilibrium E∗ in (5.22). As long as the conditions for the asymptotic stability of the
Nash equilibrium are ensured for the oligopoly with all G-firms, i.e. λc < 2, and the
following inequality holds
λ
|1− λc| ≥
2− α + αN
(N − 1)αc (5.37)
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Fig. 5.4 Basins of attraction B (E∗)r=1 (first row) and B (E∗)r=0 (second row) depicted
as white regions. Regions of infeasible trajectories are in gray. Cases of Proposition 8
are represented from the left to the right: λc < 1 with λ = 1 and c = 0.1 (first column),
1 < λc < 2 with λ = 15 and c = 0.1 (second column) and λc > 2 with λ = 25 and
c = 0.1 (third column). Parameters N = 20, α = 0.2.
then B (E∗), the basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium E∗, with all G-firms is at
least as large as the corresponding basin in the case of all LMA-firms. On the contrary,
when the Nash equilibrium with all G-firms is unstable, i.e. λc > 2, the presence of
LMA-firms is necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure the feasibility of the oligopoly.
In order to provide some insights about the dimensions of the basins of attraction of
the Nash equilibrium E∗ also with a mixture of G-firms and LMA-firms, i.e. r ∈ (0, 1),
two cases are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. In Figure 5.6 we have the first case discussed
in Proposition 8, i.e. λc < 1. In particular, for r = 1 and r = 0, we have the same
cases of Panels (a) and (d) of Figure 5.4, respectively. Note that for r = 0.5, i.e. half
of the firms adopt the LMA rule and the other half the G-rule, the basin of attraction
of E∗ increases considerably with respect to the case r = 0, and it becomes similar to
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Fig. 5.5 Panel (a) the white region is B (E∗)r=0 ⊆ R2+\ ∪+∞n=0 T−n2 (B2 ∪ B3). Points
in B2 ∩ B3 (green region) are mapped in one iteration in (0, 0). Panel (b) zoom of
B (E∗)r=0 near the origin, which is a focal point of the map. The regions of infeasible
trajectories, i.e. B2 and B3, and their preimages are in gray. Parameters: N = 20,
c = 0.1, λ = 15, α = 0.2.
the basin obtained with r = 1. In Figure 5.7, the case 1 < λc < 2 is considered. In
particular, for r = 0 and r = 1, we have the same cases of Panels (b) and (d) of Figure
5.4, respectively. In this case, the presence of a very small fraction of G-firms in the
oligopoly (0, 1% in the example) considerably enlarges B (E∗), the basin of attraction
of the Nash equilibrium, so that the oligopoly acquires stability in the state space.
Fig. 5.6 Basins of attraction of E∗ (white region), for different values of r: panel (a)
r = 0, panel (b) r = 0.5 and panel (c) r = 1. Region of infeasible trajectories in gray.
Parameters: λ = 1, N = 20, c = 0.1, α = 0.2.
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Fig. 5.7 Basins of attraction of the Nash-equilibrium E∗ (white region) for different
values of r: panel (a) r = 0, panel (b) r = 0.001 and panel (c) r = 1. Region of
infeasible trajectories in gray. Parameters: λ = 15, N = 20, c = 0.1, α = 0.2.
5.3.2 Dynamic analysis of the evolutionary model
Let it begin the analysis of the dynamical system T in (5.18) by studying the existence
and local stability of equilibria. This question is quite simple whenever the Nash
equilibria of the two-dimensional restrictions to the invariant planes r = 0 or r = 1 are
stable. Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 with the specific map (5.18) can be reformulate
in a unique proposition:
Proposition 10 Consider the dynamical system T in (5.18).
• If KG = KL, then a continuum of equilibrium points E∗ exists along the segment
E =
(
N−1
cN2 ,
N−1
cN2 , r
)
, with r ∈ [0, 1]. These equilibria are stable as long as the
stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium stated in Proposition 4 are satisfied.
One fixed point in E undergoes a codimension-two bifurcation changing KG −KL
with an associated eigenvalue equal to 1 and another one equal to −1, with the
possible creation of a stable 2-cycle
{(
x, y, r
)
, (x, y, r)
}
. The point in E that
undergoes the codimension-two bifurcation is the one such that (x+, y+, r+) =(
x, y, r
)
= (x, y, r) and λ = λ∗ (α, r+), where
λ∗
(
α, r+
)
= 2N (α (1− 2r
+ −N (1− r+)) + 4)
c (r+ (α + 4) (N − 2)− 2α (N − 1) + 8) (5.38)
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• If KG ̸= KL, then only the two extremum points of the segment E are equilibria,
namely
E0 =
(
N − 1
cN2
,
N − 1
cN2
, 0
)
and E1 =
(
N − 1
cN2
,
N − 1
cN2
, 1
)
(5.39)
in which all agents adopt the same strategy, which is LMA or G respectively:
– If KL < KG, then equilibrium E0 is stable for 2 ≤ N < 1 + 4α and λ < Nc ,
and it loses stability through a period doubling bifurcation at N = 1 + 4
α
given λ < N
c
. E1 is always unstable.
– If KL > KG, then equilibrium E1 is stable for λ < 2c and loses stability for
λ > 2
c
. At λ = 2
c
no bifurcation occurs. E0 is always unstable.
Proof. The proof is a direct application of Proposition 4, Corollary 5 and Proposition
8.
Starting from the previous investigation of the dynamics of the model on the
invariant subspaces r = 0 and r = 1, Proposition 10 describes, for the case KG ̸= KL,
the local asymptotic stability of the two Nash equilibria E0 and E1, which are located on
the invariant planes r = 0 and r = 1 respectively. For the three-dimensional model, the
main question related to these equilibria concerns their local transverse stability. When
an equilibrium on an invariant plane (either r = 0 or r = 1) is locally asymptotically
stable for the bidimensional map (5.21) then it obviously attracts sufficiently nearby
trajectories of the plane, i.e. it is stable with respect to perturbations along the plane.
Transverse stability occurs when an attractor on the plane is also an attractor for the
complete map (5.18), i.e. if it is stable with respect to perturbations that are transverse
to the plane; in particular, these perturbations have initial conditions (x (0) , y (0) , r (0))
with r (0) ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the basin of attraction of the attractor on the plane
has positive measure, i.e. the basin has positive volume, being a subset of R3.
For the sake of clarification, it is worth pointing out that the local transverse
instability of one of the two equilibria, be it E0 or E1, does not exclude that they
may also have a basin of attraction of positive Lebesgue measure in R× R× [0, 1]. In
other words, the Nash equilibria E0 and E1 might be Milnor (or weak) attractors,
see [101] and [19]. To have this, it is sufficient that a Nash equilibrium that belongs
to an invariant plane is: 1) stable along the plane and 2) its basin of attraction on
the plane intersects a set of points (with non-zero area) that are transversely stable.
These points in the plane, which do not include the Nash equilibrium on the plane
as we have assumed that it is transversely unstable, attract some trajectories with
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initial conditions (x (0) , y (0) , r (0)) with r (0) ∈ (0, 1). Once these trajectories reach
the invariant plane, they converge to the Nash equilibrium, since they are in its basin
of attraction.
Fig. 5.8 Regions of transversely unstable points (yellow region) and transversely
attractive ones (white region) on invariant planes r = 1 (first row) and r = 0 (second
row), when KG > KL. Regions of infeasible trajectories are in gray. Panels (a)-(d)
λ = 1. Panels (b)-(e) λ = 15. Panels (c)-(e) λ = 25. Parameters: N = 20, c = 0.1,
β = 1, KG = 0.0001, KL = 0, α = 0.3.
We illustrate this occurrence by numerical findings. Let us start considering the case
KG > KL, i.e. agents have a propensity to adopt the LMA rule even in case the profits
generated by the two heuristics are the same. In this case, as stated in Proposition
10, the Nash equilibrium E0 is asymptotically stable while the Nash equilibrium E1
is unstable. Nevertheless, in the basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium E1 are
included points characterized by transverse attractivity (this set of points is represented
by the white region in Figure 5.8) which attract trajectories coming from outside the
invariant subspace. That is, the Nash equilibrium E1 is a Milnor attractor. In Figure
5.8, the situation is depicted both for the cases such that E1 is stable, see panels (a)
and (b), and unstable, see panel (c), on the invariant plane r = 1. It is worth noticing
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that the dynamics of T on the restrictions r = 0 and r = 1, is the same as the one
depicted in Figure 5.4 and described in Proposition 8.
Fig. 5.9 Regions of transversely unstable points (yellow region) and transversely
attractive ones (white region) on invariant planes r = 1 (first row) and r = 0 (second
row), when KG < KL. Regions of infeasible trajectories are in gray. Panels (a)-(d)
λ = 1. Panels (b)-(e) λ = 15. Panels (c)-(e) λ = 25. Parameters: N = 20, c = 0.1,
β = 1, KG = 0, KL = 0.0001, α = 0.3.
A similar situation occurs for cases with KG < KL, i.e. when agents have a
propensity to adopt the G-rule even when profits generated by the two heuristics
are equal. In this case, as stated in Proposition 10, the Nash equilibrium E1 is
asymptotically stable while the Nash equilibrium E0 is unstable. Nevertheless, the
basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium E0 includes a set of points characterized by
transverse attractivity (this set of points is represented by the white region in Figure
5.9). That is, the Nash equilibrium E0 is a Milnor attractor. It is worth remembering
that the structure of the basins of attraction of the two Nash equilibria E0 and E1 on
r = 0 and r = 1 respectively is the same in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 as the only difference
in the two cases regards the values of KG and KL, which are two parameters that
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influence only the transverse stability. In particular, the particular shape of the basins
of attraction, with the presence of lobes, is illustrated in details in the previous sections
(see in particular Proposition 8), so it is not discussed here.
The analysis of transverse stability underlines another interesting dynamic property
of the model. This occurs when, for KG > KL, the Nash equilibrium E0 is unstable
and the attractor on the invariant subspace r = 0, generated by a sequence of period-
doubling bifurcations, becomes transversely unstable. This situation is depicted in
Figure 5.10.9 From panel (a) of this figure we note that the attractor indicated by
black dots has portions in both the white region and the yellow region. This indicates
that along the attractor there are points that are transversely unstable (yellow region)
and points that are transversely stable (white region). To provide a measure of the
transverse attractivity of trajectory along the attractor, we compute the transverse
Lyapunov exponents:
Λ⊥ (T∞ (x (0) , y (0) , r (0))) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=0
ln |v3 (x (i) , y (i) , r (i))| (5.40)
where T∞ (x (0) , y (0) , r (0)) := {(x (i) , y (i) , r (i)) = T i (x (0) , y (0) , r (0)) , i ≥ 0} is
a generic trajectory along the attractor itself and
v3 =
∂r
′
∂r
∣∣∣∣∣
r=0
= eβ∆π(x(i),y(i),0) (5.41)
is the eigenvalue of the map T corresponding to the transversal direction. If Λ⊥ (T∞ (x (0) , y (0) , r (0))) <
0 holds, then average transversely stability of T∞ (x (0) , y (0) , r (0)) is proved. In Fig-
ure 5.10 panel (b), we note that the transverse stability of the attractor is lost as α
increases. When the attractor is transversely unstable, a situation of high uncertainty
occurs for the evolutionary oligopoly game. Indeed, firms may fail to select a unique
and common heuristic.
The analysis of the transverse stability of the attractors on the two invariant planes
r = 0 and r = 1 underlines that the evolutionary selection of the heuristics by firms is
a quite complicated nonlinear phenomenon and that a simple propensity of one rule to
the other one does not necessary leads firms to adopt homogeneous behaviors.
This aspect is further confirmed by the possibility that an attractor not belonging
to an invariant plane (r = 0 or r = 1) exists. As indicated in Proposition 10, this
attractor originates by a codimension-two bifurcation at KG = KL from which a stable
9Note that in this case E0 is transversely stable as long as it is stable for the restriction of the
map on the invariant plane r = 0.
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Fig. 5.10 Panel (a) attractor on the invariant plane r = 0. Its basin of attraction is in
red. In yellow the set of points that are transversely unstable. Panel (b) Lyapunov
exponent along the attractor of panel (a) as α varies in the range [0, 0.3]. Parameters:
KG = 0.0001, KL = 0, N = 20, α = 0.3, λ = 1, N = 20.
2-cycle may appear. Moreover, this cycle may not be the unique stable attractor in
R× R× (0, 1), as numerical evidence shows that other stable attractors could exist,
see in particular the bifurcation diagram of Figure 5.11.
The evolutionary oligopoly under analysis can exhibit further nonlinear phenomena
originated by additional bifurcations that lead to complicated dynamics. For instance,
the 2-cycle that is generated through the described codimension-two bifurcation (see
e.g. Figure 5.12) represents two fixed points of the map T 2. Each of these two fixed
points of T 2 can undergo a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation as the intensity of choice β is
increased. As a result, we detect the presence of an asymptotically stable attractor
with r ∈ (0, 1) for T , see e.g. Figure 5.13. If the intensity of choice β is further
increased, the attractor takes a particular shape, see Figure 5.14 panel (d). The
dynamics along this attractor is of particular interest from an economic point of view.
Figure 5.14 presents a time series for the level of production. The dynamics of the
quantity of production for LMA-firms and for G-firms follow a very strange pattern,
which is characterized by long periods of almost constant production levels - very close
to the Nash quantity - that are interrupted by shorter periods of high production
fluctuations. These dynamic scenarios shed some light on the high unpredictability of
agents’ behavior in the evolutionary oligopoly. Indeed, a long time period on which
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Fig. 5.11 1D-bifurcation diagram as KG −KL varies on the range [0, 0.5]. Panel (a),
productions x of a G-firm (black) and y of a LMA-firm (red) as KG−KL varies. Panel
(b), dynamic of r as KG −KL varies. Panels (c) and (d) a zoom of the bifurcations
diagrams on the upper line for KG −KL close to zero. Parameters: N = 20, β = 1,
α = 0.3, λ = 1 and c = 0.1.
firms deliver almost constant productions, very close to the Nash equilibrium level,
could lead an observer to think that the oligopoly is reaching a stationary equilibrium.
Nevertheless, large bursts appear for short periods of times and at regular intervals to
break the time series of constant productions.
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Fig. 5.12 Trajectory for i.c. (q∗ − 0.002, q∗ + 0.002, 0.1). Parameters: λ = 1, N = 20,
c = 0.1, α = 0.3, β = 1, Ky = 0, Kx = 0.0001. The Nash equilibria E1 and E0 are
depicted in blue. The i.c. in green. The ω-limit set is in red.
Fig. 5.13 Trajectory for i.c. (q∗ − 0.002, q∗ + 0.002, 0.1). Parameters: λ = 1, N = 20,
c = 0.1, α = 0.3, β = 6, Ky = 0, Kx = 0.0001. The Nash equilibria E1 and E0 are
depicted in blue. The i.c. in green. The ω-limit set is in red.
Another aspect is worth of being mentioned. The periodic and aperiodic attractors
depicted in Figures 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 provide indication that it may be more profitable
for firms to behave differently than similarly. Indeed, along these inner attractors the
average level of production is lower than in the Nash equilibrium and this implies,
given the profit function of the industry here assumed, that the average profit of the
industry is higher than the profit with all firms at the Nash equilibrium. Specifically,
we observe that the level of production of G-firms is always lower than the Nash
equilibrium quantity and their profits are always higher than the one obtainable at
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Fig. 5.14 Panel (a) trajectory for i.c. (q∗ − 0.002, q∗ + 0.002, 0.1). The ω-limit set is
in red. Panels (b)-(d) time series of r, x and y. Parameters: λ = 1, N = 20, c = 0.1,
α = 0.25, β = 6, Ky = 0, Kx = 0.00001.
the Nash equilibrium, see Figure 5.15 where we depicted the profit dynamics along
the attractors of the previous examples. On the contrary, the levels of production
of LMA-firms can oscillate around the Nash quantity and the profits can oscillate
above and below the ones obtainable at the Nash equilibrium. However, relative to
the dynamic scenario depicted in Figure 5.14, this occurs only for short intervals of
time, while for most of the time both G-firms and LMA-firms experience higher profits
along the inner attractor than at the Nash equilibrium. The economic explanation
of this phenomenon is clear and based on the fact that for firms it is sufficient to
produce less than the Nash quantity to increase their profits. This requires capability of
coordination between firms, for example as if they would be able to constitute a cartel,
which is not achievable within the simple evolutionary model proposed. However, a
sufficient level of evolutionary competition (remember that inner attractors appear as
the value of β increases, parameter that measures the evolutionary pressure) between
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two boundedly-rational behavioral rules can sustain unexpected forms of coordinations
that lead the industry as a whole and both groups of players as well to experience
average levels of profits, which are higher than those obtainable at the Nash equilibrium.
This observation leads to the conclusion that in some cases firms might prefer to be in
a polymorphic rather than monomorphic state. Recapping, the heterogeneity in the
firms’ choice of the behavioral rules may lead to increments in the producer surplus
(total profit of the industry), even though at the expenses of reducing the consumer
surplus.
Besides the described phenomena, other form of complexity can arise as well. An
example is depicted in Figure 5.16 where in panel (d) we observe a quite irregular
dynamics of the fraction of G-firms that populates the evolutionary game as time
evolves. In this case, a chaotic inner attractor exists.
To conclude the investigation on the dynamics of the evolutionary model, we can sum
up by saying that asymptotic dynamics can exhibit evolutionary stable heterogeneity:
the dynamics along the asymptotically stable attractors on R× R× (0, 1) indicate
that heterogeneous behavior can be more profitable, in an evolutionary sense, than
following a homogeneous strategy over time. Indeed, this heterogeneous behavior is the
result of the evolutionary selection based on profits. The proposed analysis underlines
also that a bias for playing one strategy does not necessarily imply that in the long
run all the firms decide to adopt that strategy. More precisely, the propensity for
playing one strategy does not exclude that firms select in the evolutionary process
the other strategy in the long run. This crucially depends on several elements, but
principally on the initial condition of the system. As a final note, we emphasize the
possibility of complicated dynamics of the state variables generated by the evolutionary
stable heterogeneities, which are particular interesting both from an economic and
mathematical point of view.
To conclude it can be noted that several extensions of this model are worth being
considered further. First of all, an interesting addition is to include memory in the
fitness measures of the two strategies, following [75]. With respect to the economic
structure, another interesting question, often overlooked by the existing literature, is
to study how the elasticity of demand influences the overall properties of the system.
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Fig. 5.15 Dynamics of profits: Dotted line represents profits that firms would obtain
at the Nash equilibrium, black solid line represents profits made by G-firms and gray
solid line represents profits made by LMA-firms. First row, profit dynamics along the
attractor depicted in Figure 5.12. Second row, profit dynamics along the attractor
depicted in Figure 5.13. Third row, profit dynamics along the attractor depicted in
Figure 5.14. Central column contains panels representing the profit dynamics along an
attractor. Left and Right columns contains panels representing enlargements of some
interesting parts of the profit dynamics.
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Fig. 5.16 On the left column two projections on the x−y plane of the trajectory (x, y, r)
of the evolutionary oligopoly model. On the right column the dynamics of variable r.
Upper line KG = 0.025 and KL = 0. Bottom line KG = 0.05 and KL = 0. Parameters:
N = 20, β = 1, KG = 0.05, KL = 0, α = 0.3, λ = 1 and c = 0.1.
Chapter 6
Reinforcement Learning (RL)
Based Control with Applications
6.1 Aim and scope
The Virgo/LIGO gravitational wave (GW) detectors are Michelson interferometers
trying to observe gravitation signals typically emitted by binary systems of neutron
stars and/or black holes.
Interferometers’ mirrors vary their relative distances due to the gravitational per-
turbation produced by the GW passage. In principle mirrors’ relative motion can
be used to reconstruct the GW form. However mirrors’ motion is caused also by
other terrestrial perturbations such as Newtonian noise, that are perturbations of the
gravitational field of the earth, and seismic noise which perturbs directly the mirrors’
position through their connection to the earth’s surface. In order to suppress the
perturbations of the terrestrial noise on the relative distance among mirrors, control
forces on mirrors’ suspensions are needed. Such forces are typically the outcome of
linear controllers, such as PID of LQG, whose design is based on a model of the physical
plant. It is worth noting that a disadvantage, which may arise using linear controllers,
comes from unavoidable errors in plant modeling that could invalidate, or weaken, the
utility of the classical optimal feedback design.
The objective of the control problem here considered is to make a first attempt
towards the realization of an adaptive feedback controller based on reinforcement
learning, which will be called the “RL Agent” in the following, in order to improve
the linear controller effectiveness. What is of interest here is that the RL Agent learns
from real data and it does not need any prior knowledge of the plant. Indeed the RL
Agent consists in a controller that adapts its feedback action based on experience, that
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is on the observations of the effects that past feedback actions have produced on the
plant, improving its effectiveness as long as new information shall be obtained from
data.
In order to realize such a controller, the RL Agent must be capable of forecasting
which effects a certain action will produce on the plant, learning the causal relations
which determine the transitions between successive states. In order to do this the
RL Agent will improve its evaluations of the transition probabilities of the physical
environment through the balancing between the exploration activity, by performing
random actions, and the exploitation of the acquired knowledge, by selecting actions
based on expectations of future rewards from it.
Stability and performance of the RL Agent are determined by a number of factors,
one of the most important of which is that the learning process must proceed as efficient
as possible. This is mainly favored by the Markovianity of the environment1 and by an
appropriate balance between the exploration of the environment and the exploitation
of the acquired knowledge about it. Furthermore, another advantage from using a
reinforcement learning controller is that, if feedback forces are conveniently chosen
in a bounded set, then problems about reliability of the controller are avoided. This
aspects, as well as other important ones, will be discussed in details in the following.
The plain of the present Chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2 is described a two-
pendulum system perturbed by colored noise while in Section 6.2.1 is described the
filtering process needed to estimate the dynamical state of the system based on noisy
measures. In Section 6.3 is outlined how the reinforcement learning controller can
be used for the dynamical system control and a brief overview of the reinforcement
learning topic is presented. In Section 6.4 simulations of the two-pendulum system
using both the reinforcement learning controller and a classical linear PID controller
are used. Finally, in Section 6.5 are suggested further developments.
6.2 Coupled pendulums
The reinforcement learning based controller is here applied to a simplified model
of superattenuators of a gravitational wave detector. Superattenuators are indeed
complex mechanical elements characterized by a high number of degrees of freedom
(approximately 60 − 70 each) that are connected to the earth through suspensions,
that have the function of supporting the mirrors and are designed to suppress the
noise coming from the earth surface. At a very first approximation, superattenuators
1This makes possible to isolate the direct effect of feedback actions on the plant’s dynamics.
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and mirrors are expected to behave like two identical pendulums perturbed, at their
suspensions, by white and correlated seismic noises with higher correlation at lower
frequencies. The measures on the plant that can be performed are those that return
the relative distance between the mirrors. In this simplified model of the plant it is
assumed that such measures are affected by a simplified sensor noise, meaning by this
that it is white, Gaussian and independent from the seismic noise that perturbs the
mirrors’ motion. This can be seen as a first step towards the real application of a RL
Agent controller to gravitational interferometers.
Fig. 6.1 Schematic representation of the plant: the mirrors, located in p1 and p2 with
respect to a fixed reference frame in the laboratory, and the superattenuators behave
like two pendulums; their suspensions at the top, located in o1 and o2 in the same
frame, are perturbed by seismic noise; feedback actuators are present; a laser measures
the relative distance between the mirrors.
Let p1 and p2 be the positions of each pendulum in a certain reference frame, and
let o1 and o2 be the positions of their suspension points in the same frame. Since
the force on each pendulum depends only on the displacement pi − oi, i = 1, 2, the
equations of motion of the system can be written as:
p¨1 = −ω2(p1 − o1)− νp˙1 (6.1a)
p¨2 = −ω2(p2 − o2)− νp˙2 (6.1b)
where the oscillation frequency ω is the same for the two pendulums and the dumping
coefficient ν accounts for air friction. In gravitational interferometers the relevant and
measurable quantity is the distance between the mirrors. If there was no noise acting
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on the pendulums, then their relative distance would be fixed at X0. However, such
distance is Xt = p1(t)− p2(t) and evolves according to the evolution equation obtained
subtracting the equations (6.1) one from the other:
X¨t = −ω2(Xt −Ot)− νX˙t (6.2)
where Ot = o1 − o2 is the distance between the two suspensions. We want to take into
account that the suspensions o1 and o2, because of their finite distance on the earth
surface, are subjected to seismic perturbations that are correlated at low frequencies.
It results that the noise Ot will have higher intensity at high frequencies. A model for
the noise of Ot will be obtained from a white and Gaussian noise ξt with variance q,
that is a noise for which it results that ξt ∼ N (0, 1) and ⟨ξtξs⟩ = qδ(t− s), considering
the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
x˙t = −pxt + ξt (6.3)
where p is a positive constant. Indeed the power spectral density (PSD) of x˙t as a
function of the frequency f is:
PSD(x˙t) ∝ f
2
p2 + f 2 (6.4)
The process x˙t has the qualitative features desired for the effective noise perturbing
the distance Ot since it is characterized by a lower energy content at low frequencies
rather than at high frequencies.
Equation (6.2) and (6.3) are rewritten in the concise matrix form which highlights
that the physical plant is a linear system driven by white and Gaussian noise:
d
dt

Xt
X˙t
xt
 =

0 1 0
−ω2 −ν −ω2p
0 0 −p


Xt
X˙t
xt
+

0 0 0
0 0 ω2
0 0 1


0
0
ξt
 (6.5)
In the following we will write the equation (6.5) in compact form:
X˙t = A ·Xt +G · ξt (6.6)
where Xt is the dynamical state of the plant, the matrix A ∈ Ri×i is the reaction
matrix while the matrix G ∈ Rk×i accounts for stochastic diffusion.
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Fig. 6.2 Amplitude spectral densities (ASD) of noises’ signals of displacements. Left:
the ASD of the positions o1 and o2 of the suspensions with respect to the laboratory
reference frame which are assumed to be white noises with unitary variance (q = 1).
Right: the ASD of the process obtained by solving the SDE (6.3), that is a colored
noise used to model the difference between the positions of the suspensions of the
mirrors in a laboratory reference frame, that is o1 − o2.
In all the simulations that follow it will be used a 5-th order Runge-Kutta numerical
integrator with Cash–Karp coefficients (see [129]) to provide a solution of the equation
(6.5) with initial condition X0 = 0.
6.2.1 Filtering
For reasons that will be set out below, the measures of the distance between the mirrors
will not be sufficient to obtain effective control policies. The problem of having an
estimate of the dynamical state X̂t := E[Xt|Zt′ , 0 ⩽ t′ ⩽ t] given the observation
Zt′ = Xt′ + ηt′ up to time t is tackled using a Kalman filter (see [72] or every standard
text book on time series analysis).
The discrete time Kalman filer problem is formulated in the following way. Consider
a linear discrete model of an unknown plant involving the variable x and its measures
provided by z. Denoting by k the time advancement, the equations of the discrete
model are:
(linear system) xk+1 = a · xk + fk + g · uk (6.7)
a ∈ Ri×i, g ∈ Ri×j
(linear observation) zk = c · xk + vk (6.8)
c ∈ Rl×i
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where f accounts for known externalities and where the noise u and the sensor noise
v are assumed to be white and Gaussian, that is u ∼ N (0,q) and v ∼ N (0, r)
respectively, and also mutually independent and independent from the initial condition
x0.
The estimate x̂k+1|k+1 := E [xk+1 |zk′ , 0 ⩽ k′ ⩽ k + 1] of the state xk+1 given the
observations zk′ up to time k + 1 is provided by the recursive estimations for the
Kalman filtering which, at stage k + 1, reads as follows:
Prediction (6.9a)
x̂k+1|k = ax̂k|k + fk
Pk+1|k = aPk|kaT + gqgT
Filtering (6.9b)
y˜k+1 = zk+1 − cx̂k+1|k
Kk+1 = Pk+1|kcT
[
cPk+1|kcT + r
]−1
x̂k+1|k+1 = x̂k+1|k +Kk+1y˜k+1
Pk+1|k+1 = Pk+1|k −Kk+1cPk+1|k
The prediction and filtering updates propagate the initial conditions x̂0|0 and P0|0 =
E[(x0 − x̂0)T (x0 − x̂0)] which are included in the model of the plant providing the
expected initial distribution of state of the system. In particular the matrix Pk ∈ Ri×i
is the covariance matrix of the innovation process, Pk = E[(xk − x̂k)T (xk − x̂k)]. The
Kalman filter is a recursive estimator meaning by this that only the estimated state
from the previous time step and the current measurement are needed to compute the
estimate for the current state. So the Kalman filter signal is a Markov process.
It is proved that, with the previous assumptions on noises and the linearity of
the system, the Kalman filter is the optimal estimator minimizing a quadratic error
function. It is straightforward that if the model of the plant does not match exactly
the real unknown plant (noises’ and initial innovation process’ covariances included)
the Kalman filtering is not optimal anymore (but, however, it is still the best linear
estimator, see [50]). In particular, it is worth noting that when the Kalman filter works
optimally, the innovation process y˜k+1 = zk+1cx̂k+1|k, given by the difference between
the predicted state at step k + 1 and the measured state at the same step, carries
no systematic errors and it must be a white noise. The whiteness property of the
innovation process is a measure of the filter’s performance.
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In agreement with what was stated in the previous Section (6.2) the two pendulums
system can be described by:
plant’s model (linear system): X˙t = AXt + ft +Gξt (6.10)
A ∈ Ri×i, G ∈ Ri×j
measures: Zt = CXt + ηt (6.11)
C ∈ Rl×i
where f accounts for external, and known, feedback forces. In particular it is a linear
system where the noises ξ and η are assumed to be white, Gaussian and mutually
independent, and it is that
E
 ξ
η
 (ξ,η)
 =
 Pξ 0
0 Pη

The first order discretization of the equations (6.10) and (6.11) leads to the discrete
time equations (6.7) and () with the following correspondences:
a↔ I+Adt , q ↔ dtPξ , r↔ Pη/dt , c↔ C , g↔ G (6.12)
For the sake of completeness it is noted that the covariance matrices Pξ ∈ Rj×j and
Pη ∈ Rl×l have only one element each different from zero which coincides with the
variance of the process ξ and η.
In figure 6.3 the comparisons between the time series of the position and the velocity,
from solving (6.5) with a high order numerical integrator, with their estimations
provided by the application of the Kalman filtering, are shown.
When the discretization time dt is too large, the first order discretization of the
equations (6.5) is no longer a good approximation of these and the Kalman filer will
be based on a wrong plant model. In figure 6.4 the power spectral densities (PSD)
of the innovation processes of Kalman filtering applied to equation (6.5) for different
discretization times and the same parameters chosen in the simulation in figure 6.3
are plotted. The qualitative non whiteness of the innovation press reveald that the
Kalman filter does not works optimally.
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Fig. 6.3 Application of Kalman filtering to equation (6.5) with frequency ω =
√
0.5Hz,
air friction ν = 0.005Hz, seismic noise variance σξ = 10−4, sensor noise variance
ση = 10−5, discretization time dt = 10−2s. Left: comparison between the ASDs of the
position Xt−X0 (black) and of its estimate X̂t−X0 (red). Right: comparison between
the ASDs of the velocity X˙t (black) and of its estimate ̂˙X t (red).
(a) PSD(y˜k) for dt = 0.01s (b) PSD(y˜k) for dt = 0.1s.
Fig. 6.4 A qualitative evaluation of the PSD of the innovation process y˜k, expressed
in [m2/Hz], using the discrete Kalman Filter (6.9) applied to (6.5), shows the higher
performances of the filter with lower discretization time: dt = 0.01s (left) and dt = 0.1s
(right). All the parameters are the same as in figure 6.3.
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6.3 Application to the two-pendulum system
In many situations that involve the dynamical system control, optimal control design
of classical linear feedbacks may be invalidated or weakened since the available model
of the plant is wrong. Another disadvantage of linear controllers may arises because
of their unboundedness. Indeed feedback actuators are real physical devices and
give a linear response with good approximation only in a limited working region and
unsuspected nonlinearities may arise depending on whether the plant’s dynamical state
goes outside this region.
We study how traditional control techniques can be assisted by reinforcement
learning based nonlinear adaptive controller, which is the RL Agent, to be applied to
the two-pendulum system governed by the equation of motion (6.5) where the control
task is to keep the relative position fixed between the pendulums as if there were no
seismic noise, that is when the reference signal to the plant is provided by the fixed
distance given by X0 = 0.
It is worth noting that the RL Agent learns a control policy if all the information
about the causes that induce transitions among plant’s dynamical states are available
to it. So since the plant evolves in part due to its initial conditions and in part due
to external feedback forces, then the RL Agent has to know, at each time step, the
information about the dynamical state of the plant together with the other feedback
forces acting on it, its own included. However, the noisy measure Zt of the relative
positionXt between the mirrors is, by itself, is not sufficient to determine the subsequent
position Xt+dt since, at time t, the system is also characterized by a certain velocity
X˙t. For this reason it is needed an estimate X̂t of the full dynamic variable Xt of
the system. The same estimates X̂t are also necessary to realize any other classical
controllers. Such estimates are provided by Kalman filtering (see Section 6.2.1).
The equation of motion (6.6) with feedbacks can be written as:
X˙t = A ·Xt + ft(X̂t) + π(X̂t, ft) +G · ξt (6.13)
where ft accounts for classical linear feedback control forces and where the term π(X̂t, ft)
accounts for the feedback provided by the RL Agent which will be computed based on
the estimation X̂t and the feedback ft.
In what follows the vector ft is assumed to be a force of which the sole non-zero
component is obtained from a Partial-Integral-Differential (PID) controller given by:
ft = −Ki
∫ t
−∞
X̂sds−KpX̂t −Kd̂˙X t (6.14)
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Fig. 6.5 Scheme of the plant. The “plant” box returns as output the dynamical state X
of the plant; the “obs” box gives measures of X; the “KF” box is Kalman filter which
gives the estimates X̂ of X based on measures Z; the “f” box gives a linear feedback
force f according to (6.14); the “π” box is the RL Agent which chooses the additional
feedback force based on estimates X̂ and the feedback f . The plant is to be controlled
towards the rest configuration, that is the null reference signal X0 = 0.
where Ki, Kp and Kd are parameters.
A scheme of the plant is sketched in figure 6.5: the measures Z of the dynamical
state X are filtered to obtain the estimate X̂. Both the control policies of the RL
Agent and the linear controller use the estimate X̂ to control the plant towards the
null reference signal.
6.3.1 How the RL Agent works
To grasp how artificial intelligence can be used to control an unknown dynamical system,
a brief overview of reinforcement learning topic is presented in what follows. For a
more comprehensive treatment of reinforcement learning concepts and applications see,
for example, the classic text by R.S. Sutton and A.G. Barto, [112].
Reinforcement learning is based on the idea that learning can be realized through
interaction with the environment, that is a source of experience from which a wealth
of information about causes and effects that actions on it will produce is obtained.
Basically, to each state of the environment a reward is corresponded to the RL
Agent. The reward can be thought as an environmental circumstance and it is used by
the RL Agent to built its preferences on environmental states: a state will be preferred
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instead of another one if the expected sum of future discounted rewards achievable
from it is higher. On the basis of such preferences the RL Agent will be able to realize
a goal-directed behavior.
The agent’s goal is to maximize the total amount of reward it will receive over the
long run: the sum of discounted rewards achievable from time t onward is given by
Rt = rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + ... =
∞∑
k=0
γkrk+t+1 (6.15)
where the discount rate γ is such that 0 ⩽ γ ⩽ 1. The parameter γ tunes how far in
time action effects are taken into account: if γ = 0, the agent is “myopic” in being
concerned only with maximizing immediate rewards: its objective in this case is to
learn how to choose an action A so as to maximize only rt+1. But in general, acting to
maximize immediate reward can reduce access to future rewards so that the return
may actually be reduced. As γ approaches 1 the agent becomes more farsighted and
looking forward at future rewards.
Let S be the set of all possible states of environment in which the RL Agent acts and
let A be the set of all possible actions the RL Agent can execute on it. Therefore, given
the agent’s policy π defined as the probability to choose an action A in state S, that is
π(S,A) := P{At = A|St = S}, the RL Agent assigns a value to the state-action pairs
(S,A) ∈ S ×A that accounts for the amount of expected future rewards achievable in
the future, that is along the trajectory of the environment that starts from there and
which is driven according to π thereafter:
Qπ(S,A) = Eπ[Rt|St = S,At = A] (6.16)
= Eπ
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrk+t+1 |St = S,At = A
]
The function Qπ : S ×A → R is exactly the state-action value function, the Q-function
in the following.
The most widely used method to obtain the Q-function if the policy π is provided
is the so called temporal difference (TD) recurrence, named TD SARSA, which reads
as follow:
Qk+1(st, at)← Qk(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQk(st+1, at+1)−Qk(st, at)] (6.17)
TD methods (6.17) evaluate the Qπ-function on the basis of the acquired experience
providing at each time step both the estimation of the expected value (6.16), by
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means of rt+1 + γQk(st+1, at+1), and the estimation of the true value Qπ(st, at), by
means of Qk(st, at). In other words the recurrence (6.17) adjusts the current value
Qk(st, at) according to the TD error, defined by δt = rt+1+ γQk(st+1, at+1)−Qk(st, at),
indicating that the estimate Qk(st, at) should be more like rt+1 + γQk(st+1, at+1). By
these features, TD methods result appropriate to be implemented on-line and in
unknown environments, exactly because at each time step better estimates of expected
returns rather than the available current ones are provided.
However, when the environment is unknown and no experience about it is owned,
the RL Agent does not know which rewards can be achieved from a state or, equivalently,
which effect its actions will produce on the environment: it must discover it exploring
the environment through random actions. As the exploration activity proceeds, more
and more knowledge about the environment is acquired and this experience is used to
map states to actions in order to maximize the expected rewards it will receive. In
fact a single action may determine not only the immediate reward but also the next
and, through that, all subsequent rewards. As such learning process goes on the RL
Agent increases the exploitation of the acquired knowledge executing actions that are
expected to bring the system towards its goal.
This is realized along the on-line implementation of the TD recurrence scheme
(6.17), by balancing the exploration and the exploitation activities to assure that
as much state-action pairs as possible are visited avoiding to neglect every relevant
information about the environment. For a given policy π there is, at least, one action
in every state supposed to bring higher benefit (the so called greedy action): exploiting
the current knowledge means exactly select the greedy action, while selecting one of
the non-greedy actions means exploring the environment. The balancing between the
exploration and exploitation activities enables the RL Agent to evaluate the non-greedy
action’s effects and it is realized embedding a stochastic component to the deterministic
policy π in the following way:
πϵ(s) =
 π(s) with probability 1− ϵevery A ∈ A(s) with probability ϵ /|A(s)| (6.18)
The stochastic policy πϵ is the so called ϵ-greedy policy. Exploration, of course, will
be more beneficial in unknown environment. Then the higher the knowledge, the
higher the probability of exploitation rather than exploration: in the limit in which
state-action pairs are visited a great number of times, the ϵ-greedy policy must converge
to the deterministic policy π to make the TD methods convergent.
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It is worth noting that a new policy π′ can be obtained from a given Qπ-function,
based on an original policy π, from selecting, in every state s ∈ S, the actions which
maximize the expected future rewards:
π′(S) = argmax
A
Qπ(S,A) (6.19)
The policy defined in (6.19) is the so called greedy policy and it can be proved, using
the policy improvement theorem (see again [112]), that is strictly better than π meaning
by this that π′ is capable of driving the environment obtaining higher rewards along
its future trajectory rather then with π, except when there is no further room for
improvements and in this case it is said to be optimal,
At the light of the policy improvement theorem, the RL Agent can improve its
policy during the implementation of the TD recurrence. Indeed the value function Qπ
provides a new greedy policy π′, according to the definition (6.19), which results to
be as good as, or even better than, the starting policy π. Based on the new improved
policy π′ a new value function Qπ′ can be computed and, in turn, an even better greedy
policy π′′ can be obtained from it. As the succession of policy improvements and
policy evaluations proceeds, a sequence of monotonically improving value functions
and policies is obtained, unless they are already optimal. If the policy improvement
and the policy iteration succession - not necessarily each is completed before the other
begins - stabilizes, then both the policy and the Q-function must be optimal. It is
proved that the TD algorithm (6.17) converges with probability 1 to an optimal policy
and optimal Q-function if all state-action pairs are visited an infinite number of times
and the stochastic ϵ-greedy policy reduces to the deterministic greedy policy in the
limit. A sketch of the succession could be illustrate as follows:
π0 → Qπ0 → π1 → Qπ1 → ...→ πn → Qn → ...→ π∗ → Q∗ → ... (6.20)
The two joint process realizes an adaptive learning process.
6.3.2 A preliminary control task
A first example was developed as a first application of the reinforcement learning
concepts. In particular, it is considered the control task in which an ideal point
has to be driven towards a target in a 2D discrete space in which barriers, or walls,
that limit the movements, are present. This space is divided in a grid of 10 × 10
dimensions and in each state, having coordinates X = (i, j), 4 actions are available:
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A = (left, right, up, down). The target is located in X0 = (i0, j0) and it is represented
in the left figure 6.7 by a red dot where, also, the straight black lines stand for the
walls. The RL Agent receives the reward value +1 corresponding to the transition
towards the slot containing the red dot from the adjacent slots. This happens when
the action “left” in the slot (i0 + 1, j0) or the action “down” in the slot (i0, j0 + 1) are
selected. The RL Agent receives a punishment of value −1 if it prescribes movements
that would be possible only if walls are absent. The Q-function is stacked in a 3D
array of 10× 10× 4 dimensions and provide the ϵ-greedy policy, from the definition
(6.19), whose deterministic part is given by
A(X) = argmax
A′
Q(X, A′) (6.21)
while the stochastic part is provided by a fixed probability ϵ of exploration. The
Q-function results from a learning process in which temporal difference errors are
used to update the values of every state-action pairs (X, A). Such procedure is
computationally feasible because of the limited number of possible state-action pairs,
that are 10 · 10 · 4 = 400. So the TD recurrence
Q′(Xt, At) = Q′(Xt, At) + α (rt+1 + γQ(Xt+1, At+1)−Q(Xt, At) (6.22)
can be implemented at the end of each episode, that is once the target is reached
starting from a random initial condition. Of course the next update of Q will be
performed at the end of the subsequent episode which takes place with new initial
conditions. The number of steps to the target decreases in few episodes and it is lower
for decreasing values of the fixed exploration probability, as showed in the figure 6.6.
In figure 6.7 on the right the Q-function is represented once the learning process has
been completed. The colors distinguish among the maximum values maxAQ(X, A) of
the Q-function in each stateX over the actions and the arrows indicate the deterministic
greedy actions induced by the Q-function itself.
6.3.3 RL Agent design
In the application of reinforcement learning to the two-pendulum system, the ϵ-greedy
action of the RL Agent enters in the equation of motion (6.13) by the term π(X̂, f).
Indeed, considering that the transition probabilities between two dynamical states
of the plant are determined by the feedback actions A ∈ A of the RL Agent, by the
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Fig. 6.6 The number of steps to reach the target at different probabilities of exploration:
ϵ = 0.8 (red) and ϵ = 0.1 (green) for the speed of adjustment α = 0.6.
Fig. 6.7 Left: the space with walls and the target (red dot). Right: the maximum
values of Q-function, the arrows shows the deterministic greedy policy provided by Q.
external feedback forces ft and, of course, by the states X̂t, and then the Q-function
of the RL Agent will be a function of the type Q = Q(X̂, f, A).
However, simulations show that it is more convenient to obtain an evaluation from
the RL Agent of the total feedback applied to the plant, that is the sum π + f , based
on the state X̂ rather than an evaluation of only the action π based on the state X̂
and the feedback f . Based on this choice, the environment of the RL Agent will be
identified by the set of estimates of the plant’s dynamical states, that is S ≡
{
X̂
}
, and
then the Q-function will return the values of the feedback f + A when the estimated
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dynamical state of the plant is X̂, that is
Q(X̂, f, A) = Q(X̂, f + A) (6.23)
Furthermore, because of the infinite cardinality of the set S, the Q-function have
to be represented by a parametrize function approximator instead of stacking them in
multidimensional arrays as in the example presented in (6.3.2). A further advantage
coming from having a parametrization of theQ-function is that the values of state-action
pairs are better matched with the observed returns because of the interpolating nature
of the approximator. Indeed, in principle, the value of each state is determined by the
discounted sum of returns achievable from it. But, since in real learning experience as
well as in simulations the RL Agent will visit only a finite subset of possible plant’s
dynamical states, it could happen that the estimation of the value of a particular
state results from a sampling of smaller size than that used for the estimation of the
values of its adjacent states. So, because of the continuity property of the function
approximator, such a raw estimate will be adjusted to better fit with the values of its
neighborhood. This aspect reveals the capability of the RL Agent, implemented with
a function approximator, of generalizing value functions also to states which haven’t
been previously experienced. On the other hand, however, the finiteness of parameters’
number limits the complexity of the approximation determining some errors in the
representation .
A typical choice to tackle reinforcement learning tasks in the case of infinite state
space S consists of using a neural network as a parametrized function approximator
(see for example [7] or [8]).
For the sake of completeness it can be recalled that a neural network consists of a
sequence of layers of nodes: the input layer of ni nodes represents the entry variables
in input, the nodes of hidden layers transform the linear combinations of values of
the nodes in the preceding layer through activation functions and, finally, an output
layer returns linear combinations of the values of the nodes in the last hidden layer. In
figure 6.8 a neural network with one hidden layer and a unique node as the output
layer is depicted.
Following this approach, the Q-function will be the neural network output denoted
by Qw where w is the weights’ vector. In order to approximate a target function T ,
the values of which are available only at the sampling points {xk}k=1,..,K ∈ S ×A, the
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Fig. 6.8 A sketch of a one-hidden layer neural network that parametrizes a Q-function
Q(X, A).
weights w are chosen to minimize an error function of the form
Ew :=
K∑
k=1
E(∥T (xk)−Qw(xk)∥) (6.24)
using a backpropagation algorithm based on a gradient descent method. The backprop-
agation algorithm used to adjust the initial weights w0 of the neural network is the
scaled conjugate gradient descent algorithm, SCG in what follows, which is a method
that provides a fasten convergence towards the minimum of the error function regarding
other gradient descent methods and requires a quadratic error (further details on SCG
algorithm can be found in [102]).
In order to realize an on-line learning process taking place along the plant’s evolution
where the Q-function is provided by a neural network, the implementation of the policy
improvement scheme (6.20) realized through the TD SARSA recurrence (6.17) has to
be adapted to include parameters’ adjustments. More precisely, at the initial time
t0 = 0 the plant is unknown to the RL Agent and it explores the environment choosing
random actions with probability ϵ0 = 1. The initial weights of the neural network are
random in [−1, 1] and are denoted by w0. Similarly the initial Q-function is denoted
by Qw0 . Up to a certain time t1 = NT × dt, where NT is a parameter to be determined
experimentally and dt is a suitable discretization time, the temporal difference errors
δw0 , that have been obtained along the trajectory up to the time t1, are a record of
length NT which is stored in a memory support. At time t1 + dt this record is used to
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compute the quadratic error function:
Ew0 =
NT∑
t=0
∥δw0(t)∥2
=
NT∑
t=0
∥rt+dt + γQw0(t+ dt)−Qw0(t)∥2 (6.25)
where rt+dt is the reward at time t+ dt and with the notation Qw0(t) the value of the
state-action pair along the plant trajectory at time t is meant:
Qw0(t) := Qw0(X̂t, ft + At) (6.26)
From minimizing (6.25) through the SCG algorithm a new weights’ vector w1 is
obtained and therefore also a new Q-function, namely Qw1 . It is worth noting that,
from the starting vector w0, more intermediate adjustments of the weights through
the SCG algorithm are needed to end up with the final vector w1 in order to get as
close as possible to the minimum, or a local minimum, of the error function. Such
number of iterations of the SCG algorithm at the first stage of the learning process is
denoted by Nscg(1) = N
MAX
scg . After time t1, the exploration probability is decreased
to ϵ1 and a new record of temporal difference errors is stored replacing the previous
one. At time t2 = t1 +NT × dt, a number Nscg(2) of SGC iterations are performed to
get the new weights w2 and than the new Q-function Qw2 . At the k-th stage of the
on-line learning process the greedy policy πk provided by the current value function
Qwk is expected to drive the plant towards a goal-directed behavior better than the
starting policy π0 provided by Qw0 . The weights’ vector wk is updated by iterating
Nscg(k + 1) times the SGC algorithm to reduce the error Ewk
Ewk =
tk+NT∑
t=tk
∥rt+1 + γQwk(t+ 1)−Qwk(t)∥2 (6.27)
As the learning proceeds the exploration probability ϵk can be decreased in favor
of the exploitation probability given by 1 − ϵk. The exploration probability will be
updated, at each stage k, according to the following recurrences:
ϵk+1 = ϵkϵ1/N0 + ϵ0
1− ϵ1/N0
1 + ϵ0
−→ ϵ01 + ϵ0 as k →∞ (6.28)
where the parameter N = NT ×NK depends on the length NT of the stretch of the
trajectory while the other parameter NK , which has to be determined experimentally,
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gives an order of magnitude of how many weights’ adjustments are needed to complete
most of the learning process. Furthermore, the number Nscg(k) of SCG iterations are
decreased form the initial valueNscg(0) = N
MAX
scg downwards to a minimum positive value
N
min
scg becoming less necessary asQwk becomes more self-consistent and the error function
becomes flatter near to zero. In the application it is Nscg(k) = max
{
N
min
scg , ϵk ×NMAXscg
}
.
It is now observed that, according to the recurrence (6.28), a residual exploration
activity is maintained even for a high state of progress of the learning, since ϵk > 0
for any k. This will be helpful in the case the plant is supposed to vary slowly in
time: a residual stochastic component of the greedy policy and the strict positivity of
the minimum number of SCG iterations, Nscg(∞) := Nminscg , ensure that the learning
process never ends.
6.4 Numerical simulations
A one-hidden layer neural network-like function approximator will be used to give an
approximation of the Q-function of the RL Agent, whose output can be generically
expressed as
Qw(x) =
nh∑
j=1
h
(
ni∑
i=1
xiVij
)
Wj (6.29)
where, again, to simplify the notation the state-action vector is denoted by x, that
is x =∈ S × A, and xi is its i-th component. V and W are the matrices of weights
with dimensions respectively given by ni × nh and nh × 1 where ni is the number of
the entries in input to the neural network and nh is the number of nodes in its unique
hidden layer. The function h(·) : R→ R is the activation function. Finally, the vector
w = {V,W} combines the matrices V andW in a unique element and it is introduced
to simplify the notation.
The choice of a one-hidden layer neural network is due to the fact that backpropaga-
tion algorithms, that are gradient descent methods, may become unstable when more
than one hidden layer is present, while the number of hidden nodes are chosen with
regard to the desired performance of the RL Agent control. The activation function
will be given by nonlinear functions as the target Q-function is.
Moreover, backpropagation consists in gradient descent methods and requires the
computation of the derivatives of activation functions. Then the SGC algorithm will
adjust the weights’ vector taking steps size proportional to that derivative and, if the
derivative gets huge, the gradient descent results unstable and it will shoot the point
vector w far away from a close local minimum of the error function. To avoid this
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scenario, an activation function, having well-behaved derivatives, has to be chosen.
Common examples are the hyperbolic tangent or the sigmoid given respectively by:
tanh(x) := e
x − e−x
ex + e−x , σ(x) :=
1
1 + e−x
In particular the hidden nodes of the neural network used in the present application
will be characterized by hyperbolic tangent as activation functions (see figure 6.9).
Fig. 6.9 Hyperbolic tangent activation function.
The reinforcement learning controller will be based on a scalar and deterministic
reinforcement signal. This reinforcement induces preferences on the state-action pairs
which are propagated backwards from the goal to peripheral states during the on-line
learning process by means of value functions. In particular the reinforcement signal had
to assign to the RL Agent higher rewards as closer the plant’s dynamical state is to the
reference signal. In the present application, as sketched in figure 6.5, the reference signal
is zero and this suggests that a suitable reward function has to favor the convergence
of the plant towards the rest configuration as if there was no noise or feedback and it
will be shaped likewise the ones in figure (6.10). The reward function will contribute to
the behaviors reinforcement learning controller, but there is no methodology to choose
it, assuring established performances and stability properties (see again [112]). It has
to be chosen regarding the effectiveness of the controller when applied. Simulations
shows that the reward signal that had determined the best performances in control of
the two-pendulum system is the one given in figure 6.10c whose expression is
r(X) = 1.8× (e−|X| + 0.3)e−|X+X˙/0.7| (6.30)
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(a) The reward which has the maximum value
along the line X˙ = −X/θ and decreases ex-
ponentially from that line. Its expression is
θ = 0.7 and given by r(X) = e−|X+X˙/0.7|.
(b) A bivariate Gaussian with center in the
origin.
(c) A reward given by r(X) = 1.8× (e−|X| +
0.3)e−|X+X˙/0.7|
Fig. 6.10 Possible reward functions in R2.
Another important aspect to be taken into account is that, despite it is not
theoretically needed, in practice the neural network inputs need to be standardized
to avoid the saturation of activation functions near their limit values (−1 and 1 in
the case of tanh). Indeed if inputs are far from the interval [−1, 1] the tanh activation
function will take only values 1 or −1 and does not distinguish among different inputs.
Indeed each element x of the state-action space S×A in input to the neural network at
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the k+1-th stage of the learning process, let it be denoted as x(k+1), is standardized
according to the following formula:
xi(k + 1)→ x′i(k + 1) =
xi − µxi(k)
σxi(k)
∼ [−1, 1] (6.31)
where xi = xi(k + 1) is i-th component of x and µxi(k) and σxi(k) are respectively
its average value and its standard deviation at the k-th stage of the learning process
computed over NT points along the plant’s evolution. In this way the values
∑
i xiVik
in input to the hidden nodes are roughly within the range of the activation function
working region.
It is worth noting that the standardization is adapted to the variance of the inputs
along the learning to improve the performance of the RL Agent controller. In figure
6.11 a simulations is presented to stress the importance of the varying standardization:
it is evident that the performance with the varying standardization, provided by
the ASDs, is higher rather than the case of fixed standardization. In this particular
simulation the plant is acknowledged and no Kalman filtering is needed. Further
the linear PID controller is absent and only the RL Agent acts on the plant. The
neural network is trained based on the true plant’s dynamical states Xt. On the left
side of the figure the variation of the distance between the mirrors is depicted, that
is Xt −X0, while on the right side the ASDs of the same signal are presented once
the learning process is, for the most part, accomplished over 106 samples each. In
all cases the initial standardization is computed using the first 50000 states of the
trajectory of the uncontrolled plant before the beginning of the learning process. In
the upper figures the standardization varies according to (6.31) while in the lower
figures the initial standardization is kept fixed. Other parameters are: dt = 0.1s,
NK = 100, NT = 1500, Nmaxscg = 120, Nminscg = 15, γ = 0.95, ϵ0 = 0.001, nh =
7, A = {−10,−1,−0.1,−0.01,−0.001,−0.0001, 0, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10}m/s2,
the reward is given by r(X̂) = e−|X̂+ ̂˙X/0.7| (figure 6.10a), the frequency of the pendulums
is ω = 0.5, the air friction is ν = 0.005Hz. The white and Gaussian noise ξt is
characterized by a unitary variance, that is (E(ξ) = 0 and V(ξ) = 1).
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(a) The standardization variance σx varies at
each stage of the learning process according
to (6.31) and it is depicted by the green line.
(b) The ASD of the time series of Xt − X0
once the learning process is, for the most part,
accomplished (red) compared to the ASD of
Xt − X0 relative to the uncontrolled plant
(black).
(c) The standardization variance σ0 is fixed
and it is depicted by the green line.
(d) Comparison among the ASDs of the uncon-
trolled plant (black), of the controlled plant
with fixed standardization (blue) and of the
controlled plant with varying standardization
(red).
Fig. 6.11 Simulations to stress the importance of the varying standardization
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However, in order to reproduce a more real control problem, the PID linear controller
and the Kalman filter are introduced as a control device. The physical system is
governed by the equation of motion (6.13). The parameters of the pendulums are as
follows:
frequency: ω =
√
0.5Hz
air friction: ν = 0.005Hz
seismic noise variance: σξ = 10−4
sensor noise variance: ση = 10−5
The parameters that regulate the learning process are as follows:
learning step length: NT = 1500
- NK = 70
discount factor: γ = 0.95
max. SCG iterations: NMAXscg = 150
min. SCG iterations: Nminscg = 15
hidden neurons nr.: nh = 13
final exploration prob.: ϵ0 = 0.001
time step : dt = 10−2s
The scheme of the plant is represented by the scheme (6.5) where the feedback
architecture is recalled in figure 6.12.
Fig. 6.12 Feedback architectures
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The PID parameters, Ki, Kp and Kd, are selected to have the gain margin in the
frequency range 1 ÷ 10 Hz similarly to the case of suspended mirrors in the Virgo
gravitational interferometer. In figure 6.13 the open loop transfer function is given,
obtained when only the PID controller is present (black line), where the gain margin is
exactly in the frequency range 1÷ 10 Hz.
Ki = 10−2 , Kp = 10−2 , Kd = 10−1 (6.32)
Fig. 6.13 Open loop transfer functions between the input noise and the output feedback
from the PID controller (black) and the PID + RL Agent controller (blue).
In figure 6.14 the results of the control from the application of both the RL Agent
and the PID controllers are presented. In the upper image the exploration probability
ϵk profile is depicted as the learning advances, while in the lower image the variation
of the distance between the mirrors can be seen, that is X −X0, showing qualitatively
the effectiveness of the reinforcement learning controller. The stability of the controller
occurs when there is no continuous growth of noise or, equivalently, whenever the noise
stays below a certain level. From a look at the time series of the relative position
X −X0 in the figure 6.14 below, the control can be said stable. However for a more
informative analysis, stability can be checked through Bode plots (see for example
[56]). In figure 6.13 the open loop transfer function of the feedback controllers of the
RL Agent embedded with the linear PID (blue line) is given. However the bode plot
has to be completed including the phase margin. However the plot is presented anyway
to show that we are searching in this direction.
In figure 6.15 the mean value ⟨Q⟩k of the rewards obtained during the plant evolution
at each stage k of the learning process is represented. As expected, it results a growing
138 Reinforcement Learning (RL) Based Control with Applications
Fig. 6.14 Up: the ϵ probability profile. Down: time series of the variation of the
distance between the mirrors, that it Xt −X0. The plant is definite by equation of
motion (6.5).
function and this reveals that the RL Agent learns how to act on the plant with
increasing effectiveness.
In figure 6.16 the noise spectrum obtained with the RL Agent and the PID controller
(red line) is drawn and compared to the spectrum of the uncontrolled plant (orange) in
order to quantify the performance of the controller. Furthermore, also the performance
of the same controller, when the Kalman filter is based on a wrong plant model, it is
presented, showing that the RL Agent will be effective also in that case (magenta line).
The other ASDs are obtained for different feedback architectures that have been tried
in simulations, that is when only the PID is applied (black line) and when only the RL
Agent is applied (blue line).
To check the behavior of the neural network, the transfer function between its
output and the input velocity is computed as T 2
RL
:= PSD(
∫
A(X̂)dt)×PSD
(
dX̂/dt
)−1
and showed in figure 6.17. Indeed the use of nonlinear activation functions tanh, which
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Fig. 6.15 In the ordinate axis the mean values ⟨Q⟩k of the Q-function computed at
each k-th stage of the learning process over NT = 1500 values.
is needed to represent the nonlinearities of the Q-function, may lead the plant towards
uncontrollable states resulting that the RL Agent is not a stable controller. However
it is worth noting that the transfer function depicted in figure 6.17 reveals a well
shaped behavior of the RL Agent which is mainly linear since it takes high values
correspondingly to the linear response with respect to the input velocity and to the
harmonic modes of the plant. Less important contributions due to nonlinearities are
present where, out of the linear response regions, the transfer function is not exactly
zero. Such contributions will be used to improve the performances of the controller, as
showed in figure 6.16, and in particular in the control of real physical systems where
nonlinearities, even very small, are necessarily present.
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Fig. 6.16 Amplitude spectral densities of the estimated displacement X̂ of a two-
pendulum system with frequency ω =
√
0.5Hz, friction ν = 0.005Hz, seismic noise
s.d. σξ1,2 = 10−4, sensing white noise s,.d. σX˜ = 10−5. Kalman filter used to get
the estimates X˜ is based on an exact plant model. The action set of the RL Agent
is as follows: A = {−10−2,−10−3, ...,−10−8, 0, 10−8, ..., 10−2}. Orange: plant. Black:
PID control. Blue: RL control. Red: PID and RL controls. Homogeneous results are
obtained for the RL and PID architectures also when the Kalman filter is based on
wrong plant model (with ω
Kalman
=
√
0.2Hz and ν
Kalman
= 0.002Hz) as the Magenta
PSD of X˜, obtained with the PID+RL controller, shows.
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Fig. 6.17 Logarithmic values of the transfer function TRL of the RL controller between
the integral of its output and the estimate velocity in input, obtained from T 2
RL
:=
PSD(
∫
A(X̂)dt)× PSD
(
dX̂/dt
)−1
, for an input signal (instead of seismic noise) character-
ized by a single frequency. On the x axis frequencies of the transfer function are placed and
on the y axis the frequency f of the input signal sin(2πf).
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6.5 Further developments
The next step of this work will be to apply the reinforcement learning techniques
to control more complex and high dimensional physical systems. This will be a non
trivial task since the stability is not only affected by the non Markovianity of the
environment, see the figure 6.18, and the architecture of the controller, but also by the
reward function, by the complexity of the function approximator and by the learning
process in general.
Fig. 6.18 An example of non stable controller provided by the RL Agent applied to the
two-pendulum system in the case in which it does not receive one of the components
of the vector X̂ in input. The stable data series, the black one, is obtained when X̂
is in input to the RL Agent, while the unstable data series (the red one) is obtained
when the estimate of the velocity is removed from X̂.
Performance can be improved by changing the action set A of the RL Agent, as
shown in figure 6.19. Moreover, further neural network can be embedded in the RL
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Agent each of which receiving a specific frequency band of the inputs signal in order to
be more effective where is necessary.
Fig. 6.19 Amplitude spectral densities as in figure 6.16 where only the architec-
ture of RL Agent and the PID, showed in figure (6.12), are used. Different from
the previous simulation in the present case the RL Agent is endowed with differ-
ent action sets A. Red: A = {−10−2,−10−3, ...,−10−8, 0, 10−8, ..., 10−2}. Black:
A = {−10−2,−10−3, 10−4,−5× 10−4, ...,−10−8, 0, 10−8, ..., 5× 10−4, 10−3, 10−2}. Ma-
genta: A = {−10−2,−10−3, ...,−5× 10−5, ...,−10−8, 0, 10−8, ..., 5× 10−5, ..., 10−2}
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Appendix A
Puu’s Oligopoly
In this Section we recall the map of the Cournot duopoly model proposed in [107] and
its main properties.
The map assumes the form
q′1 = (1− λ1) q1 + λ1
[√
q2
c1
− q2
]
(A.1)
y′ = (1− λ2) q2 + λ2
[√
q1
c2
− q1
]
where also in this case the parameters λi ∈ [0, 1] represent the attitude of firm i to
adopt the best reply, hence (1− λi) represents the inertia of firm i, i = 1, 2, and
ci > 0, i = 1, 2, represent unitary costs. The fixed points, nonnegative solutions of the
algebraic system
q1 =
√
q2
c1
− q2
q2 =
√
q1
c2
− q1
are the trivial one E0 = (0, 0) and the unique positive solution E1 =
(
c2
(c1+c2)2
, c1(c1+c2)2
)
.
The Jacobian matrix, computed at the fixed point E1, becomes
J(E1) =
 1− λ1 λ1
(
c1 + c2
2c1
− 1
)
λ2
(
c1 + c2
2c2
− 1
)
1− λ2

The coefficients of the characteristic equation
P (z) = z2 − Tr · z +Det = 0 ,
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are Tr = 2 − λ1 − λ2 and Det = (1− λ1) (1− λ2) − λ1λ2
(
a1 + a2
2a1
− 1
)
a1 + a2
2a2
− 1,
hence the Schur conditions for stability become
P (1) = λ1λ2 (c1 + c2)
2
4c1c2
> 0 for each ci > 0, λi ∈ (0, 1]
P (−1) = 8c1c2 (2− λ1 − λ2) + λ1λ2 (c1 + c2)2 > 0 for each ci > 0, λi ∈ (0, 1]
1−Det > 0 if (c1 + c2)
2
4c1c2
<
λ1 + λ2
λ1λ2
The third condition is always satisfied for c1 = c2 = c, whereas the equilibrium may
become unstable through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation when c1
c2
̸= 1. In particular,
without any inertia, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = 1, the unique positive equilibrium is stable if and
only if c1/c2 ∈ (3− 2
√
2, 3 + 2
√
2).
It is worth to notice that the map (A.1) is a particular case of (2.6) because after
the change of coordinates
x = c2q1 ; y = c1q2 (A.3)
the following map is obtained
x′ = (1− λ1)x+ aλ1
(√
y − y
)
y′ = (1− λ2)y + 1aλ2 (
√
x− x)
where a = c2/c1. This is a particular case of (2.6) with a1 = a and a2 = 1a , and
this explains why the creation of further fixed points is not possible, as explained in
the remark after Proposition 2, Indeed, the unique equilibrium E =
(
1
(a1+1)2
, 1(a2+1)2
)
existing in the particular case a1a2 = 1 corresponds to E1 =
(
c2
(c1+c2)2
, c1(c1+c2)2
)
by
considering a1 = c2/c1, a2 = c1/c2, together with (A.3). We refer to [3] and [1] for a
deeper analysis of the same model.
Appendix B
Noninvertible maps and critical
sets
In this appendix are given some definitions, properties and simple examples about
discrete dynamical systems represented by the iteration of noninvertible maps.
B.1 Definitions and simple examples
A map T : S → S, S ⊆ Rn, defined by x′ = T (x), transforms a point x ∈ S into a
unique point x′ ∈ S. The point x′ is called the rank-1 image of x, and a point x such
that T (x) = x′ is a rank-1 preimage of x′.
If x ≠ y implies T (x) ̸= T (y) for each x, y in S, then T is an invertible map in S,
because the inverse mapping x = T−1 (x′) is uniquely defined; otherwise T is a said to be
a noninvertible map, because points x exist that have several rank-1 preimages, i.e. the
inverse relation x = T−1 (x′) is multivalued. So, noninvertible means “many-to-one”,
that is, distinct points x ̸= y may have the same image, T (x) = T (y) = x′.
Geometrically, the action of a noninvertible map can be expressed by saying that it
“folds and pleats” the space S, so that distinct points are mapped into the same point.
This is equivalently stated by saying that several inverses are defined in some points of
S, and these inverses “unfold” S.
For a noninvertible map, S can be subdivided into regions Zk, k ≥ 0, whose points
have k distinct rank-1 preimages. Generally, for a continuous map, as the point x′ varies
in Rn, pairs of preimages appear or disappear as it crosses the boundaries separating
different regions. Hence, such boundaries are characterized by the presence of at least
two coincident (merging) preimages. This leads us to the definition of the critical sets,
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one of the distinguishing features of noninvertible maps (see Gumowski and Mira, 1980,
Mira et al., 1996):
Definition. The critical set CS of a continuous map T is defined as the locus of
points having at least two coincident rank− 1 preimages, located on a set CS−1, called
set of merging preimages.
The critical set CS is generally formed by (n− 1)-dimensional hypersurfaces of Rn,
and portions of CS separate regions Zk of the phase space characterized by a different
number of rank−1 preimages, for example Zk and Zk+2 (this is the standard occurrence
for continuous maps). The critical set CS is the n-dimensional generalization of the
notion of local minimum or local maximum value of a one-dimensional map, and of the
notion of critical curve LC of a noninvertible two-dimensional map1. The set CS−1 is
the generalization of local extremum point of a one-dimensional map, and of the fold
curve LC−1 of a two-dimensional noninvertible map.
As an illustration, we consider the one-dimensional quadratic map (logistic map)
x′ = f(x) = µx(1− x). (B.1)
This map has a unique critical point c = µ/4, which separates the real line into the
two subsets: Z0 = (c,+∞), where no inverses are defined, and Z2 = (−∞, c), whose
points have two rank-1 preimages (figure B.1a). These preimages can be computed by
the two inverses
x1 = f−11 (x′) =
1
2 −
√
µ (µ− 4x′)
2µ ; x2 = f
−1
2 (x′) =
1
2 +
√
µ (µ− 4x′)
2µ . (B.2)
If x′ ∈ Z2, its two rank-1 preimages, computed according to (B.2), are located sym-
metrically with respect to the point c−1 = 1/2 = f−11 (µ/4) = f−12 (µ/4). Hence, c−1
is the point where the two merging preimages of c are located. As the map (B.1) is
differentiable, at c−1 the first derivative vanishes.
We remark that in general the condition of vanishing derivative is not sufficient
to define the critical points of rank-0 since such condition may be also satisfied by
points which are not local extrema (e.g. the inflection points with horizontal tangent).
Moreover, for continuous and piecewise differentiable maps the condition of vanishing
derivative is not necessary as well, because such maps may have the property that the
images of points where the map is not differentiable are critical points, according to the
1This terminology, and notation, originates from the notion of critical point as it is used in the
classical works of Julia and Fatou.
B.1 Definitions and simple examples 159
292 C Noninvertible Maps and Critical Sets
by a different number of rank � 1 preimages, for example Zk and ZkC2 (this
is the standard occurrence for continuous maps). The critical set CS is the
n-dimensional generalization of the notion of local minimum or local maximum
of a one-dimensional map, and of the notion of critical curveLC of a noninvertible
two-dimensional map. This terminology, and notation, originates from the notion of
critical point as it is used in the classical works of Julia and Fatou. The set CS�1
is the generalization of local extremum point of a one-dimensional map, and of the
fold curve LC�1 of a two-dimensional noninvertible map.
As an illustration, we consider the one-dimensional quadratic map (logistic map)
x0 D f .x/ D �x.1 � x/: (C.1)
This map has a unique critical point c D �=4, which separates the real line into the
two subsets: Z0 D .c;C1/, where no inverses are deﬁned, and Z2 D .�1; c/,
whose points have two rank-1 preimages (Fig. C.1a). These preimages can be
computed by the two inverses
x1 D f �11 .x0/ D
1
2
�
p
� .� � 4x0/
2� I x2 D f
�1
2 .x
0/ D 1
2
C
p
� .� � 4x0/
2� :
(C.2)
If x0 2Z2, its two rank-1 preimages, computed according to (C.2), are located sym-
metrically with respect to the point c�1D 1=2 D f �11 .�=4/ D f �12 .�=4/. Hence,
c�1 is the point where the two merging preimages of c are located. As the map (C.1)
is differentiable, at c�1 the ﬁrst derivative vanishes.
We remark that in general the condition of vanishing derivative is not sufﬁcient
to deﬁne the critical points of rank-0 since such a condition may be also satisﬁed by
points which are not local extrema (for example the inﬂection points with horizontal
tangent). Moreover, for continuous and piecewise differentiable maps the condition
of vanishing derivative is not necessary as well, because such maps may have the
property that the images of points where the map is not differentiable are critical
points, according to the deﬁnition given above. This occurs whenever such points
are local maxima or minima, like in the cases shown in Figs. C.2a, b. In Fig. C.2a,
Fig. C.1 (a) The preimages of the logistic map. (b) The folding action of the logistic map. (c) The
unfolding action of the inverses
0Z
1x 1R 1c− 2R 2x
*q
2Z
c c
1c−
*p
*
1q−
(a)
Folding
1x 2xc0 1 (0)f
(1)f
f
f
f
(b)
Unfolding
1
1f
−
1c−
1
2f
−
(c)
Fig. B.1 (a) The preimmages pf the logistic map. (b) The folding action of the logistic
map. (c) The unfolding action of the inverses.
definition given above. This occurs whenever such points are local maxima or minima,
like in the cases shown in figures B.2a,b. In figure B.2a, a typical Z0 − Z2 tent map is
shown, where the kink point behaves like the critical point of the logistic map even
if it is not obtained as image of a point of vanishing derivative. The same reasoning
applies to the "bimodal" Z1 − Z3 − Z1 piecewise linear function shown in figure B.2b.
Up to now we have considered continuous maps, but the properties of critical points
can easily be extended also to piecewise continuous maps T . In this case a point of
discontinuity may behave as a critical point of T , even if the definition in terms of
merging preimages cannot be applied. This happens when the ranges of the map on the
two sides of the discontinuity have an overlapping zone, so that at least one of the two
limiting values of the function at the discontinuity separates regions having a different
number of rank-1 preimages (see e.g. the map shown in figure B.2c). The difference
with respect to the case of a continuous map is that now the number of distinct rank-1
preimages through a critical point differs generally by one (instead of two), that is,
a critical value c (in general the critical set CS) separates regions Zk and Zk+1. A
one-dimensional example is shown in figure B.2c, where the point of discontinuity is a
critical point c−1, and both the two limiting values of the function in c−1 are critical
points, say c1 and c2, associated with c−1, as both c1 and c2 separate regions Z1 and
Z2. Notice that now the critical points have no merging rank-1 preimages. More on the
properties and bifurcations of discontinuous maps of the plane can be found in Mira et
al., 1996.
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Fig. C.2 The preimage regions of certain maps. (a) The tent-map. (b) A bimodal piecewise linear
map. (c) A discontinuous map. Notice that in (a) and (b) the number of preimages in adjacent
regions differ by 2, whereas in (c) they differ by 1
a typical Z0 �Z2 tent map is shown, where the kink point behaves like the critical
point of the logistic map even if it is not obtained as the image of a point with
vanishing derivative. The same reasoning applies to the “bimodal” Z1 � Z3 � Z1
piecewise linear function shown in Fig. C.2b.
Up to now we have considered continuous maps, but the properties of critical
points can easily be extended also to piecewise continuous maps T . In this case a
point of discontinuity may behave as a critical point of T , even if the deﬁnition in
terms of merging preimages cannot be applied. This happens when the ranges of
the map on the two sides of the discontinuity have an overlapping zone, so that at
least one of the two limiting values of the function at the discontinuity separates
regions having a different number of rank-1 preimages (see for example the map
shown in Fig. C.2c). The difference with respect to the case of a continuous map
is that now the number of distinct rank-1 preimages through a critical point differs
generally by one (instead of two), that is, a critical value c (in general the critical
set CS ) separates regions Zk and ZkC1: A one-dimensional example is shown in
Fig. C.2c, where the point of discontinuity is a critical point c�1, and both the two
limiting values of the function in c�1 are critical points, say c1 and c2, associated
with c�1; as both c1 and c2 separate regionsZ1 andZ2: Notice that now the critical
points have no merging rank-1 preimages. More on the properties and bifurcations
of discontinuous maps of the plane can be found in Mira et al. (1996).
In order to explain the geometric action of a critical point in a continuous map,
let us consider, again, the logistic map, and note that as x moves from 0 to 1 the
corresponding image f .x/ spans the interval Œ0; c twice, the critical point c being
the turning point. In other words, if we consider how the segment � D Œ0; 1 is trans-
formed by the map f , we can say that it is folded and pleated to obtain the image
� 0 D Œ0; c. Such folding gives a geometric reason why two distinct points of � , say
x1 and x2, located symmetrically with respect to the point c�1 D 1=2, are mapped
into the same point x0 2 � 0 due to the folding action of f (see Fig. C.1b). The same
conclusions can be obtained by looking at the two inverse mappings f �11 and f �12
Fig. B.2 Th preima e regions of certain maps. (a) The tent-map. (b) A bimodal
ie ewise linear map. (c) A discontinuous map. Notice that in (a) and (b) the umber
of preimages in adjacent regions differ 2, whereas in (c) they differ by 1
In order to explain the geometric action of a critical point in a continuous map,
let us consider, again, the logistic map, and let us notice that as x moves from 0
to 1 the corresponding image f(x) spans the interval [0, c] twice, the critical point c
being the turning point. In other words, if we consider how the segment γ = [0, 1]
is transformed by the map f , we can say that it is folded and pleated to obtain the
image γ′ = [0, c]. Such folding gives a geometric reason why two distinct points of γ,
say x1 and x2, located symmetrically with respect to the point c−1 = 1/2, are mapped
into the same point x′ ∈ γ′ due to the folding action of f (see figure B.1b). The
same arguments can be explained by looking at the two inverse mappings f−11 and
f−12 defined in (−∞, a/4] according to (B.2). We can consider the range of the map f
formed by the superposition of two half-lines (−∞, a/4], joined at the critical point
c = a/4 (fig. 1c), and on each of these half-lines a different inverse is defined. In other
words, instead of saying that two distinct maps are defined on the same half-line we say
that the range is formed by two distinct half lines on each of which a unique inverse
map is defined. This point of view gives a geometric visualization of the critical point c
as the point in which two distinct inverses merge. The action of the inverses, say f−1 =
f−11 ∪ f−12 , causes an unfolding of the range by mapping c into c−1 and by opening the
two half-lines one on the right nd one on the left of c−1, so that the whole real line R
is covered. So, the map f folds th re l line, the two inv rses unfold it.
Another interpretation of the folding action of a critical point is the following. Since
f(x) is increasing for x ∈ [0, 1/2) and decreasing for x ∈ (1/2, 1], its applicati n to
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segment γ1 ⊂ [0, 1/2) is orientation preserving, whereas its application to a segment
γ2 ⊂ (1/2, 1] is orientation reversing. This suggests that an application of f to a
segment γ3 = [a, b] including the point c−1 = 1/2 preserves the orientation of the
portion [a, c−1], i.e. f([a, c−1]) = [f(a), c], whereas it reverses the portion [c−1, b], i.e.
f([c−1, b]) = [f(b), c], so that γ
′
3 = f (γ3) is folded, the folding point being the critical
point c.
Let us now consider the case of a continuous two-dimensional map T : S → S,
S ⊆ R2, defined by
T :
 x′1 = T1(x1, x2)x′2 = T2(x1, x2) , (B.3)
If we solve the system of the two equations (B.3) with respect to the unknowns x1
and x2, then, for a given (x′1, x′2), we may have several solutions, representing rank-1
preimages (or backward iterates) of (x′1, x′2), say (x1, x2) = T−1 (x′1, x′2), where T−1 is
in general a multivalued relation. In this case we say that T is noninvertible, and the
critical set (formed by critical curves, denoted by LC from the French “Ligne Critique”)
constitutes the set of boundaries that separate regions of the plane characterized by a
different number of rank-1 preimages. According to the definition, along LC at least
two inverses give merging preimages, located on LC−1 (Following the notations of
Gumowski and Mira, 1980, Mira et al., 1996).
For a continuous and (at least piecewise) differentiable noninvertible map of the
plane, the set LC−1 is included in the set where detDT (x1, x2) changes sign, since T is
locally an orientation preserving map near points (x1, x2) such that detDT (x1, x2) > 0
and orientation reversing if detDT (x1, x2) < 0. In order to explain this point, let us
recall that when an affine transformation x′ = Ax + b, where A = {aij} is a 2 × 2
matrix and b ∈R2, is applied to a plane figure, then the area of the transformed figure
grows, or shrinks, by a factor ρ = |detA|, and if detA > 0 then the orientation of
the figure is preserved, whereas if detA < 0 then the orientation is reversed. This
property also holds for the linear approximation of (B.3) in a neighborhood of a point
p = (x1, x2), given by an affine map with A = DT , DT being the Jacobian matrix
evaluated at the point p
DT (p) =
 ∂T1/∂x1 ∂T1/∂x2
∂T2/∂x1 ∂T2/∂x2
 (B.4)
A qualitative visualization is given in fig. 3. Of course, if the map is continuously
differentiable then the change of the sign of DT occurs along points where DT vanishes,
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thus giving the characterization of the fold line LC−1 as the locus where the jacobian
vanishes.
Fig. B.3 (a) A qualitative visualization of a map of the plane, and how the folding
relates to the sign of the Jacobian matrix. (b) Visualizing a Riemann foliation of the
plane, in the case of a Z0 − Z2 noninvertible map.
In order to give a geometrical interpretation of the action of a multi-valued inverse
relation T−1, it is useful to consider a region Zk as the superposition of k sheets,
each associated with a different inverse. Such a representation is known as Riemann
foliation of the plane (see e.g. Mira et al., 1996). Different sheets are connected by
folds joining two sheets, and the projections of such folds on the phase plane are arcs
of LC. This is shown in the qualitative sketch of fig. 3b, where the case of a Z0 − Z2
noninvertible map is considered. This graphical representation of the unfolding action
of the inverses also gives an intuitive idea of the mechanism which causes the creation
of non-connected basins for noninvertible maps of the plane.
To give an example, let us again consider a quadratic map T : (x, y) → (x′, y′),
extensively studied in Mira et al., 1996, and Abraham et al., 1997, defined by
T :
 x′ = ax+ yy′ = b+ x2 (B.5)
Given x′ and y′, if we try to solve the algebraic system with respect to the unknowns
x and y we get two solutions, given by
T−11 :
 x = −
√
y′ − b
y = x′ + a
√
y′ − b ; T
−1
2 :
 x =
√
y′ − b
y = x′ − a√y′ − b (B.6)
if y′ ≥ b, and no solutions if y′ < b. So, (B.5) is a Z0 − Z2 noninvertible map, where
Z0 (region whose points have no preimages) is the half plane Z0 = {(x, y) |y < b}
and Z2 (region whose points have two distinct rank-1 preimages) is the half plane
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Z2 = {(x, y) |y > b}. The line y = b, which separates these two regions, is LC, i.e. the
locus of points having two merging rank-1 preimages, located on the line x = 0, that
represents LC−1. Being (B.5) a continuously differentiable map, the points of LC−1
necessarily belong to the set of points at which the Jacobian determinant vanishes, i.e.
LC−1 ⊆ J0, where J0 = {(x, y) | detDT (x, y) = −2x = 0}. In this case LC−1 coincides
with J0 (the vertical axis x = 0) and the critical curve LC is the image by T of LC−1,
i.e. LC = T (LC−1) = T ({x = 0}) = {(x, y) |y = b}.
In order to show the folding action related to the presence of the critical lines
fact, we consider a plane figure (a circle) U separated by LC−1 into two portions, say
U1 ∈ R1 and U2 ∈ R2 (fig. 4a) and we apply the map (B.5) to the points of U . The
image T (U1)∩T (U2) is a nonempty set included in the region Zk+2, which is the region
whose points p′ have rank-1 preimages p1 = T−11 (p′) ∈ U1 and p2 = T−12 (p′) ∈ U2. This
means that two points p1 ∈ U1 and p2 ∈ U2, located at opposite sides with respect to
LC−1, are mapped in the same side with respect to LC, in the region Zk+2. This is also
expressed by saying that the ball U is “folded” by T along LC on the side with more
preimages (see Fig. 4). The same concept can be equivalently expressed by stressing
the “unfolding” action of T−1, obtained by the application of the two distinct inverses
in Zk+2 which merge along LC. Indeed, if we consider a ball V ⊂ Zk+2, then the set of
its rank − 1 preimages T−11 (V ) and T−12 (V ) is made up of two balls T−11 (V ) ∈ R1 and
T−12 (V ) ∈ R2. These balls are disjoint if V ∩ LC = ∅ (see figure B.4b)
Fig. B.4 A quadratic map example. Here a = 0.3 and b = 1. (a) The folding of the
ball U by the map along the critical line LC. (b) The unfolding action of the inverses
of the map.
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Many of the considerations made above, for 1-dimensional and 2-dimensional
noninvertible maps, can be generalized to n-dimensional ones, even if their visualization
becomes more difficult. First of all, from the definition of critical set it is clear that the
relation CS = T (CS−1) holds in any case. Moreover, the points of CS−1 where the map
is continuously differentiable are necessarily points where the Jacobian determinant
vanishes:
CS−1 ⊆ J0 = {p ∈ Rn| detDT (p) = 0} (B.7)
In fact, in any neighborhood of a point of CS−1 there are at least two distinct points
which are mapped by T in the same point. Accordingly, the map is not locally invertible
in points of CS−1, and (B.7) follows from the implicit function theorem. This property
provides an easy method to compute the critical set for continuously differentiable
maps: from the expression of the jacobian determinant one computes the locus of points
at which it vanishes, then the set obtained after an application of the map to these
points is the critical set CS.
Also the geometric properties illustrated above for the two-dimensional noninvertible
map (B.5) can be easily generalized to the case of the critical set of an n-dimensional
noninvertible map. It is worth to notice that, in general, for piecewise differentiable
maps the set of points where the map is not differentiable may belong to CS−1, i.e. the
images by T of such points may separate regions characterized by a different number
of rank-1 preimages (see e.g. Mira, 1987). Moreover, piecewise continuous maps may
have points of CS−1 at the discontinuities and, differently from the case of continuous
maps, the corresponding portions of CS may separate regions that differ by an odd
number of preimages (see e.g. Mira, 1987). In any case, the importance of the set CS
lies in the fact that its points separate regions Zk characterized by different number of
preimages2
B.2 Discrete dynamical system as iterated maps
A discrete-time dynamical system, defined by the difference equation
x (t+ 1) = T (x (t)) (B.8)
can be seen as the result of the repeated application (or iteration) of a map T .
Indeed, the point x represents the state of a system, and T represents the “unit time
2This property may also be shared by points where some inverses are not defined due to a vanishing
denominator, as shown in Bischi et al. 1999, 2003.
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advancement operator” T : x (t)→ x (t+ 1). Starting from an initial condition x0 ∈ S,
the iteration of T inductively defines a unique trajectory
τ(x0) =
{
x(t) = T t(x0), t = 0, 1, 2, ...
}
, (B.9)
where T 0 is the identity map and T t = T (T t−1). As t→ +∞, a trajectory may diverge,
or it may converge to a fixed point of the map T , i.e. a point x such that T (x) = x,
or it may asymptotically approach another kind of invariant set, such as a periodic
cycle, or a closed invariant curve or a more complex attractor, for example a so called
chaotic attractor (see e.g. Devaney, 1987, Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983, Medio
and Lines, 2001). We recall that a set A ⊂ Rn is invariant for the map T if it is
mapped onto itself, T (A) = A. This means that if x ∈ A then T (x) ∈ A, i.e. A is
trapping, and every point of A is image of some point of A. A closed invariant set A
is an attractor if (i) it is Lyapunov stable, i.e. for every neighborhood W of A there
exists a neighborhood V of A such that T t(V ) ⊂ W ∀t ≥ 0; (ii) a neighborhood U of
A exists such that T t(x)→ A as t→ +∞ for each x ∈ U .
The basin of an attractor A is the set of all points that generate trajectories
converging to A
B (A) =
{
x|T t(x)→ A as t→ +∞
}
(B.10)
Let U(A) be a neighborhood of an attractor A whose points converge to A. Of course
U(A) ⊆ B (A), and also the points that are mapped into U after a finite number of
iterations belong to B (A). Hence, the basin of A is given by
B (A) =
∞⋃
n=0
T−n(U(A)) (B.11)
where T−1(x) represents the set of the rank-1 preimages of x (i.e. the points mapped
into x by T ), and T−n(x) represents the set of the rank-n preimages of x (i.e. the
points mapped into x after n applications of T ).
Let B be a basin of attraction and ∂B its boundary. From the definition it follows
that B is trapping with respect to the forward iteration of the map T and invariant
with respect to the backward iteration of all the inverses T−1. Points belonging to ∂B
are mapped into ∂B both under forward and backward iteration of T . This implies
that if an unstable fixed point or cycle belongs to ∂B then ∂B must also contain all
of its preimages of any rank. Moreover, if a saddle-point, or a saddle-cycle, belongs
to ∂B, then ∂B must also contain the whole stable set (see Gumowski and Mira 1980,
Mira et al. 1996).
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A problem that often arises in the study of nonlinear dynamical systems concerns
the existence of several attracting sets, each with its own basin of attraction. In
this case the dynamic process becomes path-dependent, i.e. which kind of long
run dynamics characterizes the system depends on the starting condition. Another
important problems in the study of applied dynamical systems is the delimitation of a
bounded region of the state space where the system dynamics are ultimately trapped,
despite of the complexity of the long-run time patterns. This is an useful information,
even more useful than a detailed description of step by step time evolution.
Both these questions require an analysis of the global dynamical properties of the
dynamical system, that is, an analysis which is not based on the linear approximation
of the map. When the map T is noninvertible, its global dynamical properties can
be usefully characterized by using the formalism of critical sets, by which the folding
action associated with the application of the map, as well as the “unfolding” associated
with the action of the inverses, can be described. Loosely speaking, the repeated
application of a noninvertible map repeatedly folds the state space along the critical
sets and their images, and often this allows one to define a bounded region where
asymptotic dynamics are trapped. As some parameter is varied, global bifurcations
that cause sudden qualitative changes in the properties of the attracting sets can
be detected by observing contacts of critical curves with invariant sets. Instead, the
repeated application of the inverses “repeatedly unfold” the state space, so that a
neighborhood of an attractor may have preimages far from it, thus giving rise to
complicated topological structures of the basins, that may be formed by the union of
several (even infinitely many) non connected portions. In fact, from (B.11) it follows
that in order to study the extension of a basin and the structure of its boundaries
one has to consider the properties of the inverse relation T−1.The route to more and
more complex basin boundaries, as some parameter is varied, is characterized by global
bifurcations, also called contact bifurcations, due to contacts between the critical set
and the invariant sets that form the basins’ boundaries.
B.3 Critical sets and the delimitation of trapping
regions.
Portions of the critical set CS and its images CSk = T k(CS) can be used to obtain the
boundaries of trapping regions where the asymptotic dynamics of the iterated points of
a noninvertible map are confined. This can be easily explained for a one-dimensional
noninvertible map, for example the quadratic map (B.1). In fact, it is quite evident
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that if we iterate the logistic map for 3 < µ < 4 starting from an initial condition
inside the interval [c1, c], with c1 = f(c), no images can be obtained out of this interval
(see Fig.5), i.e. the interval formed by the critical point c and its rank-1 image c1 is
trapping. Moreover, any trajectory generated from an initial condition in (0, 1), enters
[c1, c] after a finite number of iterations. Following the terminology introduced in Mira
et al., 1996, the interval [c1, c] is called absorbing.
Fig. B.5 The trapping region of the quadratic map. Trajectories starting from any
point in (0, 1) will enter the trapping region after a finite number of iterations.
In general, for an n-dimensional map, an absorbing region A (intervals in R, areas
in R2, volumes in R3, ...) is defined as a bounded set whose boundary is given by
portions of the critical set CS and its images of increasing order CSk = T k (CS),
such that a neighborhood U ⊃ A exists whose point enter A after a finite number of
iterations and then never escape it, since T (A) ⊆ A, i.e. A is trapping (see e.g. Mira
et al., 1996 for more details).
Loosely speaking, we can say that the iterated application of a noninvertible map,
folding and folding again the space, defines trapping regions bounded by critical sets
of increasing order.
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Sometimes, smaller absorbing regions are nested inside a bigger one. This can be
illustrated, again, for the logistic map (B.1), as shown in Fig.6a, where inside the
absorbing interval [c1, c] a trapping subset is obtained by higher rank images of the
critical point, given by A = [c1, c3] ∪ [c2, c]. In Fig.6b it is shown that, for the same
parameter value µ = 3.61 as in Fig.6a, the numerical iteration of the logistic map gives
points which are trapped inside the two-cyclic interval A.
Fig. B.6 Illustrating a trapping subset inside the absorbing set of figure B.5 for the
quadratic map with µ = 3.61. (a) The delineation of the trapping subset [c1, c3]∪ [c2, c].
(b) The iterates of the map remain trapped inside the two cyclic interval.
Inside an absorbing region one or more attractors may exist. However, if a chaotic
attractor exists which fills up a whole absorbing region then boundary of the chaotic
attractor is formed by portions of critical sets.
This is the situation shown in Fig.6, where the absorbing interval A = [c1, c3]∪ [c2, c]
is invariant and filled up by a chaotic trajectory, as shown in Fig.6b. To better illustrate
this point, we also give a two-dimensional example, obtained by using the map (B.5).
In Fig.7a chaotic trajectory is shown, and in Fig.7b its outer boundary is obtained by
the union of a segment of LC and three iterates LCi = T i(LC), i = 1, 2, 3.
Indeed, following Mira et al., 1996 (see also Bischi and Gardini, 1998) a practical
procedure can be outlined in order to obtain the boundary of an absorbing area
(although it is difficult to give a general method). Starting from a portion of LC−1,
approximately taken in the region occupied by the area of interest, its images by T of
increasing rank are computed until a closed region is obtained. When such a region is
mapped into itself, then it is an absorbing area A. The length of the initial segment is
to be taken, in general, by a trial and error method, although several suggestions are
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given in the books referenced above. Once an absorbing area A is found, in order to
see if it is invariant or not the same procedure must be repeated by taking only the
portion
γ = A ∩ LC−1 (B.12)
as the starting segment. Then one of the following two cases occurs:
(case I) the union of m iterates of γ (for a suitable m) covers the whole boundary
of A; in which case A is an invariant absorbing area, and
∂A ⊂
m⋃
k=1
T k(γ) (B.13)
(case II) no natural m exists such that ⋃mi=1 T i(γ) covers the whole boundary of A;
in which case A is not invariant but strictly mapped into itself. An invariant absorbing
area is obtained by ∩n>0T n(A) (and may be obtained by a finite number of images of
A).
The application of this procedure to the problem of the delimitation of the chaotic
area of Fig.7a by portions of critical curves suggests us, on the basis of Fig.7b, to take
a smaller segment γ and to take an higher number of iterates in order to obtain also
the inner boundary. The result is shown in Fig.8a, where by four iterates we get the
outer boundary. By a few more iterates also the inner boundary of the chaotic area
is get, as shown in Fig.8b. As it can be clearly seen, and as clearly expressed by the
strict inclusion in (B.13), the union of the images also include several arcs internal
to the invariant area A. Indeed, the images of the critical arcs which are mapped
inside the area play a particular role, because these curves represent the ”foldings” of
the plane under forward iterations of the map, and this is the reason why these inner
curves often denote the portions of the region which are more frequently visited by a
generic trajectory inside it (compare Fig.7a and Fig.8b). Many examples are given in
the literature on noninvertible maps, see e.g. Mira et al., 1996. This is due to the fact
that points close to a critical arc LCi, i ≥ 0, are more frequently visited, because there
are several distinct parts of the invariant area which are mapped in the same region
(close to LCi) in i+ 1 iterations.
Examples of applications is dynamic economic modelling are given in Bischi and
Naimzada (1999) Bischi, Gardini and Kopel (2000) Puu, 2000, Agliari et al. (2000,
2002, 2004), Chiarella et al., (2001, 2002), Sushko et al. (2003).
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Fig. B.7 Delineating the absorbing area of the two-dimensional map given in (B.5).
Here a = −0.3 and b = −1.4. (a) A chaotic trajectory of the map. (b) The boundary
of the absorbing area formed by the critical line and three of its iterates. The location
of the starting line LC−1 is discussed in the text.
Fig. B.8 Delineating more precisely the structure of the absorbing area of the quadratic
map given by (B.5). (a) Higher order iterates of the boundary curves. (b) After a
sufficient number of further iterates the inner boundaries of the chaotic area emerge.
These should be compared with the frequently visited areas of the chaotic trajectory
in figure B.7a.
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B.4 Critical sets and the creation of non connected
basins
From (B.11) it is clear that the properties of the inverses are important in order
to understand the structure of the basins and the main bifurcations which change
their qualitative properties. In the case of noninvertible maps, the multiplicity of
preimages may lead to basins with complex structures, such as multiply connected
or non connected sets, sometimes formed by infinitely many non connected portions
(see Mira et al., 1994, Mira and Rauzy, 1995, Mira et al., 1996, ch.5, Abraham et al.,
1997,ch.5). In the context of noninvertible maps it is useful to define the immediate
basin B0(A), of an attracting set A, as the widest connected component of the basin
which contains A. Then the total basin can be expressed as
B (A) =
∞⋃
n=0
T−n(B0(A))
where T−n(x) represents the set of all the rank-n preimages of x, i.e. the set of points
which are mapped in x after n iterations of the map T . The backward iteration of a
noninvertible map repeatedly unfolds the phase space, and this implies that the basins
may be non-connected, i.e. formed by several disjoint portions.
Also in this case, we first illustrate this property by using a one-dimensional map3 In
Fig.9 the graph of a Z1−Z3−Z1 noninvertible map is shown, where Z3 is the portion of
the codomain bounded by the relative minimum value cmin and relative maximum value
cmax. In the situation shown in fig. 9a we have three attractors: the fixed point z∗, with
B (z∗) = (−∞, q∗), the attractor A around x∗, with basin B (A) = (q∗, r∗) bounded by
two unstable fixed points, and +∞ (i.e. positively diverging trajectories) with basin
B (+∞) = (r∗,+∞). In this case all the basins are immediate basins, each being given
by an open interval. In the situation shown in fig. 9a, both basin boundaries q∗ and r∗
are in Z1, so they have only themselves as unique preimages (like for an invertible map).
However, the situation drastically changes if, for example, some parameter changes
causes the minimum value cmin to move downwards, until it goes below q∗ (as in fig.
9b). After the global bifurcation, when cmin = q∗, the portion (cmin, q∗) enters Z3, so
new preimages f−k (cmin, q∗) appear with k ≥ 1. These preimages constitute an infinite
(countable) set of non-connected portions of B (z∗) nested inside B (A), represented by
the thick portions of the diagonal in fig. 9b, bounded by the infinitely many preimages
of any rank, say q∗−k, k ∈ N, of q∗, that accumulate in a left neighborhood of the fixed
3The example is taken from an evolutionary game proposed in Bischi, Dawid and Kopel, 2000.
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point r∗. In fact, as r∗ is a repelling fixed point for the forward iteration of f , it is an
attracting fixed point for the backward iteration of the same map.. So, the contact
between the critical point cmin and the basin boundary q∗ marks the transition from
simple connected to non connected basins. Similar global bifurcations, due to contacts
between critical sets and basin boundaries, also occur in higher dimensional maps.
C.4 Critical Sets and the Creation of Disconnected Basins 303
preimages may lead to basins with complex structures, such as multiply connected
or disconnected sets, sometimes formed by inﬁnitely many disconnected portions
(see Mira et al. (1994), Mira and Rauzy (1995), Mira et al. (1996), Chap. 5 and
Abraham et al. (1997), Chap. 5). In the context of noninvertible maps it is useful to
deﬁne the immediate basin B0.A/, of an attracting set A, as the largest connected
component of the basin that contains A. Then the total basin can be expressed as
B .A/ D
1[
nD0
T �n.B0.A//
where T �n.x/ represents the set of all the rank-n preimages of x, in other words
the set of points which are mapped into x after n iterations of the map T . The
backward iteration of a noninvertible map repeatedly unfolds the phase space, and
this implies that the basins may be disconnected, that is they are formed by several
disjoint portions. Also in this case, we ﬁrst illustrate this property by using a one-
dimensional map based on an evolutionary game proposed in Bischi et al. (2003b).
In Fig. C.9a, b the graph of a Z1 � Z3 � Z1 noninvertible map is shown, where
Z3 is the portion of the co-domain bounded by the relative minimum value cmin
and the relative maximum value cma . In the situation sho n in Fig. C.9a we have
three attractors: the ﬁxed point z�, with B .z�/ D .�1; q�/, the attractor A around
x�, with basin B .A/ D .q�; r�/ bounded by two unstable ﬁxed points, and C1
(attracting positively diverging trajectories) with basin B .C1/ D .r�;C1/. In
this case all the basins are immediate basins, each being given by an open interval.
In the situation shown in Figure C.9( ), both basin boundaries q� and r� are in Z1,
Z1
Z3
Z1 B(z
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z*
q*
x*
r*
B(x*)
cmax
cmin
B(∞)
(a)
Z1
Z3
Z1
q*
x*
r*
H0
H–1
H−2
−1q
*
*q−2
*q−2
*q−1
cmax
cmin
z*
(b)
Fig. C.9 The global bifurcation of a one-dimensional noninvertible Z1 �Z3 �Z1, map. (a) The
attractors of the map are z�, x� and C1, and their basins are .�1; q�/, .q�; r�/ and .r�;1/
respectively. Note that cmin is above q�. (b) After a parametric change cmin moves below q� and
a global bifurcation has occurred. Now the basin of z� includes the (countably inﬁnite number
of) disconnected portions, H�1;H�2 etc. on .x�; r�/. These are the preimages of the portion
.cmin; q
�/
Fig. B.9 The global bif cation of a one-dimensi al noninvertible 1 − Z3 − Z1 map.
(a) The attractors of the map are z∗, x∗ and +∞ and their basins are (−∞, q∗), (q∗, r∗)
and (r∗,+∞) respectively. Note that cmin is above q∗. (b) After a parametric change
cmin moves below q∗ and a global bifurcation has occurred. Now the basin of z∗
includes the (countably infinite number of) disconnected portions, H−1, H−2 etc. on
(x∗, r∗). These are the preimages of the portion (cmin, q∗).
Also in higher dimensional cases, the global bifurcations which give rise to complex
topological structures of the basins, like those formed by non connected sets, can
be explained in terms of contacts of basins boundaries and critical sets. In fact, if a
parameter variation causes a crossing between a basin boundary and a critical set which
separates different regions Zk so that a portion of a basin enters a region where an
higher number of inverses is defined, then new components of the basin may suddenly
appear at the contact. However, for maps of dimension greater than 1, such kinds
of bifurcations can be very rarely studied by analytical methods, since the analytical
equations of such singularities are not known in general. Hence such studies are mainly
performed by geometric and numerical methods.
Several examples of two-dimensional noninvertible maps that have non connected
basins can be found in this book. See also Puu (2000) Bischi and Naimzada (1999),
Bischi, Gardini and Kopel (2000), Bischi and Kopel (2001), Bischi, Dawid and Kopel
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(2003), Bischi and Kopel (2003)Agliari et al. (2000, 2002, 2004). Examples in thre
dimensions are given in Bischi, Mroz and Hauser (2001), Agliari, Gardini and Puu
(2000)

Appendix C
Study of the stability of the steady
states of the three models of
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 with two
firms
For simpler notations we set:
x′i := xi(t+ 1); xi := xi(t)
C.1 Model (3.7) with n = 2
Let us consider the model (3.7) with n = 2, given by
T :

x′1 = (1− λ1)x1 + λ1
(√
B
a2x2
a1
− a2x2
)
x′2 = (1− λ2)x2 + λ2
(√
B
a1x1
a2
− a1x1
)
The fixed points are the solutions of the algebraic system
T :

x1 =
√
B
a2x2
a1
− a2x2
x2 =
√
B
a1x1
a2
− a1x1
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This system can be analytically solved in the symmetric case a1 = a2 = a, and the
following fixed points are obtained: O = (0, 0); E∗ = B(1 + a)2 (1, 1), both located
along the invariant diagonal ∆, and, for a ≥ 3, two further fixed points in symmetric
positions with respect to ∆
E∗1 =
B
(a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
E∗2 =
B
(a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
The conditions for the stability of the central positive equilibrium E∗ are obtained
from the Jacobian matrix
J(x1, x2) =

1− λ1 λ1
(
1
2
√
B
x2
− a
)
λ2
(
1
2
√
B
x1
− a
)
1− λ2
 (C.2)
computed at the fixed point
J(E∗) =
 1− λ1 λ1
1− a
2
λ2
1− a
2 1− λ2

In fact, from the characteristic equation
P (z) = z2 − Tr · z +Det = 0 ,
where Tr = 2− λ1 − λ2 and Det = (1− λ1) (1− λ2)− λ1λ2 (1− a)2 /4 are the trace
and the determinant of J(E∗) respectively, a sufficient condition for the stability is
expressed by the following system of inequalities
P (1) = 1− Tr +Det > 0
P (−1) = 1 + Tr +Det > 0
1−Det > 0
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that give necessary and sufficient conditions for the two eigenvalues be inside the unit
circle of the complex plane. In our case
P (1) = λ1λ2
(
1− (1− a)
2
4
)
> 0 =⇒ a < 3
P (−1) > 0 =⇒ a < af
1−Det = λ1 + λ2 − λ1λ2 + λ1λ2 (1− a)
2
4 > 0 =⇒ ∀a, λi ∈ [0, 1]
where
af := 1 + 2
√
1 + 22− λ1 − λ2
λ1λ2
.
Hence, the equilibrium is stable for a < 3. At the bifurcation value a = 3 a pitchfork
bifurcation occurs at which E∗ becomes a saddle point and the two equilibriums E∗1
and E∗2 are created. Moreover, at a = af ≥ 3 a flip bifurcation of E∗ occurs at which
E∗ is transformed into an unstable node and a saddle cycle of period 2 is created.
Notice that for λ1 = λ2 = 1 (the case of best reply without inertia) af = 3, so the
pitchfork and flip bifurcations occur simultaneously.
C.2 Model (3.9) with n = 2
Let us consider the model (3.9) for n = 2, given by
T :

x′1 = x1 + λ1x1
(
B
a1x
β1
1
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x1
)
x′2 = x2 + λ2x2
(
B
a2x
β2
2
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x2
) (C.4)
Its fixed points are the solutions of the system

x1
(
B
a1x
β1
1
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x1
)
= 0
x2
(
B
a2x
β2
2
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x2
)
= 0
(C.5)
There are three evident “boundary solutions”:
O = (0, 0) ; E1 = (B, 0) ; E2 = (0, B) (C.6a)
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but O is not a fixed point because the map is not defined in it. There is also a positive
fixed point, given by the solution of the system

B
a1x
β1
1
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x1 = 0
B
a2x
β2
2
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
− x2 = 0
(C.7)
It is possible to see that one and only one solution exists given by
E∗ = (x∗, B − x∗) (C.8)
with x∗ ∈ (0, B) unique solution of the equation
F (x) =
(
a2
a1
)1/(1−β2)
x
(1−β1)/(1−β2) + x−B = 0
obtained from (C.7) after some algebraic manipulations. In fact, F is a continuous
function with F (0) < 0, F (B) > 0 and F ′(x) > 0 for each x > 0. An analytic
expression of the solution is obtained in the case β1 = β2 = β, given by
x∗ = B
1 +
(
a2
a1
) 1
(1−β)
Moreover, under the further assumption a2/a1 = 1, i.e. in the case of identical firms,
we get
E∗ =
(
B
2 ,
B
2
)
(C.10)
With a given set of parameters B, β1 and β2 the positive fixed point E∗ is locally
asymptotically stable for sufficiently small values of the adjustment speeds λ1 and
λ2 and, as usual in dynamic models with adaptive adjustment, the fixed point E∗
loses stability as one or both of the adjustment speeds are increased, after which more
complex attractors are created around the unstable fixed point (see [68], where these
results are obtained through a standard study of the local stability of the positive
fixed point, obtained by a numerical solution of the characteristic equation for the
localization, in the complex plane, of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix). In this
Chapter we are mainly interested in the symmetric case of identical firms, for which
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the Jacobian matrix (3.17) computed at E∗ becomes
J(E∗) =
 1−
λB
2 (1− β/2) −
λBβ
4
−λBβ4 1−
λB
2 (1− β/2)
 (C.11)
hence the eigenvalues at the positive fixed point are λ|| = 1− 12λB, with eigendirection
along ∆ and λ⊥ = 1 − 12λB(1 − β) with eigendirection orthogonal to ∆. It is easy
to see that the steady state E∗ is locally asymptotically stable for λB < 4 and
0 < λB (1− β) < 4, however only the first condition is important as only values of
βi ∈ (0, 1] are meaningful in applications, see [91].
C.3 Model (3.12) with n = 2
For the model (3.12) with n = 2, given by
T :

x′1 = x1 + λ1x1
B a1a2β1xβ11 xβ22
x1
(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)2 − 1

x′2 = x2 + λ2x2
B a1a2β2xβ11 xβ22
x2
(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)2 − 1

(C.12)
The fixed points are the solutions of the system a1a2Bβ1x
β1
1 x
β2
2 − x1
(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)2
= 0
a1a2Bβ2x
β1
1 x
β2
2 − x2
(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)2
= 0
(C.13)
The solutions must belong to the line
x2 =
β2
β1
x1 (C.14)
and plugging this equation into the first equilibrium condition we obtain xβ1+β21 F (x1) =
0, where
F (x) = a2
a1
(
β2
β1
)β2
(Bβ1 − 2x)− xβ1−β2+1 −
(
a2
a2
)2 (β2
β1
)2β2
x
β2−β1+1
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If x∗ > 0 is a zero of the function F , then the point E∗ = (x∗1, x∗2), where x∗2 is computed
according to (C.14), is a fixed point of (C.12). As F (x) is continuous with
F (0) = a2
a1
(
β2
β1
)β2
Bβ1 > 0
F
(
Bβ1
2
)
= −
xβ1−β2+1 + (a2
a1
)2 (β2
β1
)2β2
x
β2−β1+1
 < 0
then a solution x∗ ∈
(
0, Bβ12
)
exists. Moreover, as
F ′(x) = −2a2
a1
(
β2
β1
)β2
+ (β1 − β2 + 1)xβ1−β2 +
(
a2
a1
)2 (β2
β1
)2β2
(β2 − β1 + 1)xβ2−β1
uniqueness of such solution is ensured for x > 0 provided that β1 − β2 + 1 ≥ 0 and
β2 − β1 + 1 ≥ 0, a condition usually satisfied in applications, due to the conditions
βi ∈ (0, 1] (see [91]). Moreover it is always trivially satisfied in the case of equal
elasticities β1 = β2. Indeed, in the case of identical firms β1 = β2 = β; a1 = a2, the
function F (x) becomes F (x) = Bβ − 4x, hence the unique equilibrium is
E∗ = (x∗, x∗) with x∗ = Bβ4
The Jacobian matrix J has entries
J11 = 1− λ1 − λ1Ba1a2β21xβ1−11 xβ22
a1x
β1
1 − a2xβ22(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)3
J12 = λ1β1β2Ba1a2xβ11 xβ2−12
a1x
β1
1 − a2xβ22(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)3
J21 = λ2β1β2Ba1a2xβ1−11 xβ22
a2x
β2
2 − a1xβ11(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)3
J22 = 1− λ2 − λ2Ba1a2β22xβ11 xβ2−12
a2x
β2
2 − a1xβ11(
a1x
β1
1 + a2xβ22
)3
that computed at a point of the diagonal ∆ (and, in particular, at the equilibrium E∗)
becomes a multiple of the identity matrix
J(x, x) = (1− λ)I
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so that the equilibrium is an attracting star node or a repelling star node according to
λ < 2 or λ > 2 respectively. At λ = 2 a degenerate flip bifurcation occurs.

Appendix D
Chaos synchronization, transverse
stability, Milnor attractors and
related bifurcations in
two-dimensional models.
Let consider a dynamic model represented by a map of the plane into itself T :
(x1, x2)→ (x′1, x′2). Let us assume, like in the case of identical competitors, that the
map remains the same if the variables x1 and x2 are swapped, i.e. T ◦S = S ◦T , where
S : (x1, x2)→ (x2, x1) is the reflection through the diagonal
∆ =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2|x1 = x2
}
. (D.1)
This symmetry property implies that the diagonal is mapped into itself, i.e., T (∆) ⊆ ∆
, which corresponds with the obvious statement that, in a deterministic framework,
identical competitors, starting from identical initial conditions, behave identically for
each time. The trajectories embedded into ∆, i.e. characterized by x1(t) = x2(t)
for every t, are called synchronized trajectories, and they are governed by the one-
dimensional map given by the restriction of T to the invariant submanifold ∆
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t)) = T∆(x(t)) with T∆ = T |∆ : ∆→ ∆. (D.2)
A trajectory starting out of ∆, i.e. with x1(0) ̸= x2(0), is said to synchronize if
∥x1(t)−x2(t)∥ → 0 as t→ +∞. A question which naturally arises is whether identical
competitors starting from different initial conditions will synchronize in the long run,
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so that the asymptotic behavior is governed by the simpler one-dimensional model
(D.2). This question can be reformulated as follows. Let As be an attractor of the
one-dimensional map (D.2). Is it also an attractor for the two-dimensional map T?
To answer this question let us consider the Jacobian matrix of T computed at
any point of ∆, say J = {Jij (x)} with the double symmetry property J11 = J22 and
J12 = J21. The two orthogonal eigenvectors of such a symmetric matrix are one parallel
to ∆, say v∥ = (1, 1), and one perpendicular to it, say v⊥ = (1,−1), with related
eigenvalues given by
λ∥ (x) = J11 (x) + J12 (x) and λ⊥ (x) = J11 (x)− J12 (x)
Of course, λ∥ (x) = f ′(x). Since the product of matrices with the structure of J has
the same structure as well, a k-cycle {s1, ..., sk} embedded into ∆ has eigenvalues
λk∥ =
∏k
i=1 λ∥ (si) and λk⊥ =
∏k
i=1 λ⊥ (si), with eigenvectors v∥ and v⊥ respectively. So,
an answer to the question stated above requires a study of the transverse stability,
i.e. stability in the direction orthogonal to ∆. If As is a cycle, then the study of the
transverse stability is the usual one, based on the modulus of the eigenvalues of the
cycle in the direction transverse to ∆. The problem becomes more interesting when As
is a chaotic attractor. Indeed, dynamical systems with chaotic trajectories embedded
into an invariant submanifold of lower dimensionality than the total phase space have
raised an increasing interest in the scientific community because the phenomenon of
chaos synchronization may occur (see e.g. [71], [92], [94], [132]) i.e., the time evolution
of the two competitors synchronize in the long run even if each of them behaves
chaotically. The key property for the study of the transverse stability of a chaotic
attractor As ⊂ ∆ is that it includes infinitely many periodic orbits which are unstable
in the direction along ∆. In this case, Milnor attractors (see [100]) which are not stable
in Lyapunov sense appear quite naturally in this context. To better understand the
meaning of this point, we recall some definitions.
Let A be a closed invariant set such that T (A) ≡ A, and let B (A) denote its basin
of attraction, i.e. is the set of points whose ω-limit set belongs to A.
Definition. A is an asymptotically stable attractor (or topological attractor) if it
is Lyapunov stable, i.e. for every neighborhood U of A there exists a neighborhood V
of A such that T t(V ) ⊂ U ∀t ≥ 0, and B (A) contains a neighborhood of A.
In other words, if A is a topological attractor then a neighborhood W ⊃ A exists
such that T t(x)→ A as t→ +∞ for any x ∈ W . In this case the basin B (A) is an
open set given by B (A) = ⋃t≥0 T−t(W ).
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Definition. A closed invariant set A is said to be a weak attractor in Milnor
sense (or simply Milnor attractor) if its basin of attraction B (A) has positive Lebesgue
measure.
Note that a topological attractor is also a Milnor attractor, whereas the converse
is not true. The more general notion of Milnor attractor has been introduced to
evidence the existence of invariant sets which “attract” many points even if they are not
attractors in the usual topological sense. In this case, [100] denotes B (A) as “Realm of
attraction”, reserving the term “basin” when B (A) is an open set. However, since the
term basin is more standard in the literature, we shall use such term even when A is a
Milnor (but not topological) attractor, for which B (A) is not, in general, an open set.
We now recall some definitions and results related to the problem of chaos synchro-
nization, see e.g. [30], [104]. Let As be a chaotic attractor (with absolutely continuous
invariant measure on it) of the restriction (D.2) of T to ∆. Its attractivity in the
two-dimensional phase space is given in terms of the transverse Lyapunov exponents
Λ⊥ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=0
ln |λ⊥ (si)| (D.3)
where {si = f i(s0), i ≥ 0} is a trajectory embedded in As. For a chaotic set As ⊂ ∆,
infinitely many transverse Lyapunov exponents can be defined: If x(0) belongs to a
k-cycle then Λ⊥ = ln
∣∣∣λk⊥∣∣∣, so that the cycle is transversely stable if Λ⊥ < 0, whereas if
x(0) belongs to a generic aperiodic trajectory embedded inside the chaotic set As then
Λ⊥ is the natural transverse Lyapunov exponent Λnat⊥ , where the term “natural” means
that the Lyapunov exponent associated to the natural, or SBR (Sinai-Bowen-Ruelle),
measure, i.e., computed for a typical trajectory taken in the chaotic attractor As.
Λnat⊥ gives the “average” local behavior of the trajectories in a neighborhood of the
invariant set As and allows one to detect new kinds of bifurcations such as the riddling
bifurcation or the blowout bifurcation. Since infinitely many cycles, all unstable along
∆, are embedded inside a chaotic attractor As, a spectrum of transverse Lyapunov
exponents can be defined, see e.g. [30]
Λmin⊥ ≤ ... ≤ Λnat⊥ ≤ ... ≤ Λmax⊥ (D.4)
The meaning of the inequalities in (D.4) can be intuitively understood on the basis of
the property that Λnat⊥ expresses a sort of “weighted balance” between the transversely
repelling and transversely attracting cycles (see e.g. [131]). If Λmax⊥ < 0, i.e. all the
cycles embedded in As are transversely stable, then As is asymptotically stable, in
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the usual Lyapunov sense, for the two-dimensional map T . However, it may occur
that some cycles embedded in the chaotic set As become transversely unstable, i.e.
Λmax⊥ > 0, while Λnat⊥ < 0. In this case, As is no longer Lyapunov stable, but it continues
to be a Milnor attractor, i.e. it attracts a positive (Lebesgue) measure set of points
of the two-dimensional phase space. So, if A ⊂ ∆ is a chaotic attractor of T |∆ with
absolutely continuous invariant measure, then a sufficient condition for a A to be a
Milnor, but not topological, attractor for the two-dimensional map T , is that: (i) at
least one k-cycle embedded in A is transversely repelling, i.e. Λmax⊥ > 0, and (ii) the
Lyapunov exponent Λnat⊥ is negative. This means that the majority of the trajectories
on A are transversely attracting, but some (even infinitely many) trajectories inside A
can exist whose transverse Lyapunov exponent is positive. In other words, transversely
repelling trajectories can be embedded into a chaotic set which is attracting only “on
average”.
The transition from asymptotic stability to attractivity only in Milnor sense,
marked by a change of sign of Λmax⊥ from negative to positive, is denoted as the riddling
bifurcation (or bubbling bifurcation). Even if the occurrence of such bifurcations is
detected through the study of the transverse Lyapunov exponents, their effects depend
on the action of the nonlinearities far from ∆, that is, on the global properties of the
dynamical system. In fact, after the riddling bifurcation two possible scenarios can be
observed according to the fate of the trajectories that are locally repelled along (or
near) the local unstable manifolds of the transversely repelling cycles (see e.g. [44],
[80], [133], [62]):
(L) they can be reinjected towards ∆, so that the dynamics of such trajectories
are characterized by some bursts far from ∆ before synchronizing on it (a very long
sequence of such bursts, which can be observed when Λ⊥ is close to zero, has been
called on-off intermittency, see e.g. [114], [104]);
(G) they may belong to the basin of another attractor, in which case the phenomenon
of riddled basins is obtained, see [80], [44].
Some authors call local riddling the situation (L) and, by contrast, global riddling
the situation (G) (see [104], [134]). As shown in [62], see also [63], the reinjection of the
locally repelled trajectories can be usefully described by the method of critical curves
and their folding action (see Appendix B, or [34], for more details on critical curves).
When also Λnat⊥ becomes positive, due to the fact that the transversely unstable periodic
orbits embedded into As have a greater weight as compared with the stable ones, a
blowout bifurcation occurs, after which As is no longer a Milnor attractor, because it
attracts a set of points of zero measure, and becomes a chaotic saddle, see [30]. Also
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the macroscopic effect of a blowout bifurcation is strongly influenced by the behavior of
the dynamical system far from the invariant submanifold ∆: The trajectories starting
close to the chaotic saddle may be attracted by some attracting set far from ∆ or
remain inside a two-dimensional compact set located around the chaotic saddle As,
inside which on-off intermittency occurs.
As noticed by many authors, (see e.g. [104], [30], [94], [133], [64], [62]), even if
the occurrence of riddling and blowout bifurcations is detected through the transverse
Lyapunov exponents, i.e. from a local analysis of the linear approximation of the map
along ∆, their effects are determined by the global properties of the map.

Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 2 of Chapter 4
Let us rewrite the map T as follows:
T :

x
′ = Ax−Bx2 + Cxr
r
′ = r
r+(1−r)eDx−βξ
(E.1)
where
A = 1 + α− Na0q02γ ; B =
α
k
; C = N2γ (a0q0 − a1q1) ; D = β
a20q0 − a21q1
4γ (E.2)
and let us consider the second iterate of the map T , i.e.
T 2 :

x
′ = (Ax−Bx2 + Cxr)
(
A+ C r
r+(1−r)eDx−βξ
)
−B (Ax−Bx2 + Cxr)2
r
′ =
r
r+(1−r)eDx−βξ
r
r+(1−r)eDx−βξ+
(
1− r
r+(1−r)eDx−βξ
)
eD(Ax−Bx2+Cxr)−βξ
(E.3)
Its restriction to the invariant line r = 1 is
T 2|r=1 :

x
′ = F (Fx−Bx2)−B (Fx−Bx2)2
r
′ = 1
(E.4)
where
F = A+ C = 1 + α− Na1q12γ . (E.5)
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The map T 2 can have at most four fixed points, given by the solutions of the equation
x
(
B3x3 − 2FB2x2 + FB (1 + F )x+ 1− F 2
)
= 0 (E.6)
from which we obtain
E01 = (0, 1) , E∗1 = (x∗1, 1) , E∗11 = (x∗11 , 1) and E∗21 = (x∗21 , 1) (E.7)
where x∗1 is given by (4.13) and x∗11 = 1+F+
√
F 2−3−2F
2B , x
∗2
1 = 1+F−
√
F 2−3−2F
2B .
Assuming the existence of period-2 cycle {(x∗11 , 1) , (x∗21 , 1)} of T is equivalent to
the existence of E∗11 and E∗21 for T 2 which, requiring also x∗11 > 0, x∗21 > 0, implies
F > 3, i.e. α− 2 > Na1q12γ . The Jacobian matrix associated to T 2 along the restriction
r = 1 is
J2 (x, 1) =
(F − 2Bx) (F − 2BFx+ 2B2x2) J212 (x, 1)
0 J222 (x, 1)
 (E.8)
where J222 (x, 1) = eD(Fx−Bx
2+x)−2βξ, from which we have the condition for transverse
stability of E∗11 and E∗21 , given by J222 (x∗11 , 1) = J222 (x∗21 , 1) < 1. By trivial algebra we
obtain the condition
D
(
F + 1
B
)
− 2βξ < 0 (E.9)
Substituting for D, F and B, we obtain
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − 2ξ < 0 (E.10)
By similar calculation, the condition to have stable the transverse manifold of the fixed
point E∗1 of T 2 is given by
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 (E.11)
From conditions (E.10) and (E.11) it follows that the transverse invariant manifold
of E∗1 is stable and the transverse invariant manifolds of E∗11 and E∗21 are unstable if
and only if
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − 2ξ > 0 >
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − ξ
(E.12)
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which can be rewritten as follows:
ξ − k (a
2
0q0 − a21q1)
2αγ <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 (E.13)
By simple considerations it is easy to note that conditions (E.13) and condition
α− Na1q12γ > 2 required for the existence of E∗11 and E∗21 identify a nonempty set of the
parameter space.
Moreover, from stability condition (E.10) and (E.11) it is easy to note that in order
to have the instability of the transverse invariant manifold of E∗1 and the stability of
the transverse invariant manifolds of E∗11 and E∗21 is required
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − 2ξ < 0 <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 − ξ
(E.14)
which can be rewritten as
k (a20q0 − a21q1)
2αγ − ξ < ξ −
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)
8αγ2 < 0 (E.15)
Since throughout Chaper 4 we always assume a20q0 − a21q1 < 0 and α − Na1q12γ > 2 is
required for the existence of E∗11 and E∗21 , condition (E.15) implies that (|·| is the
absolute value of ·)
|ξ| >
∣∣∣∣∣k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na1q1)8αγ2
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣k (a20q0 − a21q1)2αγ
∣∣∣∣∣ > |ξ| (E.16)
which is a contradiction. It follows that condition (E.15) cannot be satisfied.
Since the condition to have stable (or unstable) transversally manifold of the
period 2-cycle {(x∗11 , 0) , (x∗21 , 0)} of the map T is equivalent to condition to have stable
transverse invariant manifold of each of the two fixed points E∗11 and E∗21 of T 2 and
the condition to have stable (or unstable) transverse invariant manifold of the fixed
point E∗1 are the same for T and T 2, the claim of the proposition follows.

Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 3 of Chapter 4
Let us consider the restriction of T 2, defined in appendix E (see (E.1)), on the invariant
line r = 0
T 2|r=0 :

x
′ = A (Ax−Bx2)−B (Ax−Bx2)2
r
′ = 0
(F.1)
It has at most four fixed points given by the solutions of the equation
x
(
B3x3 − 2B2Ax2 + AB (1 + A)x+ 1− A2
)
= 0 (F.2)
from which we obtain:
E00 = (0, 0) , E∗0 = (x∗0, 0) , E∗10 = (x∗10 , 0) and E∗20 = (x∗20 , 0) (F.3)
where x∗0 is given in (4.10), and x∗10 = 1+A+
√
A2−3−2A
2B , x
∗2
0 = 1+A−
√
A2−3−2A
2B . Assuming
the existence of period-2 cycle {(x∗10 , 0) , (x∗20 , 0)} of T is equivalent to the existence
of E∗10 and E∗20 for T 2 which, requiring also x∗10 > 0 and x∗20 > 0, implies A > 3, i.e.
α− 2 > Na0q02γ . The Jacobian matrix of T 2 along r = 0 is
J2 (x, 0) =
(A− 2Bx) (A− 2BAx+ 2B2x2) J212 (x, 0)
0 J222 (x, 0)
 (F.4)
where J222 (x, 0) = e−D(Ax−Bx
2+x)+2βξ, from which the condition for transverse stability
of E∗10 and E∗20 is J222 (x∗10 , 0) = J222 (x∗20 , 0) < 1. By trivial algebra we obtain the
condition
D
(1 + A
B
)
− 2βξ > 0 (F.5)
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Substituting for D, A and B, we obtain
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − 2ξ > 0 (F.6)
By similar calculation, the condition for transverse stability of the fixed point E∗0 of
T 2 is given by
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − ξ > 0 (F.7)
From the conditions (F.6) and (F.7) it follows that transverse invariant manifold of
E∗0 is unstable and transverse invariant manifolds of E∗10 and E∗20 are stable if and only
if
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − 2ξ
(F.8)
which can be rewritten as follows
ξ − k (a
2
0q0 − a21q1)
2αγ <
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − ξ < 0 (F.9)
By simple considerations it is easy to note that conditions (F.9) and condition α −
Na0q0
2γ > 2 required for the existence of E
∗1
0 and E∗20 identify a nonempty set of the
parameter space.
Moreover, from stability condition (F.6) and (F.7) it is easy to note that in order
to have the stability of the transverse invariant manifold of E∗0 and the instability of
the transverse invariant manifolds of E∗10 and E∗20 is required
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − ξ > 0 >
k (a20q0 − a21q1) (4γ + 2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 − 2ξ
(F.10)
which can be rewritten as follows
0 > −k (a
2
0q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)
8αγ2 + ξ >
k (a20q0 − a21q1)
2αγ − ξ (F.11)
Since throughout Chapter 4 we always assume a20q0 − a21q1 < 0 and α − Na0q02γ > 2 is
required for the existence of E∗10 and E∗20 , condition (F.11) implies that
|ξ| >
∣∣∣∣∣k (a20q0 − a21q1) (2γα−Na0q0)8αγ2
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣k (a20q0 − a21q1)2αγ
∣∣∣∣∣ > |ξ| (F.12)
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which is a contradiction. It follows that condition (F.11) cannot be satisfied.
Since the condition to have stable (or unstable) the transverse invariant manifold
of the two period cycle {(x∗10 , 0) , (x∗20 , 0)} of the map T is equivalent to condition to
have stable (or unstable) the transverse invariant manifold of each of the two fixed
points E∗10 and E∗20 of T 2 and the condition to have stable (or unstable) the transverse
invariant manifold of the fixed point E∗0 are the same for T and T 2, the claim of the
proposition follows.
